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Abstract 
Over the last 20 years there has been a growth in the relative importance of personnel 
economics as an area of economics. However, due to a lack of suitable data most of 
the work in this area has been largely theoretical. It is only in the past decade that 
there has been a growth in the availability of firm-based data sets, making it possible 
for researchers to begin to test some of these ideas empirically. 
This thesis analyses data from a rich source of monthly personnel and payroll 
records from a large banking sector firm. The data is confined to the organisation's 
U. K operations and is available over the period January 1989 to March 1997 (giving 
99 monthly observations). 
Although personnel data of this this sort is available for the US (see, for example, 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) and Lazear (1999)), this is one of the first data 
sets of its kind to be available for the U. K. This thesis focues on three areas of 
personnel economics. It analyses the issues of promotion, absenteeism, and labour 
turnover, paying particular attention in all three cases to gender differences. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Lazear (2000) defines personnel economics as: 
the application of microeconomic principles to human resource issues that 
are of concern to most businesses. 
Personnel economics thus encompasses topics such as hiring, firing, training, com- 
pensation schemes, job design, and worker evaluation. At some level these topics are 
familiar to mainstream economists. Standard production theory, for example, describes 
how much labour should be hired, how it should be combined with capital, and how its 
use varies with wages etc. However, it says little about how wages should be structured to 
motivate workers best, making it of little direct use to organisations and their managers. 
Lazear (2000) asserts that personnel economics attempts to use the tools of economics 
to fill this gap. 
The growth of interest by economists into the internal workings of firms is, however, 
a relatively recent phenomenon. Most of the early work into personnel issues has been 
carried out by industrial psychologists and sociologists. However, a common criticism 
of much of this work is that it lacks a strong theoretical background on which to base 
results. Lazear (2000), for example, argues that: 
the approach taken by the non-economist was unsatisfactory. It was loose, 
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unfocused, and ad hoe, and lacked the general rigorous framework to which 
economists have grown accustomed. 
Despite this, due to a lack of suitable data most of the work undertaken in this area 
by economists has been largely theoretical. This is because until-recently most of the 
data used by empirical economists came from labour market surveys that contained little 
firm-specific information, making inferences about personnel issues difficult to make. 
However, in the last decade there has been a growth in the availability of firm-based data 
sets, making it possible for researchers to begin to test some of these ideas empirically. 
This thesis focuses on three areas of personnel economics. It examines the issues 
of promotion, absenteeism and labour turnover using data from the personnel and pay- 
roll records of a large banking sector firm. This data is confined to the organisation's 
U. K operations and is available over the period January 1989 to March 1997 (giving 99 
monthly observations). Although personnel data of this sort is available for the U. S (see, 
for example, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) and Lazear (1999)), this is one of the 
first data sets of its kind to be available for the U. K. 
Chapter 2 gives a detailed review of this data. It analyses the internal workings of 
the firm looking at the organisation's hierarchical structure, pattern of careers, ports of 
entry and exit and the structure of pay within the organisation. 
An influential paper in setting the agenda in the area of personnel economics is Baker, 
Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994). They use data from the personnel records of a large U. S 
service sector firm over the period 1969 to 1988 to analyse the extent to which the 
arrangements in their organisation characterise an internal labour market. 
Doeringer and Piore (1971) describe an internal labour market as: 
... an administrative unit, such as a manufacturing plant, within which the 
pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative rules 
and procedures. 
It is distinguished from the external labour market, where price setting, allocation 
and training decisions are governed by economic variables, except at defined ports of 
12 
entry and exit. Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that these rules and procedures give, 
in some ways, preferential treatment to 'insiders' over 'outsiders. Workers in an internal 
labour market are, for example, shielded from the competitive influences of the external 
labour-market except at defined ports of entry and exit. 
Chapter 2 also replicates Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's (1994) analysis as far as 
possible in order to examine the extent to which their findings can be regarded as repre- 
sentative of large firms generally, and to what extent they are special. It should be noted 
that Chapter 2 draws heavily on work produced by Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and 
Barmby (2001). 
The pattern of promotion within the organisation is analysed in Chapter 3. An outline 
of some of the economic theory surrounding promotion is presented in Section 3.2, while 
some of the empirical literature on promotion is reviewed in Section 3.3. As will be 
seen, a number of stylised facts emerge when looking at comparisons in human resource 
practices between countries, particularly between Japan and the U. S. For example, a 
common view when looking at the internal workings of a firm is that U. S and Japanese 
organisations differ in their policies towards promotion. Workers in the U. S tend to be 
highly mobile, moving between firms on a regular basis in search of better opportunities. 
Thus, in order to retain their most able workers U. S organisations tend to engage in 
promotion fast-tracking and hence target a few individuals early on for top careers (see 
Rosenbaum (1984), and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994)). In contrast, tenure in large 
Japanese firms tends to be relatively long and Japanese employers often rely heavily 
on internal promotions to fill vacancies. Thus, fewer opportunities are available for 
workers, especially those in mid-career who leave the organisation, making a late selection 
approach to promotion a viable option. Workers, for example, in large Japanese firms are 
typically not differentiated from their cohort until they have been with their organisation 
for between 10 and 15 years, after which considerable career differentiation by ability 
usually occurs (see Aoki (1988)). 
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As will be seen, only a handful of studies have addressed the causes and consequences 
of promotion for the U. K. This chapter thus seeks to add to the limited body of informa- 
tion on promotion in the U. K by investigating whether there is any evidence of promotion 
fast-tracking within the large U. K banking sector organisation outlined in Chapter 2. A 
discrete-time proportional hazard based on the model Proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler 
(1978) is used to study the time before promotion. This approach enables the baseline 
hazard to be estimated non-parametrically, and thus avoids any a priori assumptions 
being made about its shape. 
The issue of worker absenteeism is addressed in Chapter 4. A review of the eco- 
nomic theory surrounding absence, and a summary of some of the empirical literature on 
absenteeism is presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. As will be seen, worker ab- 
senteeism is a serious economic problem resulting in the loss of a large number of working 
days and hence worker productivity and income each year. Vistnes (1997), for example, 
using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, finds that workers in the 
U. S missed approximately 385 million working days due to illness in 1987 (accounting for 
1.9% of their scheduled work time). Similarly, evidence for the United Kingdom suggests 
that approximately 300 million working days were lost annually due to certified incapac- 
ity for work during the 1970s - in comparison, only approximately 8 million working days 
were lost annually over this period due to industrial disputes (Doherty (1979)). However, 
despite these large costs most of the early work on absenteeism has been carried out by 
industrial and organisational psychologists with little input from economists. 
This chapter thus seeks to add to the growing body of economic research on worker 
absence by investigating some of the causes and consequences of absenteeism within our 
large U. K financial sector firm. In this chapter a dynamic model for discrete panel data, 
similar to that proposed by Heckman (1981a), is used to estimate the probability of 
absence using data from the organisation's daily absence records for 1992. The aim of 
this chapter is largely two fold: 
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First, it seeks to investigate the effect past absence has on current absence decisions. 
Since absenteeism is to some extent determined by the individual's state of health the 
worker's absence decision on a given day is unlikely to be independent of whether s/he 
was away from work the previous day. However, the effect past absence has on current 
absence decisions has been largely ignored in most economic studiesý on absence behaviour, 
or has been treated in a purely ad hoc manner. This is surprising given that in the few 
studies that account for past absence the largest and most significant coefficient is usually 
absence lagged one period. As will be seen in Chapter 4 ignoring the lag of absence also 
has important consequences for the significance of the remaining explanatory variables. 
Second, this chapter seeks to add to the empirical evidence on gender differences and 
absenteeism. A common finding of many studies is that female workers are more likely 
to be absent from work than their male counterparts (see, for example, Paringer (1983), 
Allen (1984), Dunn and Youngblood (1986), Drago and Wooden (1992), Barmby, Orme 
and Treble (1991), and Brown, Fakhfakh and Sessions (1999)). However, at present there 
seems to be little agreement as to the main causes of these gender differences. There is, 
for example, some debate in the literature with respect to the effect dependents have on 
absenteeism among women. Leigh (1983) and Vistnes (1997) find that the presence of 
children under 6 years of age increases female absence, while Paringer (1983) finds that 
women with family responsibilities are less likely to be absent. 
Chapter 5 examines the pattern of labour turnover within the firm. Again a brief 
outline of some of the economic theory surrounding labour turnover is presented in Section 
5.2, and a review of the empirical evidence on labour turnover is outlined in Section 5.3. 
Although researchers have a long history of looking at worker separation behaviour in the 
U. S very little attention appears to have been paid by economists into the determinants 
of labour turnover in the U. K. 
This chapter seeks to add to the empirical evidence on labour separation behaviour in 
the U. K by investigating some of the causes and consequences of labour turnover within 
our large banking sector firm. outlined in Chapter 2. Again particular attention is paid 
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in this chapter to the effect gender has on labour turnover. A common finding of most of 
the empirical evidence for the U. S is that females are more likely to leave the firm than 
their male counterparts (see Viscusi (1980), Blau and Kahn (1981), Sicherman (1996) 
and Spurr and Sueyoshi (1993)). This chapter seeks to investigate whether a similar 
pattern of labour separation behaviour arises in the U. K. 
Two modes of analysis are used in this chapter to analyse separation behaviour. 
Firstly, the incidence of separation is estimated using a random effects logistic model. 
Secondly, duration models with competing risks of exit due to quits, layoffs, or other 
reasons are used to estimate the hazard of separation. 
Finally, the general concluding remarks to this thesis are presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Data 
2.1 Introduction 
Until recently most of the data used by economists came from labour market surveys that 
contained little firm-specific information, making inferences about the internal workings 
of firms difficult to make. As a result, most of the early work in the area of personnel 
economics has been largely theoretical. However, in the past decade there has been a 
growth in the availability and use of firm level data sets making it possible for economists 
to begin to test some of these theories empirically. For example, as mentioned earlier 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) use data from the personnel records of a large 
U. S service sector firm over the period 1969 to 1988 to analyse the extent to which the 
arrangements in their organisation characterise Doeringer and Piore's (1971) definition 
of an internal labour market. Similarly, Lazear (1992) studies the internal workings of 
a large U. S corporation using data from the organisation's personnel records over a 13 
year period, while Medoff and Abraham (1980) and Abraham and Medoff (1981) use 
data from the personnel records of two large U. S corporations to analyse the relationship 
between experience, performance ratings and labour earnings. 
In a similar vein this thesis analyses data from the monthly personnel and payroll 
records of a large banking sector firm. This data is confined to the organisation's UR op- 
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erations and is available over the period January 1989 to March 1997 (giving 99 monthly 
observations). Although the firm varies in size over this period overall it employs ap- 
proximately 40,000 full-time employees and 20,000 part-time employeesi. 
Each observation in the data set is identified via a unique staff identification number 
and contains details of the worker's job code, work unit code, salary, bonus, position in 
the hierarchy, date of entry into their current spell of employment, performance rating, 
partial post code of home and work, sex, age, marital status, number of children, ethnic 
origin, and some indicators of educational attainment. 
The aim of this chapter is largely two fold. First, it gives a detailed description of the 
data used in this thesis. In doing so it analyses the firm's hierarchical structure, pattern 
of careers, ports of entry and exit, and the structure of pay. Second, it seeks to replicate, 
as far as possible, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's (1994) analysis in order to examine the 
extent to which their findings can be regarded as representative of large firms generally 
and to what extent they are special. It should be noted that this chapter draws heavily 
on work produced by Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 gives a brief overview of the hier- 
archical structure of the firm. Career patterns are discussed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 
examines the structure of pay within the firm, while implications for future work and the 
conclusions are given in Section 2.5. 
2.2 Hierarchical Structure 
The firm has an explicit hierarchical structure in which workers can be assigned to one 
of 12 levels or grades; grades 2 to 6 represent the clerical grades while grades 7 to 13 
represent the management grades. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 2 examine the transitions between all grades in the hierarchy over 
'It should be noted that the data used in this thesis is confined to the organisation's full-time workers. 
2These tables show transitions between all hierarchical grades, including entry and exit, over the 
period 1989 to 1997 (annual, January to January). The numbers show the movements between the old 
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the period 1989 to 1997. These transitions are year on year giving 348,738 person-year 
transitions. As can be seen in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 these transitions highlight an important 
difference between the clerical and management grades. According to these tables the 
clerical grades appear to be more in the naturO of training grades where promotion is 
largely automatic once certain targets have been met; 52% of workers are, for example, 
promoted from grade 2 to 3. It is only in the transition from grade 5 to 6 that the 
promotion rate for the clerical staff falls to a level similar to that for the managerial 
grades. Thus, grades 2 to 4 can be thought of as being the training grades and grades 5 
to 6 the main clerical grades. 
There is also a distinct difference in promotion rates throughout the management 
grades. From grade 5 onwards the hierarchy is tapered so that the number of employees 
in each grade is always less than the number in the next lower grade. Not surprisingly, 
this causes the promotion rate to fall as workers enter the upper areas of management. 
Promotions from grades 7 and 8 are, for example, awarded to approximately 9% of the 
employees in those grades. However, promotions are harder' to come by for individuals 
in the upper management grades at rates of approximately 5% for those transitions from 
grades 9 and 10, and at rates of just under 2% for the grades above that. 
It should be noted that although Table 2.1 shows a promotion rate of 26.8% from 
grade 2 to 4, analysis of the monthly data reveals that almost all workers progress through 
the hiera rchy by passing through each grade; in this case via grade 3, but are promoted 
into grade 4 within the calendar year. Promotions of more than one grade at a time are 
thus relatively rare. 
Demotions also appear to be relatively rare. As can be seen in Table 2.2 the maximum 
demotion affects individuals in grade 8, where over the period 1989 to 1997 1.4% of 
workers in grade 8 were demoted to grade 7. 
Individuals can also be assigned to three other grades (grades 1,98, and 99) which 
grade (or entry) and the new grade (or exit) as a percentage of the number of employees in the old grade. 
A dot (. ) indicates that the move never occurs, while 0.0 implies a percentage smaller than 0.05. 
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do not appear to be part of the conventional hierarchy. Grades 98 and 99 appear to 
be some sort of 'unclassified' state that is sometimes assigned to new entrants before 
they are given a normal grade. Some employees do, however, remain in these grades 
throughout their entire life with the firm. Grade 1 also appears to be an unusual grade 
that does not fit the organisation's hierarchical structure. The level of employment in 
grade 1 fluctuates widely, and in relation to the rest of the hierarchy individuals in this 
grade can earn significant salaries. 
These three unusual grades are grouped together and given the category 'other' in this 
analysis. As can be seen in Table 2.2 very few individuals move from the main hierarchy 
i. e., grades 2 to 13, to 'other'. Workers do, however, leave 'other' to join grades 2 to 13. 
2.2.1 Stability of the Hierarchy 
Over the period January 1989 to March 1997 the number of full-time individuals employed 
by the firm declined by approximately 20%, from 45,500 to 34,900. Figure 2.1 plots entry 
and exit rates over this period and shows that the decline in the size of the organisation 
has been generated, in the main, by a significant fall in the entry rate between 1990 and 
1992. Since that time both the entry and exit rates have increased to a level above their 
1990 rates, indicating that there has been a subsequent increase in labour turnover. 
Figure 2.2 plots the change in employment between 1989 and 1997 and shows that 
the overall change in employment has been due mainly to a decline in the training and 
clerical grades (grades 2 to 6), while the number of employees in the management grades 
has remained fairly constant over time and their proportions have increased. 
Finally, Figures 2.3,2.4 and 2.5 depict the size of the grades in 1989,1993 and 1997, 
respectively and show that despite the decline in the number of individuals in the clerical 
grades the relative structure of the rest of the hierarchy has remained remarkably stable 
over time. 
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New Grade 
Old Grade Exit 2345 
Entry 7.1 16.6 24.4 13.1 8.0 
2 17.6 1.7 52.0 26.8 1.5 0.2 
3 15.1 35.2 48.1 1.4 
4 11.1 0.0 0.1 70.2 18.0 0.5 
5 9.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 79.8 8.7 
6 7.4 0.0 1.1 83.5 
7 9.6 0.0 0.1 1.3 
8 9.6 0.0 0.1 
9 10.7 0.0 
10 13.0 
11 13.2 
12 17.2 
13 24.1 
Other 14.4 0.8 2.5 4.3 
Total 9.2 0.5 3.0 15.6 25.1 17.7 
Source: Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.1: Transition Matrix between Grades in the Hierarchy - Clerical Grades. 
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New Grade Sample 
Old Grade 789 -- 10 11.12 13 Other Size 
Entry 11.1 3.6 2.3 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 12.4 25297 
2 0.1 2887 
3 0.0 0.0 13182 
4 0.1 0.1 57266 
5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.4 91266 
6 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 60773 
7 79.7 8.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 48382 
8 1.4 79.9 8.7 0.3 0.0 23262 
9 0.1 1.0 83.0 5.0 0.1 0.0 14593 
10 0.0 0.7 80.9 5.3 0.1 0.0 5199 
11 0.2 84.7 2.0 1610 
12 80.9 1.9 309 
13 74.1 1.9 54 
Other 8.4 2.3 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.1 63.7 4658 
Total 13.6 6.9 4.3 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 1.9 348738 
Source: Treble, van Cameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.2: Transition Matrix between Grades in the Hierarchy - Management Grades. 
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2.3 Careers, Entry and Exit 
As mentioned earlier Doeringer and Piore (1971) describe an internal labour market as: 
... an administrative unit, such as a manufacturing plant, within which the 
pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative rules 
and procedures. 
According to Doeringer and Piore (1971) the internal labour market gives, in some 
ways, preferential treatment to 'insiders' over 'ou tsiders' and tends to bias decisions in 
favour of 'insiders' when jobs open up in the hierarchy. They argue that except at defined 
ports of entry and exit, jobs within an internal labour market tend to be filled internally 
through promotions and lateral transfers, so giving employees some protection from the 
competitive influences of the external labour market. 
This section analyses the extent to which careers in our large financial sector firm 
characterise Doeringer and Piore's (1971) definition of an internal labour market, and 
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the degree to which they mimic the pattern of careers outlined in Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom (1994). 
2.3.1 Career Lengths 
According to Doeringer and Piore (1971) the internal labour market guarantees employees 
a certain degree of job security and career progression. Employees do not move from job 
to job in a firm by competing in a series of spot markets, but have careers that tend to 
follow more or less defined paths in the organisation. Doeringer and Piore (1971) assert 
that career paths in an internal labour market tend to be relatively stable over time 
resulting in long term worker-firm attachments. 
Table 2.3 presents some statistics on the career length, age, entry, exit and promotion 
rates of new entrants to the firm 3. The top portion of the table shows the length of 
career those entering the organisation between January 1989 and March 1992 have with 
the firm stratified by the grade at which they entered the organisation'. The results 
presented in Table 2.3 suggest that, in line with the argument outlined above, careers 
in the organisation tend to be relatively long. For example, 49.8% of those individuals 
who entered the firm in grade 6 between January 1989 and March 1992 stayed with the 
organisation for more than 5 years. In contrast, the career length of those workers who 
entered higher up the firm's hierarchy tends to be relatively shorter. For example, only 
26.1% of those who entered the organisation in grades 10 to 13 stayed with the firm 
for more than 5 years. Such a finding can be explained, in part, by the fact that the 
employees who entered higher up the organisation's hierarchy tended to be older when 
they joined the firm. For example, the average age of new hires to grade 8 was 31.8 years, 
compared with only 19 years for new entra nts to grade 2. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 
3 The top portion of the table analyses those individuals who entered the grade from outside between 
January 1989 and March 1992. The middle panel uses all those individuals who entered the firm (at any 
grade) between January 1989 and March 1992, and who are subsequently promoted into the grade up 
to Nlarch 1997. The bottom panel uses all workers in the firm between January 1989 and March 1997. 
4 Individuals who entered the firm between January 1989 and March 1992 are chosen to enable longer 
careers to be analysed without censoring the sample. 
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Grade 
567.8 9 10-13 Other 
No. of outside 
entrants to grade 2424 2426 1923 859 698 882 349 242 99 171 
Percent with 1 
year careers 19.3 22.2 23.6 16.9 11.5 16.9 15.8 16.5 13.1 22.2 
Percent with 2 
year careers 9.9 9.4 8.7 9.1 10.5 17.0 18.9 18.2 25.3 20.5 
Percent with 3 
year careers 6.3 5.3 5.9 5.8 9.6 10.3 12.9 12.4 15.2 11.7 
Percent with 4 
year careers 3.5 4.4 4.7 7.9 9.6 8.3 8.3 10.7 15.2 
Percent with 5 
year careers 6.0 5.0 4.7 7.8 9.0 7.1 6.3 8.3 5.1 5.3 
Average age 
of new hires 19.0 20.3 29.7 28.2 26.5 30.0 31.8 32.6 38.5 26.7 
No. promoted 
into grade 0 1942 3337 2450 1047 875 517 228 352 12 
Average age of 
those promoted 
into grade NIA 19.1 21.1 26.3 27.9 27.1 30.3 32.2 34.8 31.6 
Percent of all 
entrants into 
grade who were 
outside hires 77.2 36.7 26.3 11.8 9.9 18.5 9.7 11.8 12.2 21.9 
Promotion Rate 
(%) per year 80.6 49.7 18.7 9.8 7.9 9.3 9.0 5.2 1.9 21.9 
Exit Rate 
(%) per year 17.6 15.1 11.1 9.4 7.4 9.6 9.6 10.7 13.3 14.4 
Source: Treble, van Cameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.3: Career and Level Characteristics. 
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(1994) produce a similar table and also find evidence of long and varied careers within 
their organisation. 
2.3.2 Ports of Entry and Exit 
Doeringer and Piore (1971) assert that the degree of openness between the internal and 
external labour market is measured by the proportion of ports of entry and exit, and 
the restrictiveness of the entry criteria. They identify two extreme types of internal 
labour markets; closed and open. Workers in a closed internal labour market are hired 
almost exclusively into lower positions in the hierarchy, while all the remaining vacancies 
tend to be filled from the inside. At the opposite extreme is the open internal labour 
market where all vacancies are filled externally. Although the latter reassembles an 
external labour market Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that its administrative rules 
and procedures guarantee that it is still an internal labour market. Not surprisingly, 
most internal labour markets lie somewhere between these two extreme examples. 
The bottom portion of Table 2.3 looks for the existence of ports of entry and exit 
by examining what fraction of those individuals who move into a grade are promoted 
from inside rather than hired from outside the firm, and by looking at exit rates across 
grades. From this it can be seen that grade 2 appears to be a port of entry; 77.2% of 
those individuals who entered the grade between January 1989 and March 1997 do so 
from outside. There also appears to be a relatively high entry level at other points in 
the hierarchy, with the rate of entry into a grade from outside never falling below 9.7%. 
These results thus imply substantial impact of the external market on the firm. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) produce a similar table and find comparable 
results. For instance, in line with Table 2.3 they show that their level I appears to be 
a port of entry; 98.6% of the individuals who entered this level do so from the outside. 
They also find evidence of substantial entry at all other levels. For example, over 25% of 
those entering levels 2 to 4 are recruited from outside. 
Table 2.3 also identifies a distinction in entry rates between the staff and management 
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grades. Entry levels fall as one moves through the staff grades; from 77.2% in grade 2 to 
9.9% in grade 6. However, entry levels appear to be u-shaped in the management grades. 
External entry is relatively high at the lowest rung of the management hierarchy; 18.5% 
at grade 7. It then falls before rising again at the top and is 12.2% in grades 10 to 13. 
There is even less evidence in Table 2.3 for ports of exit. Exit rates are relatively 
uniform across all grades in the hierarchy, never rising above 17.6%. Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom (1994) find a similar result. 
2.3.3 New Hires Verýus Incumbents 
Table 2.3 also shows that, not surprisingly, the average age of the workers rise with 
grade. This is true for both new entrants and those promoted into the grade from within. 
Average age is, however, generally lower for new entrants than those promoted into a 
grade suggesting, in line with Doeringer and Piore's (1971) description of an internal 
labour market, that 'insiders' receive preferential treatment over 'outsiders'. 
Table 2.4 looks more closely at the career attainment of new hires and incumbents 5 
The top portion of the table compares the career progression of those hired into grade 
5 from outside (new hires) with those promoted into grade 5 from within (incumbents) 
over the period January 1989 to March 1992. Relative performance is judged in terms 
of the proportion of these two groups that exit grade 5 (and successive grades) over the 
next 5 years. 
According to these results new entrants generally appear to be more successful in 
their careers with the firm than incumbents. As can be seen, after 1 year 93.78% of 
surviving incumbents were still in grade 5, compared with only 80.91% of surviving new 
hires. After 5 years this figure had fallen to 60.46% for surviving incumbents and 42.23% 
for surviving new hires. Promotions in this organisation are clearly not restricted to 
'The table shows the career performance of those individuals who entered grade 5 between January 
1989 and March 1992 as a percentage of those workers who entered grade 5 over this period and remained 
in the firm. 
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Current New hire/ Years since entering Grade 5 
Grade Incumbent 12345 
2 New hire 
Incumbent 0.02 
3 New hire 0.13 
Incumbent 0.02 0.03 0.02 
4 New hire 0.24 0.40 0.89 1.01 
Incumbent 0.95 1.07 1.17 1.41 1.61 
5 New hire 80.91 65.41 53.39 48.44 42.23 
Incumbent 93.78 84.48 76.23 68.16 60.46 
6 New hire 12.90 18-51 22.58 24.22 27.87 
Incumbent 4.65 12.84 18.95 23.64 27.84 
7 
9 
New hire 2.28 13.52 21.12 21.40 21.11 
Incumbent 0.27 1.19 3.22 6.09 9.24 
New hire 0.37 0.93 3.27 6.08 
Incumbent 0.22 0.56 
New hire 0.13 0.15 0.68 
Incumbent 0.02 
Other New hire 3.63 1.95 1.59 1.63 1.01 
Incumbent 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.48 0.28 
Grade New hire 5.03 5.39 5.61 5.70 5.86 
(average) Incumbent 5.03 5.13 5.23 5.33 5.45 
Grade New hire 0.91 0.96 1.02 1.09 1.10 
(variance) Incumbent 0.34 0.48 O. P9 0.69 0.75 
Exit Rate New hire 17-52 11.43 8.39 10.62 12.17 
M Incumbent 4.56 6.70 7.07 6.49 7.34 
N New hire 902 927 822 753 674 
Incumbent 6488 6196 5782 5374 5025 
Source: 'Reble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.4: Career Attainment: New Hires Versus Incumbents Promoted into Grade 5. 
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incumbents, which implies that the level of firm-specific human capital is not the only 
deciding factor in the firm's promotion decisions. However, as can be seen by looking at 
the summary statistics at the bottom of Table 2.4 although, on average, new hires attain 
a slightly higher grade than incumbents, their outcomes are more variable. Exit rates 
also appear to be higher for new hires than incumbents. For example, after 1 year 17.52% 
of remaining new hires have left the firm, compared with only 4.56% of incumbents. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) produce a similar table, but find slightly different 
results. They compare new hires at level 2 with those promoted into level 2 from within 
and find that although new hires are initially promoted more rapidly than incumbents, 
overall incumbents tend to achieve a higher grade, on average, than new hires. For 
example, they find that after 2 years 19% of new hires had been promoted to level 3, 
compared with only 16% of incumbents. However, after 5 years 33.3% of new hires 
remained in level 2, compared with only 23.7% of incumbents. In contrast, in line with 
Table 2.4 Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) find that outcomes are more variable for 
new hires than those promoted into level 2 from within. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) also compare the career performance of new hires 
and incumbents to level 3. Again they find that while average level attainment is slightly 
higher for those promoted into level 3, outcomes are more variable for new entrants than 
incumbents. Rom this they assert that observing incumbents in their prior grade with 
the firm is a more effective screen than the hiring process. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) also find that exit rates show a similar pattern 
to those in Table 2.4. However, after 7 years this relationship changes and incumbents 
begin to have a higher exit rate than new entrants. Due to a lack of available data it is 
not possible for this finding to be investigated in this analysis. 
2.3.4 Timing of Adjacent Promotions 
The nature of the screening process can also provide useful information on the pattern 
of promotion within the firm. For example, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) assert 
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Years in Years in Current Grade 
Previous Grade Statistic 12345 
I Promotion Rate 19.89 28.31 21.41 11.92 15.11 12.11 9.11 
Exit Rate (%) 10.54 13.36 9.59 11-13 7.68 9.62 9.75 
Number of Workers 3625 2522 1471 1015 781 603 472 
2 Promotion Rate 7.73 13.50 14.37 10.17 13.36 11.45 8.15 
Exit Rate (%) 6.86 9.23 6.19 7.80 8.17 8.42 7.67 
Number of Workers 3132 2675 2067 1642 1347 1057 847 
3 Promotion Rate 4.16 9.54 10.59 7.95 10.18 8.09 7.94 
Exit Rate (%) 5.57 8.92 6.64 9.14 6.96 9.42 10.17 
No. of Workers 2334 2107 1718 1422 1179 977 806 
4 Promotion Rate 3.02 7.31 7.01 5.74 8.50 7.35 6.78 
Exit Rate (%) 4.60 8.40 9.41 5.96 6.50 5.88 9.83 
No. of Workers 696 643 542 453 400 340 295 
5 Promotion Rate 1.45 3.07 7.51 5.31 4.52 4.62 4.62 
Exit Rate (%) 3.78 7.06 8.87 4.49 7.24 6.67 10.40 
No. of Workers 344 326 293 245 221 195 173 
6 Promotion Rate 3.05 5.43 7.32 2.99 9.92 3.85 4.17 
Exit Rate (%) 3.55 5.43 10.98 6.72 4.13 3.85 9.38 
No. of Workers 197 184 164 134 121 104 96 
7+ Promotion Rate 2.39 3.12 2.91 3.42 2.66 2.17 3,18 
Exit Rate (%) 3.37 9.47 8.19 7.28 5.16 7.04 10.54 
No. of Workers 919 866 757 673 601 554 503 
Total Promotion Rate 9.90 14.69 12.66 ' 8.36 10.54 8.43 7.02 
Exit Rate (%) 7.20 10-09 7.70 8.36 7.10 8.22 9.46 
No. of Workers 11247 9323 7012 5584 4650 3830 3192 
Table 2.5: Promotion and Exit Rates - All Workers. 
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that if the purpose of promotion is to sort individuals on the basis of their ability then 
those promoted quickly once should be promoted quickly again. Alternatively, if firm- 
specific human capital accumulation is important for promotion, and individuals learn at 
approximately the same rate, then those promoted quickly once will have accumulated 
less firm-specific human capital and so will have to wait longer for their next promotion. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) investigate this issue by examining the relation- 
ship between the time to promotion from level I to level 2 versus the time to promo- 
tion/exit from level 2, and find evidence of promotion fast-tracking within their firm. In 
other words, those promoted quickly at one level tend to be promoted more often and 
more quickly at the next level. 
In a similar way, Table 2.5 investigates the existence of promotion fast-tracking within 
our large financial sector firm 6. However, it considers transitions between all grades, 
rather than just the level 1 to level 2 transitions which Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 
(1994) focus on. As can be seen in Table 2.5, in line with Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 
(1994), looking down columns the promotion rate tends to fall as the time spent by 
workers in their previous grade increases, thereby providing some preliminary evidence 
for the existence of promotion fast-tracking within the firm. 
Table 2.5 also quite surprisingly finds evidence of a fast-track exit effect in which 
the very individuals who were targeted for rapid promotion also appear to be the ones 
most likely to leave the firm. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstorm (1994) find a similar result 
and argue that such a finding could be the result of some high ability workers not being 
optimally employed by the organisation, or that the firm may not be paying individuals 
according to their expected marginal products. 
The results reported in Table 2.5 are explored further in Chapter 3. In particular, it 
investigates whether the fast-track effects identified in Table 2.5 survive after controlling 
for other factors, such as human capital effects. 
6The table shows promotion and exit rates by time in the current grade, versus the time spent by 
workers in their previous grade. 
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2.4 Wages and the Hierarchy 
The second major aspect of Doeringer and Piore's (1971) description of an internal labour 
market relates to wages and how they are determined in an internal labour market. 
Doeringer and Piore (1971) assert that wages in an internal labour market are not set on 
an individual basis, but are determined by a set of administrative rules and procedures 
that assign wages to jobs. According to Doeringer and Piore (1971): 
The process of job evaluation consists in rating a job in each of the following 
categories and adding the points across categories to determine point totals. 
This is typically done once for all jobs ... when a job evaluation plan is 
first 
introduced. Jobs are then re-evaluated only when they are thought for one 
reason or another to have changed. New jobs are, of course, evaluated when 
they are introduced. The job-evaluation point totals serve as a device for 
arranging jobs in a pay hierarchy (page 67). 
This section examines the structure of pay within our large financial sector organisa- 
tion in order to examine the extent to which it fits Doeringer and Piore's (1971) descrip- 
tion of an internal labour market, and the degree to which it is similar to that outlined 
in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994). Basic pay is set at a competitive market-related 
level, and is reviewed annually, and upon promotion and demotion etc. Although the 
basic component of the worker's pay is not linked to performance the employees receive 
an annual bonus that is based on their annual performance and the performance of the 
unit to which they are assigned'. 
7 The way pay is set in the firm is largely in accordance with the findings of Brown (1990). He shows 
that, in line with predictions, due to the high costs of monitoring, large firms make a significantly greater 
use of standard rate pay than pay schemes that link the majority of pay directly to output/performance. 
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2.4.1 Pay Ranges and Grades 
Figures 2.6,2.7 and 2.8 plot the mean annual basic salary over the period January 1989 
to March 1997 for, workers in the clerical, lower management and upper management 
grades, respectively. As can be seen from these figures promotion appears to be the main 
way of obtaining salary advancement within the firm. Not surprisingly, individuals in 
the higher grades earn on average more than those in the lower grades. Baker, Gibbs 
and Holmstrom (1994) produce a similar figure and find comparable results. 
Figure 2.6 also shows that the mean wage differentials between the clerical grades 
remain approximately the same over time. However, as can be seen in Figures 2.7 and 
2.8 the same does not appear to be true for the management grades. Here there has been 
an increase in the mean wage differential between the lowest and highest management 
grades. In fact, between January 1989 and March 1997 workers in the lowest management 
grades experienced a slight fall in their real wages, while those in grade 13 received an 
approximate 25% increase in their real wages. 
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 plot the relationship between salary and grade in a typical year, 
1990, for both the clerical and managerial grades, respectively. As can be seen the 
relationship between salary and grade is clearly convex; mean pay in grade 12 is, for 
example, approximately 15 times greater than mean pay in grade 5 (the lowest non- 
training grade). Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) find a similar result. Such a 
finding is in line with many incentive-based theories e. g., tournament theory (see Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986))'. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 also show that there appears 
to be substantial overlap of pay between grades. Pay is thus not determined solely by 
grade and consequently promotion is not the only means of salary advancement in the 
firm. Again, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) find comparable results. 
Table 2.6 examines the relationship between wages and grade in more detail. Baker, 
Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) estimate four wage regressions comparing the explanatory 
power of human capital variables (education and tenure, with demographic control) and 
8A more detailed analysis of tournament theory is presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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level (grade) dummies. From this they show that human capital variables explain about 
35% of the variance in salary, while level dummies are much more important accounting 
for nearly 68% of the variance in salary. 
Table 2.6 replicates these wage regressions as far as possible9. However, the education 
variables used in this study are not as detailed as Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's (1994), 
and only include dummies for degree (= I if the individual has a degree) and professional 
qualification (= 1 if the individual has a professional qualification). As can be seen in 
Table 2.6 human capital variables account for 57% of the variance in salary. However, in 
line with Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) grade dummies are much more powerful 
accounting for 90% of the variance in salary. 
2.4.2 Pay Premiums 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) argue that if wages are determined by levels (grades) 
then workers should earn large pay premiums upon promotion. Table 2.7 investigates 
this relationship in more detail. The middle three columns of Table 2.7 calculate the 
percentage mean change in real salary (across years) for those individuals who stay where 
they are, are demoted, or promoted, relative to the mean rise (that year) of all individuals 
who do not change grade. As can be seen in Table 2.7 there are premiums for promotions 
and a small negative premium for demotions. Table 2.7 shows that on average promotions 
result in a 11.9% rise in salary while demotions result in a 2.6% fall in salary. 
The final column of Table 2.7 shows the average (across years) percentage difference 
in mean salary between grades. As can be seen, the difference in average salary between 
grades is always greater than the average premiums individuals earn on promotion into 
the grade. For example, mean pay is, on average, 25.6% higher in grade 4 than grade 
3. However, the promotion premiums workers earn upon changing grade accounts, on 
9The dependent variable in all these regressions is the log of total salary (including bonus pay). The 
first three regressions are pooled cross-sections over 1989 to 1997, while the final regression shows a 
single cross-section for 1989. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
43 
Independent 
Variables 
Year Dummies 
Sex Dummy 
Intercept 
Degree 
Professional 
Qualification 
Tenure 
Tenure Squared 
Grade 4 
Grade 5 
Grade 6 
Grade 7 
Grade 8 
Grade 9 
Grade 10 
Grade 11 
Grade 12 
R-squared 
R-squared regression 
w/o year dummies 
N 
Dependent Mean 
1989-1997 Pooled Regressions 1989 
Human Capital Levels Combined Cross-Section 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes No Yes Yes 
8.91 8.52 8.49 8.70 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.01) 
0.65 0.09 0.10 
(0-003) (0.002) (0.004) 
0.05 -0-05 -0.05 
(0.002) (0.0008) (0.002) 
0.04 0.03 0.03 
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
-0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 
(0.00001) (5.24e-06) (0.00002) 
0.34 0.26 0.17 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.01) 
0.59 0.43 0.35 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.01) 
0.79 0.59 0.50 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.01) 
1.05 0.85 0.80 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.01) 
1.34 1.11 1.07 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.01) 
1.67 1.43 1.40 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.01) 
2.14 1.90 1.85 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.01) 
2.73 2.48 2.50 
(0-006) (0.005) (0.02) 
3.02 2.77 2.70 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
0.57 0.90 0.92 0.94 
0.51 0.82 0.87 
180251 180251 180251 20226 
9.6 9.6 9.6 9.5 
Source: Treble, van Garneren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.6: Effects of Human Captial and Hierarchical Levels on Current Salary. 
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% salary premium on % diff. in mean 
Grade Stay Demotion Promotion pay across levels 
2 3.7 3.6 NIA NIA 
3 1.9 -1.4 0.9 6.4 
4 0.9 -0.2 16.2 25.6 
5 0.3 -0.4 10.6 25.5 
6 -0.3 -7.2 8.0 23.0 
7 -1.4 -4.7 19.3 24.5 
8 -1.5 -4.0 10.3 32.4 
9 0.5 -5.3 14.4 41.1 
10 -0.8 -5.0 9.5 46.7 
11 -1.5 N/A 4.5 53.2 
12 1.2 NIA 5.3 39.2 
13 0.2 N/A 4.6 71.7 
2-13 0.0 -2.6 11.9 
Source: Treble, van Garneren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.7: Salary Premiums by Type of Job 'Iýransistion and Across Levels. 
average, for only 16.2% of this change in salary. Thus, promotion premiums explain 
only part of the difference in pay between grades. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) 
produce a similar table and find comparable results. 
It should be noted that for promotions to grades 4,5 and 7 the proportion of the 
total pay differential obtained on promotion is large in comparison to other promotions 
in this firm and relative to Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's (1994) results. Thus, as 
conjectured earlier, promotions to grades 4 and 5 are more standards based than others, 
while promotion to grade 7 represents a promotion to the first management grade and is 
thus rewarded by a large increase in salary. 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 examine the distribution of pay for promotees in salary deciles'O. It 
'OSalary deciles are calculated within each hierarchical grade and year. The difference in the number 
of observations before and after promotion arises because of missing salary data. 
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examines where promotees come from in the pay distribution in their prior job and where 
they go to in the pay distribution in their new job. If the grades were non-overlapping 
intervals of salary, such that a grade number simply indicated a range of compensation, 
then grade would be determined by pay. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) suggest 
that if this were the case then individuals would always be promoted out of the top 
decile and into the bottom decile of successive grades. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show that there 
are wide variations in which deciles employees come from and go to. For example, only 
6.6% of workers promoted into grade 3 are from the top decile of their previous salary 
range, while 12.1% are from the lowest decile. However, in the management grades there 
appears to be a slight tendency for individuals to be promoted from the higher end of 
their previous salary range. For example, 37.4% of workers promoted into grade 10 are 
from the top decile of their previous salary range. There also appears to be a small 
tendency for promotees to enter their new grade at the lower end of the salary range; 
33.8% of workers promoted into grade 5, for example, entered at the lowest salary decile. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) produce a similar table and find broadly compa- 
rable results. In particular, they observe wide variations in which deciles employees come 
from and go to. Nevertheless, they also find that there is a slight tendency for workers 
to be promoted from the top decile of their previous salary range into the lower end of 
their new salary range. 
Table 2.10 compares the pattern of exit by grade and salary decile". It shows that 
there are statistically significant variations in exit rates between deciles, although a clear 
overall pattern is difficult to ascertain. However, as can be seen in Table 2.10 the exit 
rates for the management grades 8 to 10 appear to be increasing with the salary deciles 
within each grade. This suggests that there could be some promotion bottlenecks within 
the organisation, causing workers who are tired of waiting for promotion to leave the firm. 
"Annual percentage exit rates are shown in this table. Deciles are calculated within each hierarchical 
grade and year. The last column shows X2 statistics for the hypothesis that exit rates for all deciles in a 
grade are the same. Critical values for the X2 -test are 21.67 at the 1% and 16.92% at the 5% significance 
level. 
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Percentage in each salary decile 
Promotion Statistic N Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Grade 2 to Decile before promotion 1502 12.1 12.3 10.7 11.2 10.5 
Grade 3 Decile after prorntion 1500 16.4 13.8 9.5 11.4 15.9 
Grade 3 to Decile before promotion 6317 8.5 9.6 11.2 10.4 11.8 
Grade 4 Decile after promotion 6298 33.4 10.4 13.3 5.9 5.4 
Grade 4 to Decile before promotion 10200 5.5 8.5 9.9 11.4 12.9 
Grade 5 Decile after promotion 10165 33.8 16.8 11.7 9.2 8.2 
Grade 5 to Decile before promotion 7859 9.8 10.3 10.0 9.3 9.2 
Grade 6 Decile after promotion 7820 30.2 17.8 16.3 13.0 7.8 
Grade 6 to Decile before promotion 4673 16.0 17.0 12.1 9.1 8.6 
Grade 7 Decile after promotion 4663 28.7 18.5 10.4 13.6 12.7 
Grade 7 to Decile before promotion 4260 6.2 4.6 7.2 7.8 8.4 
Grade 8 Decile after promotion 4244 29.1 14.8 13.3 13.2 6.4 
Grade 8 to Decile before promotion 1983 3.9 3.9 5.2 6.8 9.0 
Grade 9 Decile after promotion 1984 25.8 20.7 15.6 8.2 7.8 
Grade 9to Decile before promotion 696 0.9 1.0 1.9 2.6 3.9 
Grade 10 Decile after promotion 701 20.5 17.1 12.6 10.1 8.8 
Grade 10 to Decile before promotion 260 0.4 0.8 0.8 2.3 3.7 
Grade 11 Decile after promotion 263 15.5 13.2 7.9 9.7 11.8 
Grade 11 to Decile before promotion 28 0.0 0.0 3.6 14.3 10.7 
Grade 12 Decile after promotion 27 11.1 22.2 33.3 18.5 1.9 
Source: Treble, van Carneren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.8: Distribution of Pay for Promotees in Salary Deciles Before and After Promo- 
tion - Lower Deciles. 
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Percentage in each salary decile 
Promotion Statistic N 6th 7th 8th 9th Top 
Grade 2 to Decile before promotion 1502 10.6 9.7 8.7 7.7 6.6 
Grade 3 Decile after prorntion 1500 10.0 6.6 6.2 6.5 3.6 
Grade 3 to Decile before promotion 6317 11.1 9.3 9.7 10.1 8.2 
Grade 4 Decile after promotion 6298 6.7 5.4 13.1 3.6 2.7 
Grade 4 to Decile before promotion 10200 11.3 10.3 9.9 11.7 8.4 
Grade 5 Decile after promotion 10165 7.2 5.7 2.9 2.7 1.9 
Grade 5 to Decile before promotion 7859 10.4 10.0 11.0 11.9 8.1 
Grade 6 Decile after promotion 7820 4.8 2.9 3.2 2.6 1.3 
Grade 6 to Decile before promotion 4673 7.9 8.4 7.3 6.7 6.9 
Grade 7 Decile after promotion 4663 7.1 3.5 2.3 1.7 1.5 
Grade 7 to Decile before promotion 4260 10.0 10.0 13.0 14.1 18.7 
Grade 8 Decile after promotion 4244 6.3 5.2 3.5 3.0 5.3 
Grade 8 to Decile before promotion 1983 9.8 11.9 10.6 16.1 22.7 
Grade 9 Decile after promotion 1984 6.3 3.3 2.7 2.7 7.0 
Grade 9 to Decile before promotion 696 7.7 11.8 12.8 20.1 37.4 
Grade 10 Decile after promotion 701 6.3 4.0 5.0 6.3 9.3 
Grade 10 to Decile before promotion 260 6.7 7.1 16.5 29.1 32.7 
Grade 11 Decile after promotion 263 8.9 10.5 6.5 8.1 7.9 
Grade 11 to Decile before promotion 28 20.7 6.1 14.3 19.6 10.7 
Grade 12 Decile after promotion 27 4.4 0.7 1.9 5.9 0.0 
Source: Treble, van Cameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.9: Distribution of Pay for Promotees in Salary Deciles Before and After Promo- 
tion - Upper Deciles. 
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Exit rate in each decile x2 Grade N Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th gtli Top value 
2 2887 13.6 13.7 14.3 14.8 19.7 19.1 21.3 19.8 19.4 20.4 14.1 
3 13042 10.8 11,0 10.0 14.7 17.1 15.9 18.8 19.3 16.9 15.8 87.6 
4 56772 10.0 10.1 10.6 10.5 12.0 11.7 11.6 12.2 11.2 9.5 40.0 
5 90721 9.6 9.9 10.7 10.5 9.7 9.1 9.1 8.3 8.0 9.2 65.3 
6 60331 7.5 7.8 7.5 6.4 6.7 7.3 6.9 8.1 8.2 7.8 25.1 
7 47983' 13.6 8.3 6.9 7.1 9.0 8.5 9.9 9.9 10.8 12.2 205.1 
8 22958 7.8 7.0 7.9 8.1 8.1 9.7 10.1 11.6 11.7 14.4 116.7 
9 14285 6.7 7.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 11.9 10.4 11.9 13.8 15.7 92.7 
10 4925 13.4 10.9 9.6 13.7 11.5 12.0 16.5 11.8 14.0 16.1 17.0 
11 1497 14.8 13.2 12.0 11.5 15.0 16.0 8.9 10.7 10.1 15.2 7.3 
12 263 23.1 19.6 13.7 27.6 7.1 6.4 6.0 11.1 27.4 13.8 9.1 
Total 320109 12.0 11.4 11.3 10.2 8.7 7.8 7.8 8.5 9.1 11.7 796.5 
Source: Treble, van Cameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.10: Exit Rate in each Decile. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) produce a similar table, but find little significant 
variation in exit rates across salary deciles within their organisation. 
2.4.3 'Green Card' Effects 
Finally, Table 2.11 examines what Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) term'Green Card' 
effects 12 . Many organisations have explicitly set guidelines/rules that impose bounds on 
pay increases. For example, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) report that the firm 
studied in their paper issues guidelines on pay progression based on performance relative 
to some reference group, and the worker's performance ratings". These guidelines are 
examples of the kinds of administrative rules and procedures that an internal labour 
12 The table shows the mean perce ' ntage salary rise 
in 1989 constant pounds by performance rating in 
the same period. Performance is rated on a scale from I (worst) to 5 (best). 
13 These rules are printed on green cards, hence the term 'Green Card' effects. 
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market might operate to determine pay progression in the organisation. Although no 
such explicit rules exist within our large financial sector firm, this table is still replicated 
in order to examine whether the effects operate implicitly. 
As in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) each employee is placed in a salary quartile 
prior to each pay rise. Table 2.11 thus presents the mean percentage real rise in salary 
stratified by the quartile of pay versus the employee's performance rating in each period. 
In Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) the rules operate in such a way that they tend to 
generate pay compressions within grades. Table 2.11 finds a similar result for workers in 
the staff grades. For example, employees in the higher quartiles tend to receive smaller 
pay increases than those in the lower quartiles. However, in contrast to Baker, Gibbs 
and Holmstrom (1994) there is evidence of pay dispersion in the management grades and 
workers in the higher quartiles tend to receive bigger pay increases than those in the lower 
quartiles. If the main means of pay progression within the firm is by winning promotion 
tournaments high pay spreads might induce less co-operative behaviour and a 'too high' 
degree of competition among the workers. However, one way round this problem is to 
give individual rewards, such as bonuses, which is what occurs in this firm. 
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Level Salary Performance Rating 
Quartile 1-2 345 1-5 
3 Top 2.0 3.6 4.5 3.4 4.0 
3rd 2.7 3.8 4.9 4.7 4.3 
2nd 1.7 4.6 5.9 7.6 5.1 
Bottom 1.5 5.7 6.7 8.8 5.9 
N 98 2527 1561 111 4297 
4 Top 3.2 3.8 3.4 1.8 3.3 
3rd 1.8 2.6 2.8 3.6 2.8 
2nd 3.4 3.8 4.5 5.4 4.2 
Bottom 1.2 4.5 5.3 5.8 4.9 
N 456 16454 18609 3368 38887 
5 Top 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.3 
3rd 2.8 2.8 2.2 3.1 2.6 
2nd 2.1 3.1 3.8 4.2 3.6 
Bottom 3.7 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.1 
N 382 20110 35344 14544 70380 
6 Top 1.0 1.5 2.1 1.7 1.8 
3rd 0.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
2nd 1.4 2.1 2.9 4.3 3.0 
Bottom 2.3 3.4 4.1 4.5 3.9 
N 239 10496 22144 15368 48247 
7 Top -1.4 0.8 3.8 4.0 1.5 
3rd -2.5 0.6 2.3 3.2 0.9 
2nd -1.7 0.8 4.2 3.0 1.4 
Bottom 0.7 1.0 2.6 3.6 1.2 
N 1044 24741 5859 567 32211 
8 Top -1.2 0.9 4.0 4.8 1.9 
3rd -2.5 0.4 2.4 3.5 1.0 
2nd -1.9 0.6 2.6 4.6 1.1 
Bottom -1.7 0.7 2.3 4.5 1.1 
N 397 11283 4358 398 16436 
9 Top -0.2 0.9 5.1 5.2 3.1 
3rd -0.8 1.8 3.2 4.7 2.5 
2nd -1.5 0.9 2.6 3.8 1.6 
Bottom -0.4 0.5 2.2 3.0 1.0 
N 186 6000 3926 436 10548 
Source: Treble, van Carneren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.11: 'Green Card' Effects of Relative Salary in Title on Raises, by Performance 
Rating. 
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Level Salary Performance Rating 
Quartile 1-2 345 1-5 
10 Top -0.5 0.9 8.5 24.5 7.7 
3rd -18.4 -0.6 2.0 5.3 1.1 
2nd -5.5 -0.6 2.0 6.1 0.7 
Bottom -4.2 -0.5 -0.1 3.5 -0.3 
N 26 1621 1587 196 3430 
2-12 Top -1.7 0.7 4.8 3.3 2.1 
3rd -0.1 1.4 2.5 2.3 2.0 
2nd 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.2 
Bottom 2.2 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.0 
N 2834 93528 94214 35133 255709 
Source: Treble, van Cameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Table 2.12: 'Green Card' Effects of Relative Salary in Title on Raises, by Performance 
Rating, cont'd. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter gives a detailed analysis of the large U. K financial sector firm used in this 
thesis. It examines the organisation's hierarchical structure, pattern of careers, ports of 
entry and exit, and the structure of pay. It also seeks to replicate Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom's (1994) analysis as far as possible in order to gauge the extent to which their 
findings can be regarded as characteristic of large firms generally, and to what extent they 
are specific. Although the two organisations operate in different countries, with different 
employment law, regulations and educational systems the results reported in this chapter 
show that the structure of the two firms are, nevertheless, remarkably similar. 
The first section of this chapter examines the pattern of careers within our large 
financial sector organisation and finds that the firm, like Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's 
(1994), has an explicit hierarchical structure that is relatively stable over time. Workers 
in our large financial sector firm can be assigned to one of 13 levels or grades; grades 2 
to 6 are the main clerical grades, and grades 7 to 13 the main management grades. 
In line with Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) there is also evidence that the 
internal labour market is allocating workers to jobs in the firm. Careers in this firm, 
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for example, tend to be relatively long and demotions are rare. There is, however, no 
evidence in either organisation to support the idea of defined ports of entry and exit; 
entry and exit can occur at all grades/levels. 
Employers in both organisations also tend to use lower level job performance to learn 
about the innate abilities of their workers and use this information in their subsequent 
promotion decisions. Such an inference is supported by the existence of fast-track pro- 
motion effects in which those promoted quickly at one grade/level tend to be promoted 
more often and more quickly at the next grade/level. There is also, quite surprisingly, 
evidence of a fast-track exit effect in both firms in which the very individuals who are 
targeted for rapid promotion also appear to be the ones most likely to leave the organisa- 
tion. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) argue that such a finding could be the result 
of their so-called 'Green Card' effects. In other words, administrative constraints in the 
way pay is awarded may prevent the firm from giving their best workers large enough 
pay rises to retain them. 
The second section of this chapter examines the structure of pay within our large 
financial sector organisation and finds, in line with Doeringer and Piore's (1971) descrip- 
tion of an internal labour market, that pay is not determined solely on an individual 
basis but is strongly related to the grade the worker is in. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 
(1994) find a similar result. In both firms, the relationship between salary and grade is 
also clearly convex, as many incentive-based theories e. g., tournament theory (see, for 
example, Lazear and Rosen (1981)) would suggest. 
Although, there are many similarities between the two organisations important dif- 
ferences do arise. Exit rates in our large financial sector firm are, for example, more 
variable than in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's (1994). The hierarchy also changes its 
structure more markedly in this organisation than in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's 
(1994), with the management grades becoming proportionately more important over the 
period studied. In addifion, in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) the rules operate in 
such a way that they tend to generate pay compressions within grades. However, in our 
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firm evidence of pay compressions within grades is only true for the staff grades. In the 
management grades workers in the higher quartiles tend to receive bigger pay increases 
than those in the lower quartiles. 
In summary, the findings presented in this chapter and in Baker, Gibbs and Holm- 
strom (1994) together suggest that many of the characteristics of internal labour markets 
are reflected in organisational data of this type. However, there are also sufficient differ- 
ences between the two firms to suggest that other complexities exist that are not covered 
by the internal labour market model. In particular, although careers within the firm 
are important, jobs are filled from outside the hierarchy sufficiently frequently to suggest 
that the internal labour market is not fully insulated from competitive pressures. 
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Chapter 3 
Promotion 
3.1 Introduction 
A number of stylised facts emerge when looking at comparisons in liuman resource prac- 
tices between countries, particularly between Japan and the U. S. For example, a common 
view when looking at the internal workings of a firm is that U. S and Japanese organi- 
sations differ in their policies towards promotion. Workers in the U. S tend to be highly 
mobile, moving between firms on a regular basis in search of better opportunities. Con- 
sequently, in order to retain their most able workers U. S organisations tend to engage 
in promotion fast-tracking and hence target a few individuals early on for top careers 
(see Rosenbaum (1984) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994)). In contrast, tenure in 
large Japanese firms tends to be relatively long and Japanese employers often rely heav- 
ily on internal promotions to fill vacancies. Thus, fewer opportunities are available for 
workers, especially those in mid-career who leave the organisation, making a late selec- 
tion approach to promotion a viable option. Employees, for example, in large Japanese 
firms are typically not differentiated from their cohort until they have been with their 
organisation for between 10 and 15 years after which time considerable differentiation by 
ability usually occurs (see Aoki (1988)). 
As will be seen in Section 3., 3 only a handful of studies have addressed the causes and 
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consequences of promotion in the U. K. This chapter thus seeks to add to the limited body 
of information on promotion in the U. K by investigating whether there is any evidence 
of promotion fast-tracking within our large U. K financial sector firm. A discrete-time 
proportional hazard based on the model proposed by Prentice and Cloeckler (1978) is 
used to study the time to promotion. This approach enables the baseline hazard to 
be estimated non-parametrically, and thus avoids any a priori assumptions being made 
about its shape. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a summary of some of the 
economic theory on promotion. Section 3.3 reviews some of the economic evidence on 
promotion. A description of the data being used is given in Section 3.4, while the model 
and the remaining empirical results are reported in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. 
Finally, implications for future work and the conclusions are discussed in Section 3.7. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The economic theory surrounding promotion can be split into three broad categories. It 
can be modelled in terms of a learning mechanism, an incentive device, or human capital 
accumulation. This section considers each of these categories briefly in turn. 
3.2.1 Learning Hypothesis 
Suppose that individual productivity is determined by a time invariant characteristic, 
ability, which is gradually revealed over time. The learning hypothesis suggests that 
promotion to higher ranks in the hierarchy arises from the repeated observation and 
evaluation of worker performance by employers. Firms use lower-level job performance 
to learn about the innate abilities of their employees and use this information in their 
subsequent promotion decisions. 
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Firms and their Competitors 
The speed with which a worker is promoted thus depends to some extent on how much 
information competing firms have about the individual's ability. Waldman (1984), for 
example, argues that while information on ability levels will in general only be directly 
revealed to the current employer, competing organisations can, however, use the informa- 
tional content of the worker's job to derive information on ability. According to Waldman 
(1984), under spot contracting, this can lead to an inefficient assignment of individuals 
to jobs and under promotion. When a worker is promoted it signals information to com- 
peting firms that s/he is of a higher ability, which in turn often forces the firm to pay 
the individual a correspondingly higher wage in order to retain them. However, Wald- 
man (1984) argues that for those employees who are only slightly more productive in the 
new job the increase in productivity caused by efficient placement may not be enough to 
compensate the organisation for the necessary increase in wages. As a result, there is an 
incorrect assignment of workers to jobs as these individuals remain inefficiently employed 
in jobs which do not maximise their output. 
Waldman (1984) also argues that the extent of this incorrect assignment of employees 
to jobs is negatively related to the level of firm-specific human capital. He asserts that 
in the case of perfect general training the wage offered by competing firms is driven so 
high that only workers of the very highest ability can be assigned to the job. 
In addition, Waldman (1984) finds that an inefficient assignment of employees to jobs 
can still occur, although are less likely, when the assumption of spot contracting is relaxed 
and employers are able to commit themselves to a wage schedule for subsequent periods 
in advance. 
The incorrect assignment of individuals to jobs takes the form of delayed promotion 
in Bernhardt (1995). Bernhardt (1995) makes the same assumptions as Waldman (1984) 
regarding information on ability. In other words, he assumes that while information 
about the worker's ability will generally only be directly revealed to the current employer, 
competing firms can, nevertheless, use the informational content of the individual's job 
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to derive information on ability. Berlinardt (1995) argues that an employee should only 
be promoted if the increase in productivity caused by efficient placement exceeds the 
loss of the organisation's private information. He asserts that the lower is the worker's 
perceived ability to the market, the greater is the incentive for employers to exploit their 
private information by failing to promote such individuals as quickly as is socially optimal. 
Consequently, equally (or more) able workers from a less productive (e. g., uneducated) 
group will tend to get promoted less frequently than those from a more productive (e. g., 
educated) group. 
Bernhardt (1995) also uses this asymmetry of information between the incumbent 
firm and the labour market to explain promotion fast-tracking. Targeting individuals 
for promotion at lower levels in the hierarchy identifies them to competing organisations 
as being from a more skilled group. The private information about these'workers is 
consequently not as valuable to current employers, making it optimal for the firm to 
continue to target such individuals for rapid promotion ahead of less quickly promoted 
workers who may now exhibit more promise. 
Firms and their Workers 
In the learning models discussed so far individuals tend to be largely passive and do 
not make any strategic decisions regarding their careers. Prendergast (1992), however, 
assumes a more active role for employees in his model of promotion. He investigates how 
employers provide workers with incentives to accumulate firm-specific capital when the 
skills collected cannot be contracted upon, and when individuals can only be compensated 
for the collection of skills by promotion. Prendergast (1992) considers two scenarios: 
(i) the employer has private information about the worker's promotion prospects and 
(ii) both the employer and the worker are uncertain about the individual's promotion 
prospects. 
In his first scenario two separate assumptions regarding wage payments are made. 
First, the firm is assumed to have discretion over the wages it pays in any job. Second, 
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collective bargaining agreements are assumed to determine the wage that must be paid 
in any job, so that the organisation cannot tailor its wage offers to match ability levels. 
Prendergast (1992) shows that if the firm has discretion over wages it can credibly signal 
to workers that they are able by paying them a higher wage before they collect any 
skills. Alternatively, he shows that if the organisation is constrained to offer a single 
wage to individuals in a given job it can signal credibility to workers that they are 
able by promoting them to a more difficult task, even though they may not yet be 
sufficiently qualified for that task. However, while intensively training a few employees 
may encourage them to exert greater effort it can also cause overlooked workers to become 
discouraged. As a result, Prendergast (1992) argues that if maintairiing incentives among 
low ability employees is important the firm may choose not to reveal any information to 
workers about their promotion prospects. 
In Prendergast's (1992) second scenario both the employer and the worker are un- 
certain about the individual's promotion prospects. Here two employees are assumed 
to compete against one another for promotion. Again, Prendergast (1992) argues that 
intensively training the high ability worker may harm incentives since it makes the pro- 
motion race less close, thereby reducing the incentives for both employees to exert as 
much effort collecting skills. In contrast, he shows that providing more training to the 
low ability individual makes the promotion race close, thereby maximising both workers' 
incentives to accumulate firm-specific skills. 
Thus, in both scenarios revealing information to individuals about their promotion 
prospects can result in a loss of incentives to train among workers who are perceived 
to have no promotion prospects. This is in contrast to Waldman (1984) and Bernhardt 
(1995) where the cost of revealing information to employees about their ability is in the 
form of an increased market wage. Prendergast's (1992) notion of a corporate fast-track 
also differs from that of Bernhardt (1995). As outlined above he shows that in order to 
induce workers to train employers must credibly signal to them that they are able. Thus, 
in Prendergast (1992) employers implement a fast-track through wage increases or rapid 
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promotion of their most able employees. 
Prendergast (1992) uses his findings to explain why promotion patterns in the U. S dif- 
fer from those in Japan. Compared to the United States career development in Japanese 
firms tends to be seniority orientated with limited fast-tracking and a late selection ap- 
proach to promotion (see Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) and Aoki (1988)). Pren- 
dergast (1992) asserts that these different promotion patterns arise due to variations in 
production methods between the two countries. He argues that the returns to intensively 
training stars depends on the extent to which authority is centralised within the organisa- 
tion. In firms where decision-making is highly centralised and most important decisions 
are made by senior managers, little efficiency is lost if low ability workers become dis- 
couraged. However, in organisations where decision-making is highly decentralised and 
important decisions can be made lower down the hierarchy, maintaining incentives among 
the less able becomes more important. Prendergast (1992) asserts that since decision- 
making in Japanese firms tends to be more decentralised than in U. S organisations this 
may help to explain why maintaining incentives among low ability workers appears to be 
more important in Japanese firms. 
Prendergast (1992) argues that another reason for the difference in promotion patterns 
between Japan and the U. S may arise due to differences in the labour market between 
the two countries. In markets such as the U. S where turnover among workers is common, 
job offers received from competing firms (or the response of their employers to these bids) 
reveals valuable information to individuals about their performance. However, in Japan 
fewer opportunities are available for workers in mid-career who leave their jobs. As a 
result, employers in Japan are unlikely to face the same pressure from competing firms 
about their workers, so enabling them to continue to adopt a late selection approach to 
promotion. 
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3.2.2 Incentive Schemes 
In practice a wide variety of incentive schemes are used by employers to motivate their 
workers. These mechanisms largely differ depending on whether they focus on the indi- 
vidual's absolute or relative performance. Simple piece rate schemes are, for example, 
based on the worker's absolute performance and link pay and promotion directly to the 
individual's output. As a result, employees need not be working with anyone else to be 
motivated by such schemes. 
Employers can also induce effort by focusing on the worker's relative performance. 
Lazear (1995) argues that relative compensation schemes often have a number of advan- 
tages over absolute compensation schemes. Firstly, it is often easier and less costly for 
employers to observe and measure relative performance. Secondly, by concentrating on 
relative performance these schemes difference out random shocks that are beyond the 
individual's control. For example, if the economy is in a recession rewarding workers on 
their performance relative to that of their fellow peers will eliminate the common effect 
the recession has on their performance. 
Tournament Theory 
Tournament theory is an example of an incentive structure based on the individual's 
relative performance (see Lazear and Rosen (1981)). The essence of a tournament is that 
workers compete against one another for a prize, which in the case of the firm is usually 
in the form of a promotion to a relatively better paid position. 
Tournament theory has a number of essential features. Firstly, tile structure and 
number of jobs in the hierarchy are assumed to be relatively fixed, with wages being 
assigned to jobs (not individuals) in advance. Consequently, the wages that the winner of 
the tournament receives will be independent of the amount by which his/her performance 
exceeds that of the other workers. 
Secondly, assignment to a job is based on relative rather than absolute performance. 
Thus, individuals may get promoted not necessarily because they are good but because 
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they are better than the other workers (even if the other employees are good). 
Another feature of tournament theory is that the effort with which the individual 
pursues a promotion is positively related to the size of the salary increase that comes 
with the promotion. There is, however, a limit as to how big this pay spread can be. 
This is because there comes a point where the additional compensation needed to induce 
workers to exert extra effort would not be justified by the incremental output associated 
with that effort. A related point is that the high salaries among, for example, company 
directors do not necessarily reflect the value of their marginal products, but acts as an 
incentive for these individuals and for all other employees to work hard when they are 
lower down the hierarchy. Thus, company directors do not necessarily earn high salaries 
because they are more productive in these jobs, but because this type of pay structure 
makes them more productive over their entire working lives. 
The mathematics behind tournament theory can be seen by looking at Lazear and 
Rosen's (1981) rank-order tournament model. Consider a tournament comprising of two- 
players (denoted by j and k) where the winner receives the higher fixed prize, WI+1, and 
the loser receives the lower fixed prize, W1. Then, WI+1 - W, represents the prize spread. 
The output of worker i can then be written as: 
qi = pi + Ei, i =j, k (3.1) 
where pi is the level of effort and Ej is a random luck component. Worker i's optimisation 
problem is to choose the level of effort, gi, that maximises his/her expected utility. In 
other words: 
max, -,, 
Wj+jP + Wj(1 - P) - C(I-ti), i=j, k (3.2) 
where P is the probability of winning the contest and C(Iti) is the cost function for effort, 
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with C', C', > 0. 
The first-order condition is: 
6p 
(Wi+i - Wi) 61-1i - Cl(/-ti) =0 
(3.3) 
The probability that worker j wins the contest against an identical opponent k is 
given by: 
P= prob(qj > qk) = prob(pj - Yk > Ek - Ej) = G(pj - 1-tk) (3.4) 
where G(. ) is the cumulative distribution function for Ek - Ej- It follows from this that: 
bp 
- 
6G(I-ti - Ilk) 
= g(IIj bl, tj 61tj 
(3.5) 
where g(. ) is the probability density function for Sk - Ej- If the workers are identical they 
are assumed to supply the same amount of effort i. e., Lj* = /t* and equation (3.3) thus k 
becomes: 
wl)g(o) = COO (3.6) 
It follows from equation (3.6) that since C'(1-ti) is monotonically increasing in /-Z higher 
pay spreads are associated with higher levels of effort. Another implication of equation 
(3.6) is that as luck becomes less important g(O) increases causing the amount of effort 
exerted for any given pay spread to rise. 
Lazear (1995) argues that the incentive effects of pay are particularly important when 
comparing compensation structures across countries or industries. In line with the model 
63 
outlined above he asserts that riskier industries should have larger pay spreads than less 
risky industries in order to induce workers to exert the appropriate level of effort. 
Similarly, Chiang and Gort (1998) argue that managers of the same ability may exhibit 
differing levels of risk aversion that causes them to assess their chances of promotion dif- 
ferently, which in turn may influence their choice of hierarchical compensation structure. 
From this they argue that firms where the likelihood of promotion is a relevant attribute 
of the job are likely to attract the more optimistic and less conservative employees. 
Internal versus External Promotions 
A common finding of many studies is that firms tend to fill higher positions through 
internal promotions, rather than recruiting from outside. Chan (1996), for example, using 
data from the Fortune 100 firms finds that of the 84 individuals who were promoted to 
C. E. 0 since 1984 only 11 were hired from outside the organisation. 
Chan (1996) analyses the choice between promotion from within and external recruit- 
ments, and in doing so extends the basic tournament model in order to make a distinction 
between internal promotion and recruitment from outside. Opening up jobs to competi- 
tion from outside reduces an existing employee's chance of winning the contest, and with 
it his/her incentive to exert effort and compete. One way of maintaining incentives would 
be to increase the size of the pay spread. However, as outlined above there is a limit 
as to how big this pay spread can be. Accordingly, Chan (1996) suggests an alternative 
tournament structure in which the pay spread is constrained and a handicap is given to 
the internal candidate. He argues that by making the expected returns at the margin 
large enough the firm can induce efficient effort from its employees even if the pay spread 
is constrained. 
Chan (1996) also shows that this handicap can be either positive or negative depend- 
ing on the quality of the internal candidate; inferior internal workers are often given a 
positive handicap to prevent them from giving up altogether, while those of high abil- 
ities are given a negative handicap in order to induce them to exert effort. From this 
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he argues that on average internal promotions will occur more frequently than external 
recruitment, and that the quality of the- external recruits is significantly greater than 
that of internal workers who fail to win the contest. 
Biased Contests 
Meyer (1991) considers a firm's promotion decision between two workers (i and j) where 
the individuals are assumed to be strategically passive and where differences in ability 
are initially unobserved by both the workers and the organisation. 
In considering which individual to promote the firm is assumed to use the informa- 
tion about the worker's ability generated during a fixed number of observation periods 
(contests). However, the outcome of these contests are coarse in the sense that only 
rank-order information about the individual's ability is assumed to be available to the 
organisation. The quality of the firm's promotion decisions are also constrained by the 
fact that output is a noisy indicator of ability. However, at the start of each period the 
organisation is assumed to be able to adjust the rules that determine whether worker i or 
j wins the contest without cost. Thus, instead of individual i being declared the winner 
whenever worker i's output exceeds j's output, individual i can be declared the winner 
as long as his/her output does not fall short of worker j's by more than some amount c, 
where c is freely chosen by the firm. 
With this in mind, Meyer (1991) shows that in order to maximise the likelihood of 
promoting the more able individual, later contests should be biased in favour of those who 
were more successful in the earlier contests. In particular, she shows that in a sequence 
of two contests in order to promote the more able worker the second contest should be 
biased in favour of the winner of the first. 
An intuitive idea behind biased contests can be seen by considering the following 
scenario. Suppose there are two contests and the employer is seeking to promote one 
of two employees. Not surprisingly, s/he will want to promote the more able of the two 
workers, since the more able individual will usually be more productive in the higher level 
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job. In a sequence of two contests if one worker wins both contests then the promotion 
decision is clear. However, if one individual wins the first contest, and the other worker 
wins the second contest then the cumulative performance of the two employees is the 
same, and the employer effectively has no information about who to promote. One way 
round this problem is for the employer to bias the outcome of the second contest in favour 
of the winner of the first contest. Now the outcome of the second contest is informative 
(in a way that it wasn't before), and if the loser of the first contest wins the second 
the optimal decision would be to promote that worker since they have effectively had to 
overcome a higher hurdle. 
3.2.3 Human Capital Accumulation 
Another way of explaining promotion is in terms of human capital accumulation. In other 
words, the promotion of employees to jobs that require more complex skills depends on 
the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello (1997) 
argue that if these skills are developed through on-the-job training, company seniority 
should have an important role to play in the organisation's promotion decisions. For ex- 
ample, in firms where there is a high correlation between skills in lower and upper rank 
positions, experience within the hierarchy should be an important determinant of pro- 
motion decisions; innate talent or comparative advantage at the start of the individual's 
career should be less important. Ariga, Brunello and Ohkusa (1997) show that in firms 
such as these training is provided internally in order to ensure that the accumulation of 
human capital is consistent with the promotion ladder, and under these circumstances 
the optimal promotion policy is clearly one of late selection. On the other hand, they 
assert that if the organisation's hierarchy consists of a disjoint set of jobs, where there is 
little correlation between skills in lower and upper rank positions, experience within the 
hierarchy is no longer the most important determinant for promotion decisions. Ariga, 
Brunello and Ohkusa (1997) find that firms such as these do not tend to focus on internal 
training since the skills necessary to perform these jobs are often developed in the market 
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place. They assert that in these organisations the optimal promotion policy is that of 
early selection. 
3.2.4 Other Theories on Promotion 
Gender Differences 
A common finding in the empirical literature is that males fare better in the labour market 
than females. While pay within a particular grade in a firm is usually the same for both 
men and women, promotion rates and levels of training tend to be lower for females than 
males. Lazear (1995) and Lazear and Rosen (1990) argue that these gender differences 
are not the result of discrimination, but arise because women often have greater non- 
market opportunities (such as work in the home) than men. They assert that since 
females are more likely than males to leave the organisation in order to pursue these 
non-market activities, employers will be more reluctant to invest in their skills, thereby 
making it more difficult for them to be promoted into the higher-paying jobs. Similarly, 
Becker (1985) argues that married women earn less than married men because they have 
a greater role to play in the home than men. He asserts that household responsibility 
affects the careers of married women by decreasing the amount of time they spend in the 
labour market and discouraging their investment in market human capital. 
An outline of Lazear's (1995) version of this model is presented below. Lazear (1995) 
uses a two period model for his analysis where there are only two groups of workers; males 
and females. The two groups of workers have the same distribution of ability, however, 
outside opportunities are assumed to differ. The value of non-market activities (to the 
individuals), m, tends to be higher for women than men. As shown in Figure 3.1, the 
distribution of outside opportunities for males, FAI(rn), is thus stochastically dominated 
by the distribution function for females, FF(rn), i. e., Fjf(rn) > FF(M), V rn > 0. 
When workers join the firm in period 1 they are hired into one of two jobs; A or B. 
Job A requires investment from the individuals, while job B requires no investment. It 
should be noted that ability, b, is known to everyone at the time of hiring. The output 
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Figure 3-1: Distribution of Outside Opportunities. 
m 
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from jobs A and B is as follows: 
qB =b 1 
qB =b 2 
qA = -yj b 1 
qA = 2 72b 
(3.7) 
B 
where q, , for example, represents the output of a worker with ability, b, who is assigned to 
job B in period 1. The parameters -yl and -12 are determined exogenously, with -Y, <I< 
72. -y1is less than 72 because job A requires investment from the employees. Also, since 
, yl <1 the higher productivity in period 2 will be at the expense of lower productivity 
in period 1. There is thus an investment cost to hiring a worker to do job A. 
In this model individuals always work in period 1. However, whether they remain 
with the firm during period 2 depends on their wage in this period, and the value of their 
alternative use of time, m, both of which are realised at the start of period 2. Workers 
in period 2 are paid a wage equal to their output in this period. Thus, W2A = b-y2 and 
W2' = b, where W2A and W2B are the period 2 wages in jobs A and B, respectively. 
The lifetime expected output of a worker with ability, b, who is recruited to job B in 
period 1 is: 
0 
b+b 
jb 
dF + mdF (3-8) 
0 
Fb 
where F is the distribution of m. Individuals in job B remain with the firm in period 
2 if their wage in this period, b, is greater than their alternative use of time, M. Rom 
fb 
equation 3.8 this occurs with probability 0 dF causing a level of output b to be produced. 
Similarly, m is greater than b with probability 00 dF causing workers to accept their 
fb' 
alternative use of time, m. 
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The lifetime expected output of an individual with ability, b, who is recruited to job 
A in period 1 is: 
b-yl + b72 
1b7 
dF + mdF (3.9) 
0 
£2 
where F is the distribution of m. Again, workers in job A remain with the firm in period 
2 if their wage in this period, 'bY2, is greater than their alternative use of time, m. From 
f b72 
equation 3.9 this occurs with probability 0 dF causing a level of output 
bY2 to be 
produced. Similarly, m> b-Y2 with probability dF causing workers to accept their 
alternative use of time, m. 
The difference between equations 3.8 and 3.9 can be written as: 
00 00 
D(b) = -b(I - -yl) + 
bY2F(bY2) 
- bF(b) + 
42 
mdF - 
lb 
mdF 
After integrating by parts and re-arranging equation 3.10 becomes: 
D(b) -b(l -71) + bY2F(b^12)- bF(b) + [mF(m) - F(m)]ý lrY2 
-[mF(m) - F(m)d(Tn)]' b 
2 
-b(l + 
rb 
F(m)d(m) 
Equation 3.11 is plotted in Figure 3.2. As can be seen it starts at zero, falls, before 
rising and crossing the horizontal axis at some point b= B*. 
It is clear from Figure 3.2 that if the individual's ability is less than B*, D(b) will be 
negative and so it is efficient for the worker to be assigned to job B. Alternatively, for 
individuals whose ability is greater than B*, D(b) will be positive, and so it is efficient 
for the worker to be assigned to job A. 
Since in this analysis the distribution functions are different for men and women, 
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D(b) 
D(b) 
I. -, b B* 
Figure 3-2: Difference in Expected Output for Workers in Jobs A and B. 
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Lazear (1995) argues that the point at which D(b) =0 will vary by gender. In this case 
the distribution of outside opportunities for, males is dominated by that for females. It 
follows from this that women will have to exceed a higher level of B* than men in order 
to be hired into the higher-level job. Since the cut off ability level in job A is higher for 
females than males these findings also imply that average ability levels in both jobs will 
be higher for women than men. Consequently, since it is harder for woman to be assigned 
to the high ability job their earnings will, on average, be lower than that of men. 
Lazear's (1995) analysis also indirectly provides another explanation for corporate 
fast-tracking. Since human capital is at least partly firm-specific as individuals invest 
more in their jobs the value of their time with the organisation will increase relative to 
their outside opportunities. As a result, they are less likely to leave the firm, thereby 
making additional investment in their skills even more profitable. It follows from this that 
workers who are given the opportunity for investment early on in their careers are likely 
to be given additional opportunities for investment, and hence promotion throughout 
their working lives with the organisation. 
3.3 Literature Review 
Due to a lack of suitable data most of the work in the area of personnel economics has 
been largely theoretical. It is only in recent years that data sets. have emerged which 
have allowed some of these ideas to be tested empirically. As a result, the empirical 
literature in the area of promotion is still relatively scarce. In particular, only a handful 
of researchers have addressed the causes and consequences of promotion for the U. K. With 
this in mind, this section gives a brief review of the empirical literature on promotion. 
3.3.1 Speed of Promotion 
As mentioned earlier a number of stylised facts emerge when looking at differences in 
human resource practices between counties, particularly between Japan and the U. S. For 
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example, a common view when looking at the internal workings of a firm is that U. S 
and Japanese organisations differ in the speed with which they promote their workers. 
U. S firms tend to engage in promotion fast-tracking in which those promoted quickly 
at one grade/level tend to get promoted more often and more quickly from the next 
grade/level. Japanese companies, on the other hand, tend to adopt a late selection 
approach to promotion. 
As previously mentioned, an influential paper in setting the agenda in the area of 
personnel economics is Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994). Using data from the per- 
sonnel record of their large U. S service sector firm they examine the pattern of careers 
within their organisation and in doing so find evidence of promotion fast-tracking. They 
investigate the transition of workers moving through the firm's hierarchy from level I to 
level 2 and find that those promoted quickly from level I to level 2 are again likely to be 
promoted quickly from level 2. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) also find evidence 
of a fast-track exit effect in which those promoted quickly into level 2 appear to be more 
likely to leave the firm than all other individuals. They argue that such a finding could 
be the result of some high ability workers not being optimally employed by the firm, or 
that the organisation may not be paying some employees according to their expected 
marginal products. Rosenbaum (1984) also uses data from the personnel records of a 
large U. S firm and finds similar evidence of an early selection approach to promotion. 
In contrast, workers in large Japanese firms are typically not differentiated from their 
cohort until they have been with their organisation for between 10 and 15 years, after 
which time significant career differentiation by ability usually occurs (see Aoki (1988)). 
It should, however, be noted that most of this empirical evidence from Japan tends to 
concentrate on large, old, established organisations operating in either the banking or 
mature manufacturing sectors. One possible exception to this is Ariga, Ohkusa and 
Brunello (1997) who examine the career history of more than 5000 employees in a large 
Japanese company that is relatively young, profitable and high tech. Using data from 
the firm's personnel records over the p eriod 1971 to 1994 they find evidence of promotion 
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fast-tracking, a result which is clearly at odds with much of the prevailing Japanese 
evidence, and which persists even after controlling for time invariant individual effects, 
such as innate individual ability. 
3.3.2 Gender and Promotion 
Most of the empirical work on promotion examines, in some way, the relationship between 
gender and promotion. The conventional view on this issue is that female workers are 
less likely to be promoted than their male counterparts. This finding is often explained 
in terms of a 'glass ceilings' story, whereby discrimination in the market place means that 
there is a point within the hierarchy beyond which women are unable to pass. However, 
as shown in Section 3.2.4 Lazear (1995) and Lazear and Rosen (1990) assert that these 
gender differences are not the result of discrimination, but arise because females often 
have better non-market opportunities than males. They argue that since women workers 
are more likely than men to leave the firm in order to pursue these non-market activities, 
employers are reluctant to invest in their skills, thereby making it more difficult for them 
to be promoted. 
Cannings (1988) using data gathered in 1983 on a large Canadian firm finds that 
females have a lower probability of promotion than their male counterparts. She arges 
that: 
... their 
(women's) disadvantage is not primarily the result of differential prob- 
ability 'returns' to particular acquired attributes, such as level of education, 
but, rather, the result of being born female. 
Jones and Makepeace (1996) compare the promotion process for males and females 
using personnel data on a sample of full-time workers from a large U. K financial sector 
firm taken in September 1988. They show that although men and women tend to receive 
the same pay in each grade, differentials in earnings between males and females arise 
due to differences in the distribution of men and women across grades. For example, 
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they find that 85% of the females in their sample are employed in the low-paying clerical 
grades, compared with only 40% of males. In contrast, they show that only 1% of the 
women in their sample have a managerial job, compared with 25% of men. 
Jones and Makepeace (1996) use this data to estimate male/female promotion thresh- 
olds using an ordered probit model. They control for individual and employment effects 
and find that when women are treated as men the proportion of females in the lower 
clerical grades falls, while the proportion in the higher grades tends to rise. The pro- 
portion of women in the managerial grades, for example, rises from just under 1% to 
approximately 3%. However, this proportion rises to 20% if females are assumed to have 
the same mean work experience as males. The mean level of service among men in their 
data is 16.6 years, compared with only 7.6 years for that of women. Thus, the shorter 
tenure among female workers clearly has an important role to play in explaining the lack 
of women in the higher managerial grades. 
To examine this interpretation more closely they decompose the mean grade of males 
and females into their explained and unexplained parts. From this they conclude that 
between 69% and 87% of the variance in grades between men and women can be explained 
by differences in their characteristics, with the remaining variance being due to their 
different treatment. 
Similarly, Pudney and Shields (2000) uses data from a 1994 survey of NHS nursing 
staff and an ordered probit to examine the promotion process for nurses. They find that 
after controlling for the endogeneity of participation and training history, male nurses 
tend to get promoted more quickly than female nurses (representing between . 05,000 
and E48,000 in additional earnings over an entire career). 
Audas, Barmby and Treble (1997) use data from the administrative records of the 
large U. K financial sector firm outlined in Chapter 2 to investigate gender differentials 
in pay and promotion. Like Jones and Makepeace (1996) they find that although males 
and females tend to receive the same pay within each grade, pay differentials arise due 
to differences in the distribution of men and women between grades. They use a Cox 
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proportional hazard model to estimate the hazard of promotion and find that women 
have a lower likelihood of promotion than men in each grade, except for promotion from 
grade 9 upwards. 
Winter-Ebmer and ZweimUller (1997) using data from the 1983 Austrian microcensus 
and an ordered probit find that in contrast to many theoretical models on promotion, 
only a small part of the unequal distribution of men and women in the hiearchy can be 
explained by the fact that women have a comparative advantage in outside opportunities. 
In addition, they find that work experience is not rewarded in the same way for women 
as it is for men, and show that females have to be of a higher ability than their male 
counterparts in order to be promoted. 
McCue (1996) uses data from the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) 
over the period 1976 to 1988 in her study on promotions and wage growth. She estimates 
the hazard of promotion separately for a cross-classification of males, females, whites, 
and non-whites and finds that the hazard of promotion for single white women is not 
significantly different from that of white men. 
Similarly, Booth, Francesconi and Frank (1998) using data from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) over the period 1991 to 1995 finds that gender has no significant 
effect on the probability of promotion. They also examine the relationship between 
promotion and wages, and after controlling for individual and employment characteristics 
find that while promoted women may at first gain the same wage increases as promoted 
men, females do not continue to benefit from wage increases to the same extent as males. 
Booth, Francesconi and Frank (1998) conclude that such a finding is consistent with their 
so called 'sticky floors' model of promotion. In other words, although women are just 
as likely as men to get promoted they find it harder to rise through the pay scales after 
promotion than their male counterparts. 
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3.3.3 Other Personal Characteristics and Promotion 
Francesconi (1999) also uses data from the first five waves (1991 to 1995) of the BHPS in 
his study on promotion. He uses both a probit and a non-parametric hazard to estimate 
some of the determinants of promotion and finds that after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity being married (or cohabiting) and having fewer young children has a posi- 
tive and significant effect on both the probability and hazard of promotion for males and 
females. Booth, Francesconi and Rank (1998), not surprisingly, find a similar result. In 
contrast, McCue (1996) finds that for women being married has a negative and significant 
effect on the hazard of promotion, but is insignificant for men. 
A few studies have also examined the effect race has on promotion. Booth, Francesconi 
and Frank (1998), for example, find that non-whites are less likely to be promoted than 
whites. Similarly, McCue (1996) finds that non-whites have a lower hazard of promotion 
than their white male counterparts. Pudney and Shields (2000) shows that in the U. K 
nursing profession whites have better promotion prospects than their black or Asian 
counterparts. In addition, Pudney and Shields (2000b) using the same data set finds that 
white nurses are likely to get promoted more quickly than all other workers (representing 
L40,000 in additional earnings over their entire career). 
McCue (1996) also examines the effect education has on promotion. She finds that 
being a high school dropout has a negative and significant effect on the hazard of promo- 
tion for white men and black women, but is insignificant for white women and black men. 
She also finds that being a college graduate only has a significant effect on the hazard of 
promotion among white men, and even then it is not significant across all specifications. 
Similarly, Booth, Francesconi and Frank (1998) find that education has little effect on 
the individual's chance of promotion. However, Francesconi (1999) finds that for workers 
aged 35 or less educational qualifications have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of promotion among male workers. In addition, Wise (1975) using data from 
individuals working in a large US manufacturing company in 1968 finds that education 
has a positive and significant effect on the probability of promotion. 
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3.3.4 Job Characteristics and Promotion 
Francesconi (1999) also examines the effect job characteristics have on promotion. He 
finds that workers who are employed in large firms and have a managerial position have 
a signifibantly higher probability and hazard of promotion than all other employees. 
Similarly, Francesconi (1999) finds that individuals who work large amounts of overtime 
also have a higher incidence and hazard of promotion. He finds this effect to be stronger 
for females than males and argues that since men tend to work longer hours than women 
this may simply reflect the fact that males find it more difficult to work any extra hours 
through overtime. 
In contrast, Francesconi (1999) finds that individuals who work part-time have a 
'lower probability and hazard of promotion than their full-time counterparts. He finds 
this result to be greater among males than females and asserts that this may arise due 
to the fact that part-time work tends to be more common among women than men. 
Francesconi (1999) also examines the effect human capital variables such as tenure 
and work experience have on promotion behaviour. He finds that work experience has a 
strong positive effect on the probability of promotion for females but not males. However, 
this positive effect declines with experience and disappears altogether for women aged 
35 or over. In contrast, Francesconi (1999) finds that tenure with the firm is significant 
for males but not females. He finds evidence of an inverse u-shaped relationship between 
job tenure and the probability of promotion for men; between 2 and 6 years tenure has 
a strong positive effect on the probability of promotion, which then tapers off at higher 
levels of firm tenure. 
McCue (1996) also examines the effect experience and tenure has on promotion. She 
finds evidence of a significant and negative relationship between experience and the haz- 
ard of promotion. McCue (1996) also finds that tenure has a significant effect on the 
hazard of promotion. She finds that the hazard of promotion is higher for those individ- 
uals whose position in the firm has changed at least once. 
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Variable 
M. j 
J. D 
Sex 
Tenure 
Grade 1- Grade 13 
Rate I- Rate 5 
Rate 6 
Professional Qualification 
Degree 
Age 
Married 
Description 
time in current grade (months) 
time in previous grade (months) 
=1 if female, 0 otherwise 
time spent in the firm (years) 
0-1 dummies for the worker's grade 
0-1 dummies for the worker's performance rating 
=I if worker is unrated, 0 otherwise 
=I if have a professional qualification, 0 otherwise 
=1 if have a degree, 0 otherwise 
age of individual (years) 
=I if married, 0 otherwise 
Table 3.1: Variable Names and Definitions - Promotion. 
3.4 Data 
This chapter uses data from the personnel records of our large U. K financial sector firm 
to analyse the pattern of promotion within the organisation. In particular, it investigates 
the existence of promotion fast-tracking within the firm and examines whether the speed 
of an individual's previous promotion affects their duration in the next grade. 
The analysis reported in this chapter focuses on the full-time workers who were pro- 
moted during 19891; 11,247 workers were promoted in 1989,5,093 men and 6,154 women. 
A full definition of the variables and summary statistics of the sample are given in Tables 
3.1 and 3.2, respectively. It should be noted that individuals with missing values in any 
of the variables are dropped from the data set. 
'This enables duration in the previous grade to be calculated (since the date of entry into a grade is 
known) and also allows duration in the grade workers -%vere promoted to in 1989 (known as the current 
grade) to be built up from the point of promotion. 
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Variable Name Mean Std Deviation 
M. j 43.008 32.056 
J. D 29.074 31.329 
Sex 0.551 0.497 
Tenure 10.093 8.022 
Grade 100 
Grade 200 
Grade 3 0.138 0.345 
Grade 4 0.181 0.385 
Grade 5 0.219 0.414 
Grade 6 0.148 0.355 
Grade 7 0.109 0.311 
Grade 8 0.113 0.316 
Grade 9 0.054 0.227 
Grade 10 0.025 0.155 
Grade 11 0.012 0.111 
Grade 12 0.0009 0.031 
Grade 13 0.0002 0.014 
Rate 1 0.002 0.046 
Rate 2 0.013 0.114 
Rate 3 0.330 0.470 
Rate 4 0.357 0.479 
Rate 5 0.096 0.295 
Rate 6 0.200 0.400 
Professional Qualification 0.236 0.425 
Degree 0.089 0.285 
Age 30.313 9.376 
Married 0.483 0.500 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics - Promotion (Full Sample). 
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3.4.1 Promotion Patterns 
Initial evidence for the existence of promotion fast-tracking is found in Table 3.3, which 
depicts the time to promotion from the previous grade versus the time to promotion/exit 
from the current grade. This table is similar in structure to one produced by Baker, Gibbs 
and Holmstrom (1994). However, it considers transitions between all grades, rather than 
just the level 1 to level 2 transitions which Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) focus on. 
Looking down columns the promotion rate tends to fall as the time spent by workers 
in their previous grade increases. Consider, for example, the group of workers who spent 
3 years in their current grade before being promoted or leaving the firm. These workers 
had a 21.41% chance of promotion after'spending 1 year in their previous grade, compared 
to a promotion chance of 14.37% after spending 2 years in their previous grade. Those 
promoted quickly at one level clearly appear to be promoted more quickly at the next, 
thereby providing some preliminary evidence for the existence of promotion fast-tracking 
within the firm. 
The exit rate also tends to fall as the time spent by workers in their previous grade 
increases. Consider again the group of individuals who spent 3 years in their current 
grade. After spending 1 year in their previous grade there was a 9.59% chance that 
these workers would leave the firm, compared to an exit rate of 6.19% after spending 
2 years in their previous grade. Consequently, the very individuals who are targeted 
for quick promotion also appear to be the ones most likely to leave the firm. One 
possible explanation for this fast-track exit effect is that targeting a few workers for rapid 
promotion reveals information to the market about their performance causing them to 
attract better jobs elsewhere. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) find similar results 
and argue that such a finding could be the result of some high ability workers not being 
optimally employed by the firm. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 depict promotion and exit rates for male and female workers, re- 
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Years in Years in Current Grade 
Previous Grade Statistic 123456 
1 Promotion Rate 19.89 28.31 21.41 11.92 15.11 12.11 9.11 
Exit Rate (%) 10.54 13.36 9.59 11.13 7.68 9.62 9.75 
No. of Workers 3625 2522 1471 1015 781.603 472 
2 Promotion Rate 7.73 13.50 14-37 10-17 13.36 11.45 8.15 
Exit Rate (%) 6.86 9.23 6.19 7.80 8.17 8.42 7.67 
No. of Workers 3132 2675 2067 1642 1347 1057 847 
3 Promotion Rate 4.16 9.54 10.59 7.95 10.18 8.09 7.94 
Exit Rate (%) 5.57 8.92 6.64 9.14 6.96 9.42 10.17 
No. of Workers 2334 2107 1718 1422 1179 977 806 
4 Promotion Rate 3.02 7.31 7.01 5.74 8.50 7.35 6.78 
Exit Rate (%) 4.60 8.40 9.41 5.96 6.50 5.88 9.83 
No. of Workers 696 643 542 453 400 340 295 
5 Promotion Rate 1.45 3.07 7.51 5.31 4.52 4.62 4.62 
Exit Rate (%) 3.78 7.06 8.87 4.49 7.24 6.67 10.40 
No. of Workers 344 326 293 245 221 195 173 
6 Promotion Rate 3.05 5.43 7.32 2.99 9.92 3.85 4.17 
Exit Rate (%) 3.55 5.43 10.98 6.72 4.13 3.85 9.38 
No. of Workers 197 184 164 134 121 104 96 
7+ Promotion Rate 2.39 3.12 2.91 3.42 2.66 2.17 3.18 
Exit Rate (%) 3.37 9.47 8.19 7.28 5.16 7.04 10.54 
No. of Workers 919 866 757 673 601 554 503 
Total Promotion Rate 9.90 14.69 12.66 8.36 10-54 8.43 7.02 
Exit Rate (%) 7.20 10.09 7.70 8.36 7.10 8.22 9.46 
No. of Workers 11247 9323 7012 5584 4650 3830 3192 
Table 3.3: Promotion and Exit Rates - All Workers. 
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spectively. Both tables display some evidence for the existence of fast-track promotion 
and exit effects. However, perhaps surprisingly, women promoted after a year in their 
previous grade always have a higher promotion rate from their current grade than men. 
Consider, for example, the group of individuals who spent 2 years in their current grade. 
After spending 1 year in their previous grade female workers had a 31.09% chance of 
promotion, compared to a promotion chance of 24.40% for their male counterparts. The 
initial fast-track effects thus appear to be more pronounced for women than men. How- 
ever, as time in the previous grade increases the promotion rate for male workers tends 
to dominate that for female workers. 
Looking across columns in Tables 3.3,3.4 and 3.5 also provides some interesting 
results. Holding time in the previous grade constant there appears to be a number of 
so-called 'windows of opportunity' at which workers can be promoted from their current 
grade. For example, looking across columns in Table 3.3 the rate of promotion for workers 
who spent 4 years before promotion in their previous grade fluctuates up and down and 
reaches a peak at 2 and 5 years, respectively. 
3.5 Empirical Specification 
The results reported in Section 3.4.1 clearly require further examination. Most impor- 
tantly, it is necessary to investigate whether there is any evidence of promotion fast- 
tracking after controlling for other factors. The fast-track effects identified in Tables 3.3 
to 3.5 could, for example, simply be the result of human capital effects. In other words, 
if workers differ in terms of human capital then those high ability individuals promoted 
quickly once will also have more chance of being promoted quickly again. 
3.5.1 Discrete-time Proportional Hazard 
In order to investigate these effects further a discrete-time proportional hazard based on 
the model proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) is used to study the time before 
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Years in Years in Current Grade 
Previous Grade Statistic 
Promotion Rate 
Exit Rate (%) 
No. of Workers 
(%) 19.42 24.40 19.60 9.53 11-73 11.44 6.45 
10.31 13.82 7.56 11.02 6.67 7.52 7.26 
1493 1049 648 472 375 306 248 
2 Promotion Rate 
Exit Rate (%) 
No. of Workers 
3 Promotion Rate 
Exit Rate (%) 
No. of Workers 
4 Promotion Rate 
Exit Rate (%) 
No. of Workers 
(%) 
(%) 
(%) 
Promotion Rate 
Exit Rate (%) 
No. of Workers 
6 Promotion Rate 
Exit Rate (%) 
No. of Workers 
(%) 
7+ Promotion Rate 
Exit Rate (%) 
No. of Workers 
10.13 14.85 15.25 9.90 14.63 9.68 6.67 
8.06 8.81 5.77 7.18 6.72 4.93 5.33 
1638 1340 1023 808 670 527 450 
5.65 9.66 12.64 8.30 9.48 8.03 7.44 
6.17 9.17 5.35 8.89 5.90 6.77 7.94 
1150 1014 823 675 559 473 403 
4.46 9.92 9.41 5.62 10.91 9.35 9.32 
5.58 6.61 2.48 1.69 4.85 5.76 5.93 
269 - 242 202 178 165 139 118 
0.85 2.63 9.52 4.55 4.88 2.60 2.86 
2.54 5.26 6.67 2.27 1.22 6.49 7.14 
118 114 105 88 82 77 76 
2.56 5.41 7.35 3.51 12.96 0 4.55 
2.56 2.70 8.82 1.75 3.70 2.22 6.82 
78 74 68 57 54 45 44 
1.44 2.74 3.08 4.51 2.43 2.15 2.43 
3.75 8.51 5.82 2.63 3.24 9.44 13.11 
347 329 292 266 247 233 206 
Total Promotion Rate (%) 10.62 14.25 13.60 8.22 10.69 8.00 
. 
6.24 
Exit Rate (%) 7.66 9.80 5.92 7.19 5.67 6.50 7.54 
No. of Workers 5093 4162 3161 2544 2152 1800 1539 
Table 3.4: Promotion and Exit Rates - Male Workers. 
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Years in Years in Current Grade 
Previous Grade Statistic 1234567 
I Promotion Rate 20.22 31.09 22.84 14.00 18.23 12.79 12.05 
Exit Rate (%) 10.69 13.03 11.18 11.23 8.62 11.78 12.50 
No. of Workers 2132 1473 823 543 406 297 224 
2 Promotion Rate 5.09 12.13 13.51 10.43 12.11 13.21 9.82 
Exit Rate (%) 5.56 9.66 6.61 8.39 9.60 11.89 10.33 
No. of Workers 1494 1335 1044 834 677 530 397 
3 Promotion Rate 2.70 9.42 8.72 7.63 10.81 . 8.13 8.44 
Exit Rate (%) 4.98 8.69 7.82 9.37 7.90 11.90 12.41 
No. of Workers 1184 1093 895 747 620 504 403 
4 Promotion Rate 2.11 5.74 5.59 5.82 6.81 5.97 5.08 
Exit Rate (%) 3.98 9.48 13.53 8.73 7.66 5.97 12.43 
No. of Workers 427 401 340 275 235 201 177 
5 Promotion Rate 1.77 3.30 6.38 5.73 4.32 5.93 5.83 
Exit Rate (%) 4.42 8.02 10.11 5.73 10.79 6.78 12.62 
No. of Workers 226 212 188 157 139 118 103 
6 Promotion Rate 3.36 5.45 7.29 2.60 7.46 6.78 3.85 
Exit Rate (%) 4.20 7.27 12.50 10.39 4.48 5.08 11.54 
No of Workers 119 110 96 77 67 59 52 
7 Promotion Rate 2.97 3.35 2.80 2.70 2.82 2.18 3.70 
Exit Rate (%) 3.15 10.06 9.68 10.32 6.50 5.30 8.75 
No of Workers 572 537 465 407 354 321 297 
Total Promotion Rate 9.31 15.06 11.89 8.49 10-41 8.82 7.74 
Exit Rate (%) 6.82 10.33 9.17 9.34 8.33 9.75 11.25 
No. of Workers 6154 5161 3851 3040 2498 2030 1653 
Table 3.5: Promotion and Exit Rates - Female Workers. 
I 
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promotion. This approach enables the baseline hazard to be modelled flexibly and thus 
avoids any restrictive parametric assumptions being made about its shape. Imposing 
a restrictive parametric specification on the shape of the hazard can, potentially, bias 
the estimated effects, particularly those of the time varying economic variables and the 
baseline hazard (Narendranathan and Stewart (1993)). 
The estimation approach used here first involves formulating the continuous time 
hazard for individual i at time t, which is the instantaneous rate at which individual i 
will transit out of grade g to grade g+1 (1 > 0) at time dt after t. Thus: 
Ai(t) = lim 
Pr(t < Ti :ýt+ dtlTi 
dtýO dt 
(3.12) 
where Tj is a random variable representing spell length. In this analysis the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) measuring the probability that individual i will have left the 
firm by time t is given by: 
Fi(t) = Pr(Tj < t) (3.13) 
and its corresponding density function is: fi(t) = dFi(t)ldt. 
Similarly, the probability that this observed duration Tj is completed at or after time 
t is given by: 
Si(t) = Pr(Tj >, t) =1- Fi(t) (3.14) 
By the law of conditional probability: 
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Pr((t < Ti :ýt+ dt) n (Ti ý: t)) Pr(t < Ti :! ý t+ dtlTi ý! t) =ý Pr(Tj > t) 
Pr(t < Ti :ýt+ dt) 
Pr(Tj > t) 
In terms of the distribution function equation 3.15 can be written as: 
Prob(t < Ti :! ý t+ dtlTi ý! t) = 
Fi (t + dt) - Fi (t) 
1- Fi(t) 
Dividing by dt and letting dt go to zero to get the hazard gives: 
Ai(t) = lim 
Fi t+ dt) - Fi(t) 1 
dt--ýO dt Fi(t) 
Fi(t) 1- Fi(t) 
It follows from this that: 
ft 
Ai(u)du= 
I AM 
du=[-In(I-Fj(u))]O=-In(l-Fj(t)) 
0 
10 
1- Fj (u) 
and so equation 3.14 becomes: 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
t 
Si(t) =1- Fi(t) = exp(- 
in 
Aj (u) du) 
87 
A convenient specification for Ai(t) is the proportional hazard model: 
Ai (xi, t) = A,, (t) exp (xi (t)', 6) (3.19) 
where A,, (t) is the baseline hazard, and xi(t)' is a vector of explanatory variables with 
unknown coefficients, 6. It is called a proportional hazard because the explanatory vari- 
ables have the effect of multiplying the hazard function by a scale factor exp(xi(t)', O) 
which does not depend on duration, t. 
The probability of being promoted by t+1 given that the spell was uncompleted at 
time t is given by the discrete-time hazard, hi(t). Thus: 
hi(t) = Prob(Ti <t+ 11t <, Ti) = 
Pr((Ti <t+ 1) n (Ti ý: t)) 
Pr(Tj > t) 
=I- 
Si (t) 
exp(- fo'+l Ai(u)du) 
Fi(t + 1) - Fi(t) 
1- Fi(t) 
Si(t) - Si(t + 1) 
exp(- t Ai(u)du) 0 
t+l 
exp(- Ai(u)du) 
it 
ý 
Combining (3.19) and (3.20) gives: 
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(3.20) 
t+l 
hi(t) =1- exp(- 
it 
A (u) exp (xi (u)'ß) du) 
=1- exp[- exp(xi(t)', 3) + 7(t))] 
where -y(t) = In ft'+' Ao(u)du. 
In this approach the baseline hazard is allowed to vary flexibly over time. The elements 
of -y(t) thus consist of a set of dummy variables designed to capture time in the current 
spell. 
The model is fitted by maximum likelihood methods. The probability of observing a 
completed spell for individual i of length Tj is given by: 
t-1 
Prob(Ti t) = hi(t) fl(I - hi(j)) (3.22) 
j=l 
and the probability of observing an uncompleted spell for individual i is given by: 
t 
Prob(Ti > t) = fl(l - hi(j)) 
j=l 
Hence the log-likelihood function for a sample of n individuals can be written as: 
t-1 
In L(6) =Ec, In hi (t) fl (1 - hi 
i=l j=l 
(1- c. ) ft(' - h(j)) i=l j=l 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
where ci =1 if the ith spell is uncensored. 
The model discussed so far is based on the assumption of homogeneity of the survival 
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distribution across individuals. However, if this assumption is incorrect, and if systematic 
individual differences remain in the distribution after the observed effects have been con- 
trolled for, problems can arise in interpreting the data. Uncontrolled heterogeneity can, 
for example, lead to misleading inferences being made about both duration dependence 
and the effect the explanatory variables have on the model. 
Meyer (1990) controls for heterogeneity by conditioning the model on an individual's 
unobserved characteristics, ej. The proportional hazard function, Ai(xi, t), thus becomes: 
Ai (t) = ei Ao exp (xi (t), 6) (3.25) 
The conditional survivor function is of the form: 
Si(t I E) = exp[-ei exp(xi(t), 8 + -y(t))] (3.26) 
and the marginal survivor function can be written as: 
S(t) Expected value over - of S(t I E) 
00 
= 
10 
S(t I E)f (E)de (3.27) 
In this analysis the random variable, E, is assumed to be gamma-distributed with 
density function: 
Me) =0 (OE)--i F(a) exp-ae (3.28) 
The expected value and variance of the gamma-distributed random variable is given by, 
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E(E) =2 and var(E) respectively. If E(, -) =1 and var(E) o, 2 the marginal 0 
survival function becomes: 
S(t) = [1 + U2 exp(xi(t), 3 + -y(t)))--a]7 (3.29) 
and: 
hi(t) =I- exp[- exp(xi(t)', 8) + -y(t) + log(Ei)] (3.30) 
The corresponding log-likelihood function can be written as: 
n 
In L(6) ln(l - c, )Ai + cBi (3.31) 
where Ai =1 +0,2 Ej=l exp(xi(t)', 6 + -y(t))--* 
andBi= 1+o, '3. '-'exp(xi(t)', 6+-Y(t)) Ai if t>1 
Bi =1- Ai if t=1. 
3.5.2 Weibull Specification 
The most commonly used parametric specification for the baseline hazard is Weibull in 
form. Thus: 
Ao(t) = at" (3.32) 
where Ao, a>0. Ao(t) is increasing in duration if a>1, decreasing in duration if a<1, 
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and reduces to the constant exponential case if a=1. 
Using a Weibull specification the discrete-time baseline hazard is of the form: 
-y(t) = gt(ce,, 80) = In(ft 
t+l au'-' exp)30du) (a > 0) 
=, 30 + Inf (t + 1)Q - ta 1 (3.33) 
where gt(a,, 80) denotes the vector of this function at each of the discrete points. 
For comparison purposes a minimum XI distance test similar to that used by Han and 
Hausman (1990) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) is used to determine whether 
the discrete-time Weibull is consistent with the estimates from the unconstrained model. 
Suppose the vector ý contains the estimates of the baseline hazard pararmeters from 
the flexible discrete-time 
Then ý will be asymptotically normally distributed with a mean of -y and variance Q. 
Thus: 
aN(-y, Q) (3.34) 
where Q is the appropriate block of the inverse of the information matrix. The minimum 
distance estimates for a and, 30 are obtained by minimising W Thus: 
min(W) g(a,, 60))Q- g(a,, 30)) (3.35) a, flo 
Under the null of a Weibull specification W is asYmptotically distributed as aX2 with 
k-2 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of estimated baseline hazard parameters 
in 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
The sample used to estimate the discrete-time proportional hazard outlined in Section 
3.5 is estimated using 7,239 of the full-time workers (3,447 men and 3792 women) who 
were promoted in 1989. It should be noted that individuals who leave the firm after 1989 
without being promoted are not included in the estimation. In this analysis the duration 
variable is the time spent by workers before promotion in the grade they were promoted 
to in 1989. Summary statistics of this restricted sample are given in Table 3.6 2. 
The explanatory variables in the specification of the hazard of promotion includes a 
variable measuring time in the previous grade (J. D). The estimated parameter on this 
variable will reflect the existence of a correlation between hazards of promotion in any 
two successive grades in the hierarchy in a simpler way than a fully bivariate model of 
joint hazards. This variable is used to investigate the existence of promotion fast-tracking 
within the firm with a negative sign on its coefficient indicating the presence of fast- 
tracking. In other words, the shorter the time spent by workers in their previous grade 
the more likely they are to be promoted from their current grade. 
Other covariates include a set of grade dummies (base case is grade 1 to 3) to measure 
how the hazard of promotion changes as the individual moves through the hierarchy. 
Since from grade 5 onwards the number of individuals in each grade is always less than 
the number in the next lower level the promotion rate should fall as the worker enters 
the management grades. 
A set of dummy variables are also used to capture performance evaluations (base case 
is rate 1 to 3). Workers are evaluated approximately every 6 months. Five different per- 
formance evaluations are possible: 'Outstanding' (5) is the best, followed by 'Very Good' 
(4), 'Satisfactory' (3), Not Fully Effective' (2), and 'Unsatisfactory' (1), respectively. In 
practice, employees rarely receive evaluations that are below 'Satisfactory'. At any one 
time there are quite a large number of employees who have no rating. This may arise 
2jt should be noted that since information on the number of children is only available from 1992 
onwards, no control for the presence of children can be made in the following regression equation. 
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Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
M. j 47.203 34.021 
-J. D 27.606 29.151 
Age 25.764 7.580 
Tenure 5.939 6.356 
Grade 100 
Grade 200 
Grade 3 0.161 0.368 
Grade 4 0.175 0.380 
Grade 5 0.211 0.408 
Grade6 0.156 0.363 
Grade 7 0.111 0.314 
Grade 8 0.112 0.315 
Grade 9 0.047 0.211 
Grade 10 0.019 0.136 
Grade 11 0.008 0.088 
Sex 0.524 0.499 
Rate 1 0.001 0.024 
Rate 2 0.006 0.080 
Rate 3 0.298 0.457 
Rate 4 0.396 0.489 
Rate 5 0.112 0.316 
Rate 6 0.185 0.389 
Professional Qualification 0.274 0.446 
Degree 0.083 0.276 
Married 0.451 0.498 
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics - Promotion (Restricted Sample). 
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due to a lag between a hire or promotion and the first appraisal in the new job. A value 
of 6 is given to these employees. 
Finally controls are included for tenure with the firm, educational attainment, gender 
(base case is male), marital status (base case is single) and age. 
In addition to these explanatory variables a set of 8 dummy variables (one for each 
year it is possible to spend in the current grade) are included in the hazard as elements 
of -y(t) to capture duration effects. 
Maximum likelihood estimates for the discrete-time proportional hazard are given in 
Table 3.7. Columns I and 11 of Table 3.7 report the results for the standard model, while 
columns III and IV report the results for the flexible baseline hazard model after control- 
ling for heterogeneity. The coefficient on the gamma-distributed variance is significant, 
and the analysis of the result that follows thus focuses on the estimates of the model 
with heterogeneity. 
Figure 3.3 plots the estimated baseline hazard. In order to make the results more 
meaningful the baseline hazard is scaled to represent the characteristics of an 'average' 
person 3. The hazard appears to fluctuate up and down and reaches a peak at 2 and 5 
years, respectively. Such a finding is in line with the results reported in Section 3.4.1 
and appears to indicate the presence of a number of so-called 'windows of opportunity' 
at which workers can be promoted from their current grade. 
As can be seen the hazard appears to fluctuate up and down and reaches a peak 
at 2 and 5 years, respectively. Such a finding is in line with the results reported in 
Section 3.4.1 and appears to indicate the presence of a number of so-called 'windows of 
opportunity' at which workers can be promoted from their current grade. 
As can be seen in Table 3.7 the coefficient on the variable of interest, J. D, is negative 
and significant, indicating that the shorter the time spent by workers in their previous 
grade the more likely they are to be promoted from their current grade. The promotion 
31n other words, the continuous covariates are set to their sample means, and the dummies are set to 
represent an 'average' person. 
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Non-Parametric Specification 
without unobserved with Gamma - 
heterogeneity heterogeneity 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -3.561 -41.102 -3.653 -38.242 
J. D -0.004 -4.616 -0.004 -4.451 
Grade 4 -0.850 -17.737 -0.836 -16.328 
Grade 5 -1.032 -18.906 -1.024 -17.730 
Grade 6 -0.892 -13.488 -0-870 -12.406 
Grade 7 -1.170 -15-960 -1.115 -14.015 
Grade 8 -0.685 -8.033 -0.611 -6.540 
Grade 9 -1.043 -9.383 -0.987 -8.237 
Grade 10 -0.818 -5.469 -0.763 -4.799 
Grade 11 -1.987 -7.563 -2.002 -7.369 
Rate 4 0.406 10.859 0.422 10.718 
Rate 5 0.602 11.999 0.611 11-542 
Rate 6 2.055 44.403 2.248 30.699 
Tenure -0.054 -10.729 -0.058 -10.661 
Sex -0.210 -6-696 -0.214 -6.389 
Married -0.379 -10.729 -0.402 -10.574 
Age -0.009 -2.331 -0.009 -2.336 
Degree 0.061 0.980 0.073 1.080 
Professional Qualification 0.040 0.999 0.056 1.304 
Dur 2 1.028 23.302 1.147 20.287 
Dur 3 0.956 18.706 1.108 16.350 
Dur 4 0.686 11.443 0.858 10.986 
Dur 5 0.970 16-315 1.160 14.334 
Dur 6 0.761 11.135 0.970 10.644 
Dur 7 0.639 8.487 0.860 8.707 
Dur 8 0.570 6.063 0.803 6.945 
Gamma Variance 0.101 3.369 
Log-likelihood -48954.546 -24470.475 
Number of Observations 7239 7239 
Table 3.7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Duration in Grade. 
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Figure 3-3: Non-Parametric Baseline Hazard. 
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fast-track effects identified in Tables 3.3 to 3.5 thus appear to survive after controlling 
for other factors. 
Other interesting results include the negative and significant coefficients on the grade 
dummies. The hazard of promotion fluctuates up and down as the individual moves 
through grades 2 to 6 (the clerical grades). However, from grade 8 onwards (the man- 
agement grades) the coefficients on the grade dummies have a downward trend, and so, 
not surprisingly, gaining promotion gets increasingly difficult as the individual enters the 
upper areas of management. 
The coefficient on the gender dummy is also negative and significant indicating that 
female workers have a lower chance of promotion than their male counterparts. Such a 
finding is in line with the results of most other studies (e. g., Cannings (1988), Jones and 
Makepeace (1996), Pudney and Shields (2000)). 
In contrast, the variables measuring tenure with the firm and age both have a negative 
effect on the hazard, indiciating that the longer a worker has been with the organisation 
or the older they are the lower is their chance of promotion. Such a result is in line with 
the early selection approach to promotion employed by this firm. 
Finally, the dummy variable for maritabstatus is negative and significant, indicating 
that married people are less likely to be promoted than single people. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the commonly used Weibull specification only 
allows for monotonically increasing or decreasing hazards over time. A minimum distance 
test to determine whether a Weibull specification is consistent with the estimates from 
the unconstrained model (after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity) gives a X2 (5) 
statistic of 12. This exceeds the critical value of 11.07 at the 5% level, so rejecting the 
null hypothesis of a Weibull specification. The Gauss program used to carry out this test 
is outlined in the appendix to this chapter. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the pattern of promotion within the large U. K banking sector 
firm outlined in Chapter 2. In particular it finds evidence of promotion fast-tracking in 
which those targeted for quick promotion lower down the hierarchy are more likely to be 
targeted for rapid promotion further up the hierarchy than all other workers. 
These findings contribute to the debate on the economics of promotion in at least two 
ways: 
Firstly, previous papers have found inter-country differences in promotion patterns, 
especially between Japan and the U. S. This study is one of the first to address the issue 
of promotion for a U. K firm and provides preliminary evidence that U. K organisations 
adopt similar fast-track promotion patterns to their U. S counterparts. 
Secondly, a number of theoretical models can be used to explain promotion fast- 
tracking e. g., human capital models, biased contests (Meyer(1991)), and the optimal set- 
ting of promotion criteria in the face of differing outside opportunities (Lazear (1995)). 
However, the results reported in this paper, using duration models of time to promo- 
tion, produce similar findings to Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello (1997) and show that 
fast-tracking survives even after controlling for the effects of human capital. Barmby and 
Bridges (2002) discusses ways of analysing the personnel data from our large financial 
sector firm in order to cast light on some theories of promotion. The paper finds prelim- 
inary evidence that the firm may optimally bias contests to increase the probability of 
promoting the most able individual. 
This chapter also investigates some of the causes and consequences of promotion 
within our large U. K financial sector firm. The results show that workers who have a 
long tenure with the firm, are older, have a low performance rating and are in an upper 
management grade have a lower hazard of promotion than all other workers. These 
findings also add to the limited empirical evidence on gender differences and promotion 
and show that in line with the conventional view on promotion females are less likely to 
be promoted than their male counterparts. 
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3.8 Appendix 
Gauss program used to carry out the minimum distance X2 test: 
x=fO. 03 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025, 
0.024 0.038 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.028, 
0.024 0.027 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.031, 
0.024 0.028 0.03 0.048 0.031 0.032 0.033, 
0.024 0.027 0.03 0.0310.0710.033 0.034, 
0.025 0.028 0.03 0.032 0.033 0.09 0.036) 
0.025 0.028 0.0310.033 0.034 0.036 0.085}; 
gam=10.160,0.020, -O. 281,0.149, -O. 326, -O. 389,0.2411; 
Y=inv(x); 
library pgraph; 
graphset; 
a= seqa(1,2,3)'; 
b= seqa(1,2,3); 
c= w(a, b); 
contour(a, b, c); 
proc w(a, b); 
local v, w, g; 
g=z(a, b); 
v=(gam-g); 
w=(V, *Y*V); 
retp(w); 
print w; 
endp; 
proc z(a, b); 
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local g, t, alpha; 
g=zeros(7, I); 
do while t <= 8; 
t=t+l; 
alpha=exp(b); 
g=a+ln((t+ 1) ^ alpha- (t) -alpha); 
endo; 
retp(g); 
endp; 
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Chapter 4 
Worker Absenteeism 
4.1 Introduction 
Worker absenteeism is a serious economic problem resulting in the loss of a large number 
of working days and hence worker productivity and income each year. Vistnes (1997), 
for example, using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey finds that 
workers in the U. S missed approximately 385 million working days due to illness in 
1987 (accounting for 1.9% of their scheduled work time). Similarly, evidence for Canada 
shows that 2.9 million individuals were absent from work during an average week in 1987 
(Akyeampong (1988)), while in the United Kingdom approximately 300 million working 
days were lost annually due to certified incapacity for work during the 1970s' (Doherty 
(1979)). In more recent work, Barmby, Ercolani and Týeble (1999), using data from the 
Labour Force Survey and General Household Survey, estimated an absence rate for the 
U. K that averaged approximately 3.2% per annum over the period 1989 to 1997. 
Despite these large costs most of the early work on absenteeism has been carried 
out by industrial and organisational psychologists who typically regarded absence as a 
withdrawal response to a negative work environment (see Steers and Rhodes (1978) and 
'In contrast, only approximately 8 million working days were lost annually over this period due to 
industrial disputes. 
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Fichman (1984) for a review of this literature). 
The 1980s, however, saw a surge of interest by economists into the causes and conse- 
quences of worker absenteeism. In most of these studies the decision to be absent from 
work has been modelled as a labour supply phenomenon on behalf of workers (see Allen 
(1981a), and Dunn and Youngblood (1986)). In this model the potential for absence 
arises because workers are usually constrained to supply a fixed amount of labour within 
a given time frame. However, treating absence purely as a supply-side problem ignores 
the role employers may play in managing absence. As a result, some researchers have 
attempted to take labour demand aspects into consideration in their models of absence. 
Allen (1981b, 1983), for example, tries to take labour demand into account in his model 
of absence by treating absenteeism as a non-pecuniary characteristic of the employment 
contract. 
This chapter seeks to add to the growing body of economic research on worker absence 
by investigating some of the determinants of absenteeism within our large U. K financial 
sector firm. In this study a dynamic model for discrete panel data, similar to that 
proposed by Heckman (1981a), is used to estimate the probability of absence for a random 
sample of workers who were continuously employed by the firm in 1992. The aim of this 
chapter is largely two fold: 
First, it seeks to investigate the effect past absence has on current absence decisions. 
Since absence is to some extent determined by the individual's state of health the worker's 
absence decision on a given day is unlikely to be independent of whether s/he was away 
from work the previous day. Despite this, most analyses on absence behaviour tend 
to either ignore the effect past absence has on current choices, or address the issue in 
a purely ad hoc manner. This is surprising given that in the studies that account for 
past absence (see, for example, Barmby, Orme and Treble (1995)) the largest and most 
significant coefficient is usually absence lagged I period. As will be seen, ignoring the 
lag of absence also has important consequences for the significance of the remaining 
explanatory variables. 
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Second, this chapter seeks to add to the empirical evidence on gender differences and 
absenteeism. A common finding of many studies is that female workers are more likely 
to be absent from work than their male counterparts (see, for example, Paringer (1983), 
Allen (1984), Dunn and Youngblood (1986), Drago, and Wooden (1992), Barmby, Orme 
and Treble (1991), and Brown, Faklifakh and Sessions (1999)). However, at present there 
seems to be little agreement as to the main causes of these gender differences. There is, 
for example, some debate in the literature with respect to the effect dependents have 
on absenteeism among females. Leigh (1983) and Vistnes (1997) find that the presence 
of children under 6 years of age increases female absence, while Paringer (1983) finds 
that women with family responsibilities are less likely to be absent. There is a similar 
debate over the effect of age; Leigh (1983) finds that age has no significant effect on 
female absenteeism, while Paringer (1983) finds evidence of a strong positive relationship 
between age and the level of absence, which is greater for males than for females. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a summary of some of 
the economic theory on absence. Section 4.3 reviews some of the empirical evidence on 
absence. A description of the data and the empirical model being estimated is given in 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Key empirical results are reported in Sections 4.6 and 
4.7, while implications for future work and the conclusions are discussed in Section 4.8. 
4.2 Theoretical F'ramework 
4.2.1 Labour Supply Approach 
As mentioned above the decision to be absent from work is often modelled in terms of a 
standard neo-classical model of labour supply (see, for example, Allen (1981a), Dunn and 
Youngblood (1986), and Vistnes (1997)). In this model the potential for absence arises 
because workers are usually constrained to supply a fixed amount of labour within a given 
time period. Such constraints arise because employers usually have an interest in how 
many hours their employees work and specify these hours in an employment contract. 
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For example, workers on an assembly line are usually contracted to work a fixed number 
of hours in order to ensure optimal manning levels. Thus, a lack of information by 
employers about their workers' preferences, technological and institutional requirements, 
as well as the high costs of search may cause some individuals to accept jobs where the 
number of hours they are contracted to work exceeds their desired number of hours. 
When employees are contracted to work for more than their desired number of hours 
given wages they have an incentive to consume more leisure, and one way of doing this 
is by being absent from work. 
As well as setting the number of hours individuals must work employment contracts 
also tend to specify the particular hours they must work. Thus, even if employees are 
contracted to work their desired number of hours, absenteeism may still arise if highly 
attractive/important alternative events (e. g., a doctor's appointment or an important 
family occasion) occur during their contracted working hours. Similarly, leisure time 
often becomes more attractive the longer an employee is ill a's the need for rest and 
recuperation becomes increasingly necessary. 
Allen (1981a) presents this idea in a more formal setting. In this framework the 
worker's preferences are assumed to be represented by a twice-differentiable utility func- 
tion of the form: 
U= U(C, L) 
where C is consumption and L is leisure time. 
The firm imposes a penalty, D, on unscheduled absences. Thus: 
D= D(t') (4.2) 
where D' > 0, D(O) 0 and P represents time absent from work. This penalty could, 
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for example, take the form of a fine, dismissal, a decreased probability of being promoted 
or a reduction in the probability of receiving a pay rise. 
In addition, workers are assumed to be endowed with a stock of time, T. Thus: 
tc + tl + ta (4.3) 
where t' indicates contracted hours, and t' represents leisure time when P=0 (t' + t' 
L). 
Individuals are also assumed to spend all their income and thus the budget constraint 
facing each worker is of the form: 
N+ w(tc - t') - D(t') (4.4) 
where N is unearned income, and w is the real wage. 
Now the individual's problem is to maximise his/her utility subject to the constraints 
outlined above. Substituting equations (4.3) and (4.4) into (4.1) and differentiating with 
respect to ta produces the first-order utility maximising condition: 
dU 
- 
dU (w+D) =0 dL dC 
(4.5) 
It follows from this that a worker will be absent on a given day only if the rise in utility 
obtained through increased leisure is greater than the fall in utility that arises due to the 
resultant loss in current and future earnings. 
Allenýs (1981a) labour/leisure model of absence yields a number of predictions. As- 
suming absence (like leisure) is a normal good: 
1. The relationship between wages and absence is a pHoTi indeterminate due to con- 
flicting income and substitution effects. An increase (decrease) in the wage rate 
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produces an income effect that increases (decreases) the tendency to be absent, and 
a substitution effect that decreases (increases) the tendency unequivocally. 
2. The pure income effect produces a positive relationship between non-labour income 
and absenteeism, and a negative relationship between the penalty associated with 
absenteeism and the level of absence. 
3. The relationship between contracted hours and absenteeism is positive given the 
assumption of a diminishing marginal utility of leisure. 
Allen (1981a) and Vistnes (1997) also examine the effect sick pay has on absence be- 
haviour. They include a dummy variable for sick pay, S, in the worker's budget constraint 
and so equation (4.4) becomes: 
C= R+w(tc- (I _ S)ta) - 
D(ta) (4.6) 
where S is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a worker has sick leave benefits and 
is 0 otherwise. The first-order utility maximising condition facing each worker is now of 
the form: 
dU 
D' 
dU 
dL dC 
(4.7) 
It follows from this that unless higher penalties for absence are imposed on workers 
with sick leave benefits the level of absence will always be greater in firms that provide 
sick pay than in those which do not. In addition, the effect of a change in wages on 
absence behaviour is now unambiguously positive since there is no longer a substitution 
effect. 
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4.2.2 Hedonic Wage Model 
As mentioned previously the potential for absence can only arise if workers are obliged 
to supply a certain amount of labour within a given time period. Observed absence is 
thus necessarily conditioned by the individual's employment contract. However, treating 
absence purely as a supply-side problem on behalf of workers ignores the role employers 
may play in managing absence. 
Firms find absenteeism costly since it disrupts work schedules resulting in the loss of 
a large number of working days and hence worker productivity and income each year. 
Employers are thus unlikely to stand by and do nothing if faced with a frequently absent 
work-force and may, for example, employ more stringent absence control measures (such 
as increased monitoring, fines, inducements and even threats of dismissal) or make their 
contracts more flexible (by, for example, introducing flexi-time schemes, and part-time 
work) in an attempt to reduce the level of absence. It follows from this that interpreting 
absenteeism purely as a supply-side phenomenon may lead to an important identification 
problem, making it difficult to separate the changes in absence which arise due to demand- 
side effects (i. e., the efforts of employers) from those which arise due to changes in the 
behaviour of employees (see Barmby, Orme and Treble (1991)). 
Allen (1981b, 1983) attempts to take labour demand aspects into account in his model 
of absence by treating absenteeism as a non-pecuniary characteristic of the employment 
contract. He argues that employers adjust their compensation and. personnel policies 
in order to attain an optimal level of absence. Using Rosen's (1974) hedonic pricing 
framework Allen (1981b, 1983) asserts that it is possible to derive an offer curve for 
each employer reflecting the firm's trade-off between wages and absence at each level 
of profit. He argues that in organisations where the cost of absence is relatively high 
(low) employers offer compensation packages that pay higher (lower) wages in return for 
lower (higher) levels of absence. In addition, Allen (1981b, 1983) asserts that in the long 
run there should be a unique offer curve for each employer r eflecting the trade-off that 
prevails in the market between wages and absence at zero profits. 
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Rate (A) 
A(W) 
Wage (W) 
Figure 4-1: Market 'Rade-off between Wages and Absence Rates. 
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Figure 4.1 depicts the wage-absence offer curves for three such firms denoted by J1, J2 
and J3, respectively. The envelope of this family of curves (represented by A(w)) reflects 
the trade-off prevailing in the market between wages and absence. Similarly, Allen (1981b, 
1983) asserts that for each individual a family of indifference curves between wages and 
absence can also be derived. 
Workers are then assumed to select the job with the combination of wages and absence 
that maximises their utility. As can be seen in Figure 4.1 this occurs at the point where 
the individual's indifference curve is tangential to A(w). Workers who prefer more absence 
and a lower wage (e. g., individual a with indifference curve 1a), not surprisingly, opt for 
jobs with employers who find absence relatively inexpensive (such as firm 1). In contrast, 
those who prefer a high wage and lower absence (e. g., individual c with indifference curve 
Ic) seek employment with those firms who find absence relatively costly (such as firm 
3). Since workers make a trade-off between wages and absence when choosing a job the 
wage/absence correlation in this framework is unambiguously negative. 
4.2.3 Reservation Sickness Model 
Barmby, Sessions and Treble (1994) take explicit account of the worker's state of health 
in their model on absence. A simplified version of this framework is presented below. 
In this model utility is assumed to be an increasing function of income, leisure, and 
a decreasing function of the worker's state of health. Thus: 
U= U(C, L, a) (4.8) 
where U represents the individual's utility, C is consumption, L is leisure time, and a is a 
random variable representing the worker's state of health. The parameter, a, is assumed 
to be randomly distributed over the interval [0,1] with individuals valuing leisure or 
recuperation time more highly as a tends to 1, and valuing consumption (work) more 
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highly as a tends to 0. Workers are also assumed to sign an enforceable employment 
contract that pays a wage, w, for hours of work, h. In addition, a firm financed sick pay 
scheme which pays sick pay at a rate s<w is available to all individuals whose level 
of sickness is greater than or equal to some exogenously defined minimum a' i. e., for 
whom a> a'. Assuming a linear functional form for the utility function, the utility the 
individual obtains from work and absence is as follows: 
Ujv = (1 - a)w + a(T - h) (4.9) 
UA = (I - a)s + aT (4.10) 
where Ujv is the utility from work, UA is the utility from absence, and T is total time. 
From equations 4.9 and 4.10 a reservation level of sickness, Oz*, can be calculated at 
which the worker is indifferent between work and absence. At this point the utility s/he 
gets from work is equal to the utility which s/he gets from leisure i. e., Ujv(oz*) = UA(oz*). 
Thus: 
+h 
Realisations of sickness greater than a* induce the individual to be absent from work. 
Conversely if a< a* the employee maximises his/her utility by attending work. It follows 
from equation 4.11 that the reservation level of sickness is a positive function of wages, 
and negatively related to sick pay and contracted hours. Thus, an increase (decrease) 
in wages or a decrease (increase) in sick pay or contracted hours causes the reservation 
level of sickness to increase (decrease), thereby causing the level of absence to fall (rise). 
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4.3 Literature Review 
As mentioned earlier, despite the large costs that are associated with absenteeism until re- 
cently very little attention has been paid by economists into the causes and consequences 
of worker absenteeism. This section thus gives a brief review of some of the empirical 
literature on absence. As will be seen, the majority of these studies use a model for 
absenteeism based on the traditional labour/leisure framework outlined in Section 4.2.1. 
4.3.1 Absenteeism and Contracts 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1 in the labour/leisure model of absence, individuals absent 
themselves in an attempt to maximise their utility and hence move to the point where 
their marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure (MRS) is equal to their 
marginal wage. Dunn and Youngblood (1986) test this idea using individual data from 
a utility company, and an empirical measure of each worker's MRS. They estimate an 
equation of the form: 
Absence =a+ b(MRS - Marginal Wage) + i (4.12) 
where a, b, and c are the parameters to be estimated and Zi is a vector of socio-economic 
variables. Using a tobit analysis they find evidence of a positive and significant rela- 
tionship between absence and the difference between the individual's marginal rate of 
substitution and his/her marginal wage for both medical and non-medical absence. 
Barmby, Orme and Treble (1995) using data from two manufacturing plants in the 
U-K and a logit analysis also find that wages have a negative and significant effect on 
the probability of absence, even after controlling for unobserved effects. Similarly, Drago 
and Wooden (1992), Chaudhury and Ng (1992), and Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) find 
evidence of a negative and significant relationship between wages and absence. 
Allen (1981a) uses data from the 1972 to 1973 Quality of Employment Survey in the 
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US in his study on absence. He analyses a sample of workers who self-report the number 
of days they were away from work in the two weeks prior to being interviewed. Using a 
logit analysis he finds evidence of a negative and significant relationship between wages 
and absence, but only after excluding personal characteristics, industry dummies and 
occupation dummies. Allen (1981a) also estimates these equations separately for blue 
and white collar workers and finds that a negative and significant wage effect is only 
present for the blue collar subgroup; wages are insignificant for white collar workers. 
In contrast, Winkler (1980) finds that a significant positive relationship exists between 
wages and absenteeism, while both Doherty (1979) and Leigh (1991) find that wages have 
no statistically significant effect on absence behaviour. 
The effect sick pay has on absence behaviour has also been examined in a multitude 
of studies. Vistnes (1997) estimates both a logit and a truncated negative binomial 
model and finds that neither wages or paid sick leave have a significant effect on absence 
behaviour. However, she finds that for females paid sick leave and the interaction between 
paid sick leave and the log of wages is jointly significant and has a positive effect on the 
probability of absence. Vistnes (1997) argues that for women the presence of paid sick 
leave increases her probability of absence by approximately 5.6%2 . In contrast, Doherty 
(1979) and Leigh (1991) find that paid sick leave has no significant effect on absence 
behaviour. 
Although an employment contract usually specifies which and how many hours an 
individual must work, employers can potentially induce their workers to supply more 
labour by paying an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of their contracted 
hours. The effect overtime has on absence behaviour is, however, a priori ambiguous. 
On the one hand, within the labour/leisure model of absence paying individuals a wage 
premium for overtime introduces a non-convexity into the worker's budget constraint. 
This may increase the utility of those who work overtime inducing them to supply more 
labour and thereby causing the level of absence to fall. In contrast, the income effect 
2This figure is calculated using the mean value of after tax wages for Nvomen. 
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together with the assumption of diminishing marginal utilities of leisure suggests that 
the relationship between overtime hours and labour absence should be positive. 
Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics over 
the period 1966 to 1984 find evidence of a negative and significant relationship between 
average hours of overtime per employee (one of their proxies for overtime) and absence. 
According to their results increasing overtime per employee by an hour should reduce 
absence by between 300 and 400 workers per day. In contrast, Chaudhury and Ng (1992) 
using Canadian firm-level data finds that overtime has an insignificant effect on absence 
behaviour. 
It is apparent from the above analysis that overtime partly affects absence by altering 
the length of the working day. A related point therefore concerns the effect the availability 
of part-time work has on absence behaviour. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) investigate the 
relationship between part-time employment and absence and find absenteeism to be lower 
in firms employing a higher proportion of part-time workers. They find the elasticity of 
working days lost with respect to part-time individuals to be approximately 0.2. From 
this they argue that if the average organisation in their sample increased the proportion 
of part-time workers it employed from 11.88% to 23.76% the number of working days 
lost per employee would fall from 6.22 days to 4.97 days. Similarly, Barmby, Orme and 
'Reble (1995) and Drago and Wooden (1992) find that full-time workers have a higher 
probability of absence than their part-time counterparts. 
A number of reasons can be used to explain these findings. First, since part-time 
employees work fewer hours than their full-time counterparts they tend to derive less 
utility from an additional unit of leisure obtained through absenteeism. Second, part-time 
individuals tend to experience greater work schedule flexibility than full-time employees 
making it less necessary for them to be absent from work in order to pursue non-market 
related activities. In addition, Chaudhury and Ng (1992) argue that since part-time work 
is often less secure than full-time employment, part-time employees may face a greater 
penalty for not attending work when scheduled to do so. 
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4.3.2 Absence and other Job Characteristics 
Another finding of many studies is that workers in large firms are more likely to be 
absent than those in smaller organisations. Barmby and Stephan (2000), for example, 
investigate the relationship between firm size and absence using data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel over the period 1984 to 1990 (excluding 1989). They estimate a 
random effects regression for a cross classification of male, female, blue, and white collar 
workers and show that firm size has a positive and significant effect on absence for blue 
collar workers and white collar females; but is insignificant for white collar males. Barmby 
and Stephan (2000) also estimate a model of absence using data from the Hannover Panel, 
which contains information on approximately 1000 firms in the German manufacturing 
sector, and find similar evidence of a positive and significant relationship between firm 
size and absence. 
Allen (1981b) using data from the American Paper Institute for 1976 also shows that 
firm size has a positive and significant effect on the probability of absence. Vistnes (1997) 
finds that being female in a small firm (i. e., one with less than 10 employees) reduces 
both their probability of absence, and the length of this absence once they are away from 
work compared with women in larger firms (i. e., ones with more than 500 individuals). 
In contrast, she finds that for males being in a small firm has a negative and significant 
effect on their probability of absence, but has an insignificant effect on the length of this 
absence once they are away from work. 
A number of explanations can be used to illustrate these findings. First, it is frequently 
argued that individuals in larger firms experience a greater sense of alienation than 
those in smaller organisations, making them less loyal to their employers and therefore 
more likely to be absent from work. Second, Barmby and Stephan (2000) assert that 
larger firms are often able to diversify their risk from absence more easily than smaller 
organisations. For example, given that large firms tend to employ more individuals than 
small firms they should find it easier to find capable replacements for absent workers. 
Finally, Vistnes (1997) argues that smaller organisations may offer their employees more 
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flexible working arrangements making it easier for them to take scheduled time off work, 
and also asserts that these findings could reflect the lower occupational injury rates in 
small firms than in large firms. 
Another variable thought to affect absenteeism is the worker's tenure with the firm. 
Leigh (1986) finds evidence of a positive and significant relationship between tenure and 
absenteeism. He argues that the longer workers spend with the firm the more secure 
they should feel in their jobs and hence should be less worried about the consequences of 
absenteeism. In contrast, Vistnes (1997) finds that tenure with the firm has a positive and 
significant effect on the probability of absence for males, but is insignificant for females. 
She argues that for males increased tenure with the organisation could be acting as a 
proxy for greater job satisfaction and loyalty to the firm, hence giving rise to this negative 
relationship between tenure and absence. 
A number of studies have also sought to investigate the differences in absence that 
arise due to occupation. For example, a common view in many studies is that white- 
collar workers are less likely to be absent from work than their blue-collar counterparts. 
Drago and Wooden (1992) argue that such a finding could arise since white-collar jobs 
tend to involve less dangerous working environments and greater flexibility to engage in 
necessary non-work activities during the day. 
4.3.3 Absence and Unions 
The effect unions have on absence has also been examined in a number of studies. Since 
grievance procedures are often more structured in unionised firms, unions may increase 
absence since they make it more difficult for employers to penalise those individuals who 
are frequently absent from work (Allen (1981b), (1984)). In addition, Allen (1984) asserts 
that union guidelines often give managers in union plants less flexibility to tailor work 
schedules to match individual preferences. On the other hand, Allen (1984) argues that 
employees in union plants often have a stronger 'voice' thereby reducing unsatisfactory 
working conditions and hence absenteeism. For example, union contracts often mandate 
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that higher wage premiums are paid for overtime, shift-work and weekend work. Allen 
(1984) asserts that this will tend to reduce the amount of work that takes place at 
unsociable hours thereby increasing scheduling flexibility and reducing absence. A pTiori, 
the effect of unionisation is therefore ambiguous. 
Vistnes (1997) finds that union membership increases both the probability that a 
man will be absent, and the length of this absence once he is away from work, but 
is insignificant for women. She argues that in addition to the reasons outlined above 
unionisation may also be more representative of firms in hazardous industries so the 
union variable captures, to some extent, the risk associated with the worker's job. 
Allen (1984) estimates the difference in absence rates between union and non-union 
workers using three different data sets; the pooled May 1973-1978 Current Population 
Survey, the 1973 Quality of Employment Survey (QES), and the first five waves of the 
Panel Survey of Income Dynamics. Using a logit analysis he finds that union members 
are more likely to be absent from work than non-union members. 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) also find that unionisation increases the total number of 
days lost due to absenteeism. In contrast, Allen (1981b) using data from the American 
Paper Institute for 1976 finds that union membership has an insignificant effect on the 
probability of absence. 
4.3.4 Absenteeism and Personal Characteristics 
Another important explanatory variable in most studies on absence is the worker's gender. 
A common finding of many of these studies is that female workers are more likely to be 
absent from work than their male counterparts (see, for example, Paringer (1983), Allen 
(1984), Dunn and Youngblood (1986), Drago and Wooden (1992), Barmby, Orme and 
Treble (1991), and Brown, Fakhfakh and Sessions (1999)). 
Youngblood (1984) attributes these findings to the fact that women are more likely 
to take time off work due to illness than men. A common view in the empirical literature 
is that females invest more in their health than males. They are, for example, more 
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likely to visit the doctor than men and tend to make better use of preventative and other 
medical services than their male counterparts. In a similar vein, Leigh (1983) finds that 
women are more sensitive than men to absence inducing events such as a lack of sleep. 
In addition, many researchers argue that the higher rate of absence among females 
may arise because women often have a greater role to play in the home than men. It 
follows from this that women may be absent from work more frequently than men while 
ill in order to reduce their recovery time from illness since for females ill health affects 
both their home and market production. In addition, since women tend to assume 
responsibility for the children within a household their absence may also correspond to 
times when their children are ill so that they can look after them. 
Vistnes (1997) investigates the determinants of some of these gender differences on 
absence behaviour and finds that the presence of children under 6 years of age increases 
both the probability that a woman will be absent and the length of her absence once she 
is away from work; Leigh (1983) finds a similar result. 
In contrast, both Vistnes (1997) and Leigh (1983) find that the presence of young 
children has no effect on male absence behaviour. However, Vistnes (1997) finds that 
for men who are already absent from work the presence of children in day care has a 
positive and significant effect on the length of their absence. Rom this she argues that 
the behaviour of men with children in day care (e. g., single fathers, and husbands whose 
wives work) more closely mirrors that of working women with children than that of other 
men as far as home production and care giving responsibilities are concerned. 
In contrast, Paringer (1983) finds that family responsibilities lead to a reduction in 
absence, especially among women. Using data from the 1974 Household Interview Survey 
in the U. S she finds that married women with families are less likely to be absent from 
work than unmarried women. Paringer (1983) argues that the dual responsibility married 
women with children have as both home producers and labour market participants may 
cause them to invest more in their health, so reducing their absence from work due to 
illness. 
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Many studies on absence also find that married people are less likely to be absent 
from work than single people (see Allen (1984), Leigh (1986)). Married people may, for 
example, be under greater financial pressure than single people making them more likely 
to attend work. 
Another variable that is often thought to be associated with absenteeism is the age of 
the worker. The relationship between the individual's age and absenteeism is, however, 
a priori indeterminate. On the one hand, age may act as a proxy for the health of the 
worker, and so firms with older employees may experience higher levels of absence as 
a result of health related problems. Paringer (1983), for example, finds evidence of a 
strong positive relationship between age and the level of absence. She finds this effect 
to be more pronounced for males than females, and argues that such a finding may arise 
because women tend to invest more in their health than men, thereby resulting in a 
slower depreciation of their health stock as they age. 
The age of the individual may also be acting as a proxy for attitude towards work. 
Brown, Fakhfakh, and Sessions (1999) using data from a panel of French firms over the 
period 1981 to 1991 finds that younger workers (those under 35) are more likely to be 
absent from work than older workers (those over 50). They argue that younger employees 
maybe less attached to their firms and workgroups and have fewer financial and family 
commitments than older workers, making them more likely to change jobs and hence 
search for new employment by taking time off work. Similarly, Delgado and Kneisner 
(1997) find that firms whose workers are 10% older than average have between 5% and 
9% fewer short-term absence spells. Allen (1984), Leigh (1986), Dunn and Youngblood 
(1986) and Vistnes (1997) also find evidence of a negative relationship between age and 
absence. 
In contrast, Allen (1981a) finds evidence of a non-linear relationship between age and 
absence. He shows that the relationship between age and absence initially rises with age 
before falling for those aged 35 and over. Similarly, VandenHeuvel and Wooden (1995) 
finds evidence of a u-shaped relationship between age and absence for men. However, 
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they find that for women age has an insignificant effect on attendance behaviour. 
However, not all researchers agree that demographic characteristics are good deter- 
minants of absence. Allen (1981a) finds: 
Except for a positive correlation between absenteeism and family size among 
married (spouse present) women and a positive female coefficient in the blue 
collar equation, there is no sizable or significant relationship between work 
attendance and variables reflecting household composition, race, or education. 
Barmby and Treble (1991) find that personal characteristics such as gender, age and 
marital status have no significant effect on the probability of absence, and emphasize the 
importance of contractual considerations in determining absence behaviour. Similarly, 
both Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) and Chaudliury and Ng (1992) find sex and age to be 
insignificant in their studies on absence. 
4.3.5 Absence and Health Status 
Since absence is to some extent determined by illness, the worker's state of health is 
another important variable in most studies on absenteeism. 
Allen (1981a) includes a health evaluation variable in his study on absence and finds 
that absence is significantly higher among individuals who claim to be in poor health; 
Paringer (1983) finds a similar result. 
Vistnes (1997) takes a closer look at the worker's state of health in her study on 
absence and includes. five general measures to capture the individual's state of health in 
her estimations. These are: the number of self-reported chronic conditions, the worker's 
self-perceived health status, the number of medical events experienced in 1987 (including 
the number of ambulatory visits, the number of drugs prescribed, and the number of 
emergency visits), whether the person smokes, and whether the individual is obese. 
She finds that variables measuring self-reported health status and the number of 
medical events experienced in 1987 are significant predictors of the probability of absence. 
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For example, she finds that those who view their health status as being excellent or good 
have a significantly lower probability of absence relative to those who describe their health 
status as fair or poor. In addition, she shows that the number of ambulatory visits and 
visits to an emergency room also have a significant positive effect on the probability of 
absence. However, the magnitude of the effect of ambulatory visits is greater for males 
than females. Vistnes (1997) argues that since men are often more reluctant to visit 
the doctor than women, a visit to hospital in an ambulance could be the result of a 
more serious medical complaint for males than females. Out of the remaining health 
status variables included in the logit, smoking, obesity, the number of chronic conditions, 
and the number of prescription medicines have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of absence for women, but are insignificant for men. 
Vistnes (1997) finds that health status measures also have an important role to play in 
explaining the length of absence. For example, she finds that self-reported health status 
has a positive effect on the number of days lost from work for females, but is insignificant 
for males. In addition, she shows that in line with the findings of her logit analysis the 
number of ambulatory visits and visits to an emergency room also have a significant and 
positive effect on the length of absence. 
4.4 Data 
The data used in this study is drawn partly from the absence records of the large U-K 
financial sector firm outlined in Chapter 2. This absence data is available over the 
period April 1991 to February 1994 (35 months) and for each individual contains a 
daily record of any absence, and the reason for this absence (which may include illness, 
family care, personal leave, and jury duty, among other things). As mentioned earlier 
monthly personnel data is also available over this period which provides information on 
the worker's personal and job characteristics (including, gender, martial status, number 
of children, education, tenure with the firm, pay and grade within the organisational 
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Variable 
Absence 
AblagI - Ablag14 
Gradel - Grade13 
Management 
Tenure 
Annsal 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Description 
=I if absent, 0 otherwise 
0,1 absence lag dummies 
0,1 grade dummies 
=1 if in grades 7-11,0 otherwise 
individual's tenure with the firm (years) 
individual's annual salary 
=I if have a degree, 0 otherwise 
=1 if have a professional qualfication, 0 otherwise 
age of individual (years) 
=1 if married, 0 otherwise 
=I if have children, 0 otherwise 
Table 4.1: Variable Names and Definitions - Absence. 
hierarchy). 
The analysis reported here focuses on a random sample of 3,737 individuals, 1,685 men 
and 2,052 women who were continually employed by the firm during 1992. There are 254 
scheduled working days during this period (assuming that the individuals work a5 day 
week, not including Public and Bank holidays), giving 427,934 person-day observations 
for males and 521,166 person-day observations for females. 
As mentioned earlier, each worker in the organisation is identified via a unique staff 
identification number. Using this identification number it is possible to merge the in- 
formation from the payroll data with the information from the attendance records with 
monthly precision. All individuals with missing values in any of the variables are dropped 
from the data. A full definition of the variables, and summary statistics of the sa mple 
are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. 
In this sample a total of 29,486 working days were lost due to absence in 1992. The 
women in this sample were absent for a total of 20,988 days, compared with 8,498 days 
for that of men. In addition, 925 workers (301 females and 624 males) were not absent at 
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all during 1992, while 1 man was absent for a total of 168 days and I woman was absent 
for a total of 228 days. This results in an absent rate of 4.03% for females compared with 
only 1.99% for that of males. 
As shown in Section 4.3.4 a common finding of many of the empirical studies on 
absence is that there are gender differences in absence behaviour. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show 
the distribution of absence rates for both men and women by grade and age, respectively. 
As can be seen in Table 4.3 in each age group females have a higher absence rate than 
their male counterparts. Looking at the distribution of absence rates by grade produces 
a similar result. Apart from grades 2 and 3, in all other grades females have a higher 
absence rate than their male counterparts. However, for both males and females the 
absence rate in the management grades (grades 7 onwards) tends to be lower than those 
in the clerical grades. This could reflect the fact that managers are likely to have more 
flexible employment contracts than staff. 
4.4.1 Absence Procedures 
The absence procedures adopted by the firm are relatively straightforward. Employees 
are able to self-certify themselves absent for the first 7 days of any absence spell. However, 
for absence that exceeds (or is likely to exceed) 1 week a medical statement from the 
individual's doctor is required. 
The organisation also has some absence control mechanisms in place in order to 
monitor and control the level of absence. For example, under certain circumstances 
employees maybe required to give permission for the firm to contact their doctor, and/or 
maybe required to visit the organisation's medical adviser. As a deterrent against long 
periods of absence the firm may also reduce the individual's annual leave entitlement 
on a pro-rata basis in line with their attendance during that year. Finally, disciplinary 
action maybe sort if the organisation considers the explanation given by the individual 
for his/her absence to be false. 
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Variable Males Females 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Absence 0.020 0.140 0.040 0.197 
Ablag I-Ablag 14 0.020 0.140 0.040 0.197 
Grade 1 0.013 0.114 0.010 0.101 
Grade 2 0.0006 0.024 0.0003 0.018 
Grade 3 0.017 0.129 0.028 0.164 
Grade 4 0.118 0.322 0.223 0.416 
Grade 5 0.146 0.353 0.429 0.495 
Grade 6 0.182 0.386 0.219 0.413 
Grade 7 0.233 0.423 0.063 0.243 
Grade 8 0.151 0.358 0.018 0.132 
Grade 9 0.094 0.292 0.007 0.083 
Grade 10 0.034 0.181 0.002 0.040 
Grade 11 0.010 0.102 00 
Grade 12 0.0006 0.024 00 
Grade 13 0000 
Management 0.523 0.499 0.090 0.285 
Tenure 14.768 9.206 10.033 6.862 
Basic Pay 20326.19 11804.90 12839.46.4128.54 
Degree 0.085 0.279 0.025 0.157 
Professional Qualification 0.516 0.500 0.098 0.297 
Age 36.076 9.733 30.780 8.388 
Married 0.621 0.485 0.487 0.500 
Kid 0.660 0.946 0.182 0.505 
Table 4-2: Summary Statistics - Absence. 
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Age Group Absence Rate 
Males Females 
17-29 2.034 4.049 
30-39 1.851 3.779 
40-49 1.932 4.276 
>50 2.573 5.447 
Table 4.3: Absence Rate by Age. 
Grade Absence Rate(%) 
Males Females 
1 3.615 4.058 
200 
3 4.359 3.671 
4 2.509 4.730 
5 2.841 4.314 
6 2.344 3.468 
7 1.680 2.413 
8 1.385 2.415 
9 0.908 2.529 
10 1.052 0.242 
11 0.425 N/A 
12 0 N/A 
Table 4.4: Absence Rate by Grade. 
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4.4.2 Sick Pay 
During periods of authorised sickness the firm continues to pay workers along the follow- 
ing lines 3: 
9 Full time employees 
Service in years Maximum period of normal pay granted 
Less than 28 weeks (40 working days) 
2, but under 3 16 weeks (80 working days) 
3 but under 5 26 weeks (130 working days) 
5 and over 52 weeks (260 working days) 
Note: 'Service in years' refers to continuous service at 6th April each year. 
'Maximum period' is the maximum granted in any one year starting 
at 6th April whether absence is owing to a single illness or a number of 
illnesses. 
3Under the Percentage Threshold Scheme the firm may, in some months, be entitled to reimbursement 
from the government for some of the sick pay it has paid. 
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4.5 Empirical Specification 
The firm's daily absence records enable an event history for each worker to be constructed 
consisting of binary outcomes, yit,, such that: 
71.4 = I--- 
I if indivdual i is absent 
0 otherwise 
(4.13) 
i= 11 ..... Nit= 1...... Ti, where i is the individual, and t are the time subscripts. 
It should be noted that when constructing an event history of daily absence outcomes, 
the only information that is known with any certainty are the days an individual is 
absent from work each week, and the number of hours they are contracted to work; no 
information is available on the actual days they are scheduled to work. 
For the most part the full-time employees in this sample work a standard 35 hour 
week, 7 hours per day (including a1 hour unpaid lunch break) Monday to Friday inclusive. 
However, certain parts of the organisation open for extended trading hours, which usually 
includes Saturdays. Saturday working is decided on a rotational basis, and as well as 
a Saturday working fee, time off in lieu is granted to all full-time employees who work 
this day. In addition, with the exception of Public and Bank holidays, no information is 
available on the days workers take off for holidays. According to the organisation's rules 
and regulations, individuals are required to take a minimum of 2 working weeks of their 
annual leave as consecutive weeks. 
Thus, while the event histories for each employee will usually accurately record the 
days s/he is contracted to work they will in some places, most notably during the summer 
months, misreport the days the individual is scheduled to work. 
4.5.1 Model 
This study uses a dynamic model for discrete panel data similar to that proposed by 
Heckman (1981a) to investigate the incidence of absence. In this model the probability 
u oLnerwise 
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that an individual i is absent (yit = 1) can be written as a latent variable model of the 
form: 
yit =ß Xit + 
EYlyi, 
t-i + Vit 
l=1 
such that: 
(4.14) 
t-1 
P(Yit = 1) = P(Yi*t > 0) = F(ß'Xit + EYlyi, t-i) (4.15) 
where F(. ) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) corresponding to the error 
term, vit. The error term, vit, is assumed to be independent of the vector of explanatory 
variables, Xit, and is independently distributed over i. The set of parameters, fl, capture 
the effect the explanatory variables, Xit, have on the decision to be absent, and the 
coefficients, -yl, capture the effect experience of the event I periods ago has on current 
choices. A full description of the variables used in this model is given in Table 4.1. 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the above specification are ob- 
tained by maximising the following likelihood function. In its general form this likelihood 
function can be written as: 
N Ti 
fl H F(CZit)yil [1 - F(C'Zit)] 1-yi, (4.16) 
i=l t=l 
where 6'Zit =, 3'Xit +Et-1 'Ylyi, t-1. USingalogistic specification 
for F(. ) this becomes: 1=1 
N Tj 
exp(ýZjt) "it exp(ý'Zjt) 
1-yit 
+ exp(ý, 
y- 
; f) i=l t=l it) 
+ exp(ý'Yjt) 
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N Ti 
--ttl'7 %? lit . UýI, ý" rlH 
i=l t=l 
1+ exp(ý Zit) 
4.5.2 Heterogeneity 
(4.17) 
Since data is not available on all the variables that may affect absence behaviour some 
account for unobserved heterogeneity in the model specified above needs to be made. 
This can be achieved by decomposing the error term, vit, in the following way: 
vit .. ý uai + uit (4.18) 
where ai captures time invariant individual specific effects, and uit is independently dis- 
tributed over i. Now, the probability that a worker is absent can be written as: 
P(Yit = 1) = P(yi*t > 0) = P(eZit + orai) 
In this model the individual specific effects, aj, are treated as random variables 4 
representing the extent to which the intercept of the ith individual differs from the 
overall intercept. One way of estimating such a model is to assume that the unobserved 
components, aj, are independent of the observed regressors, and are a random sampling 
from a distribution with a probability density function h(a) in the population. The 
unobserved components can then be integrated out of the likelihood to form the marginal 
likelihood in the following way: 
4jf the individual specific effects, ai, are treated as fixed then the intercept is assumed to be different 
for each of the N individuals. As well as the computational problem of having to run a regression 
containing an extra N variables, the main disadvantage of the fixed effects approach compared to the 
random effects approach is that unless T tends to infinity maximisation of the fixed effects likelihood 
function gives inconsistent estimates (e. g., Chamberlain (1980)). 
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N 00 Ti 
rl 11 F(ý'Zjt + oa)yil (1 - F(ý'Zjt + ora))'-Yil h(a)da (4.20) 
i=l 
1-00 
t=l 
Under weak regularity conditions maximisation of this likelihood function gives con- 
sistent (as N tends to co) estimates of ý. Using a logistic distribution for the cumulative 
distribution function this becomes: 
fT. 
iv i 
fl rl (exp(6Zit + ora))Yit h(a)da (4.21) 
fI+ 
exp(6Zit + ca) i=l t=l 
The unobserved term is assumed to be normally distributed N(O, 1) in the population, 
and equation 4.21 is estimated using SABRE software developed by Barry, Francis and 
Davies (1990). 
4.5.3 Initial Conditions 
Another potential problem with the model outlined above is that the presence of lagged 
variables raises the issue of initial conditions, which if ignored can lead to bias in panel 
estimates (see Hsiao, (1989)). In dealing with this problem one of two assumptions are 
typically invoked (Heckman (1981b)). Either: 
e the initial conditions or relevant pre-sample history of the sample is assumed to be 
exogenous or, 
* the process is assumed to be in equilibrium. 
For the first assumption to hold the process under analysis has to be either observed 
from the beginning or the disturbance terms have to be serially independent. However, 
the data used in this study is not sampled from the start, and the disturbance terms are 
unlikely to be serially independent. The initial conditions in this model are thus unlikely 
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to be exogenous. The second assumption is also difficult to meet in this study due to the 
presence of time-varying exogenous covariates. 
Under these circumstances the endogenous variables in this analysis are likely to lead 
to inconsistent estimates. However, Hsiao (1986) and Davies, Elias and Penn (1992) 
argue that as T --4oo this inconsistency disappears. Thus, since T in this model is large 
(T = 254), the bias created by the presence of the lagged variables is unlikely to be very 
large. Barmby, Orme and Treble (1995) make a similar assumption in their work. See 
Heckman (1981b) and Orme (1997) for Monte Carlo evidence of this 5. 
4.6 All Workers 
4.6.1 Independent Variables 
The explanatory variables in the empirical analysis include a set of lag dummies to 
measure the effect past absence has on current choices. Since absence is to some extent 
determined by the worker's state of health the individual's absence decision on a given 
day is unlikely to be independent of his/her past absence. 
Financial characteristics are represented by the worker's annual salary, which is made 
up of basic pay plus a regional allowance. As shown in Section 4.3.1 in the traditional 
labour/leisure model of absence the relationship between wages and absence is a priori 
indeterminate due to conflicting income and substitution effects. However, both Barmby, 
51t should be noted that Orme (1997) has also devised a way to check for this initial condition bias. 
He begins by assuming that the initial conditions can be modelled as: yj*O = A'zi + 77i where zi is a 
vector containing current and/or pre-sample values of the regressors. Assuming bivariate normality 
between ai and qi Orme (1997) shows that E(ailyio) = pE(qijyiO), and E(, qilyio) = ejo, where ejo = 
(2yiO - 1)0(A'zi)/4)Q2yio - 11 A'zi), with 0(. ) and 4)(. ) being the standard normal distribution and 
density function, respectively; ejo is a Probit generalised error. It follows from this that: orai crpeio+vi. 
Substituting this into equation 4.19 would yield: yi*t = ý'Zit + poejo + vi + -it in which 6 orp, and vi 
is uncorrelated with the initial observation yio. 
This approach provides bias-corrected maximum likelihood estimators. However, the results only hold 
when p is small. Nevertheless, Orme (1997) argues that at the very least this method enables us to 
assess the potential inconsistency that may result if the initial conditions problem is ignored. Both 
Aralampalam, Booth and Taylor (2001), and Audas, Barmby, and Treble (1997) adopt this approach in 
their work. 
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Sessions and Treble's (1994) reservation sickness model and Allen's (1981b, 1983) hedonic 
interpretation of absence as an 'agreeable' job attribute, predict that wages will have a 
negative effect on absence behaviour. 
The effect bonus pay has on absence is also examined in this analysis. The size of 
the workers' annual bonuses are based on their twice-yearly performance evaluations and 
the performance of the unit to which they are assigned. Therefore, one would expect the 
relationship between bonus and absence behaviour to be negative. In other words, the 
higher the bonus the more committed employees are likely to be towards their jobs and 
so are less likely to be absent from work. However, this raises an important endogeneity 
problem since the negative relationship between absence and bonus could also arise if 
workers were rewarded for lower absence rates by receiving a bigger bonus. 
In addition, a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a member of staff 
or management is included to account for the effect contractual flexibility has on the 
decision to be absent. Brown, Fakhfakh, and Sessions (1999) argue that the relationship 
between absence and the level of supervision is a priori indeterminate. On the one hand, 
they assert that close supervision may reduce the potential for workers to act on their own 
initiative, causing the level of job satisfaction to fall and absence to rise. Alternatively, 
they argue that close supervision may allow managers to get to know their employees 
better leading to a more efficient allocation of tasks within the firm, thereby causing the 
level of job satisfaction to rise and absence to fall. 
Tenure with the firm is also included as a regressor in the following empirical analysis. 
On the one hand, as noted by Leigh (1986), the longer workers spend with the firm the 
more secure they should feel in their jobs and hence should be less worried about the 
consequences of increased absenteeism. Alternatively, increased tenure with the organi- 
sation may act as a proxy for greater job satisfaction and loyalty to the firm, giving rise 
to a negative relationship between tenure and absence. 
The effect educational attainment, such as whether the individual has a degree (base 
case is no degree) or a professional qualification (base case is no professional qualification) 
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is also investigated. It should, however, be noted that in most studies education has been 
found to have an insignificant effect on absence behaviour (see Allen (1981a), Wilson and 
Peel (1991) and Vistnes (1997)). 
Finally, in line with other studies, controls for personal characteristics such as marital 
status (base case is single), age, and the presence of children (base case is no children) 
are also made. As shown in Section 4.3.4 a common finding of many studies is that 
married people are more likely to be absent from work than single people, while the 
effect children, and age has on the level of absence is a priori indeterminate. 
4.6.2 Empirical Results 
The logistic model outlined in Section 4.5.1 is estimated separately for both males and 
females. Maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic for absence lagged 7 days are pre- 
sented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 for men and women, respectively. For comparison purposes 
maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic for absence lagged 6 days to absence lagged 
0 days are presented in Appendix A. Columns I and 11 of these tables report the results 
for the standard logistic, while columns III and IV report the results for the logistic after 
allowing. for heterogeneity. 
As can be seen in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 the coefficients on the significant lag dummies 
are positive, indicating that workers who have experienced a spell of absence in the past 
have a higher probability of absence than those who have not experienced the event. The 
results show that the predicted probability of absence for a 'representative' male worker 6 
increases from 0.009 if the individual was not absent at all in the last 7 days to 0.830 
if he was absent for the whole 7 days. Similarly, the predicted probability of absence 
increases from 0.013 if a 'representative' female worker 7 was not absent at all in the past 
61n this analysis a 'representative' male worker is defined as someone with the average male basic 
pay, bonus pay, tenure, and age, who is a member of staff, has no degree, professional qualification or 
children, and is single. 
71n this analysis a 'representative' female worker is defined as someone with the average female basic 
pay, bonus pay, tenure, and age, who is a member of staff, has no degree, professional qualification or 
children, and is single. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 7 
Ablag 6 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.817 
0.554 
0.668 
0.148 
0.426 
0.146 
0.404 
4.925 
-0.105xlo-4 
-0.147xlo-4 
0.009 
-0.257 
-0.709X10-3 
-0.220 
0.002 
-0-059 
0.004 
-68.785 -4.727 -4.633 
5.890 0.285 3.101 
6.252 0.519 5.049 
1.469 0.086 0.882 
4.677 0.339 3.806 
1.889 0.084 1.092 
6.560 0.354 5.708 
118.367 4.613 105.754 
-4.137 -0.128xlo-4 -3.536 
-2.055 -0.840xlo-5 -1.271 
2.737 0.010 1.972 
-5.980 -0.245 -3.985 
-0.010 0.041 0.427 
-5.775 -0.224 -3.933 
0.832 0.004 0.962 
-1.364 -0-052 -0.860 
0.207 0.003 0.109 
-20949.570 -20696.885 
1685 1685 
Table 4.5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (7 Lags) - Males. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 7 
Ablag 6 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.316 
0.641 
0.307 
0.313 
0.143 
0.433 
0.385 
4.242 
0.307xlO-5 
-0.23 jX10-3 
-0.006 
-0.142 
-0.229 
-0.108 
-0.945xlo-3 
0.066 
0.011 
-84.397 -4.357 -54.321 
13.306 0.430 8.937 
5.498 0.202 3.665 
5.753 0.246 4.604 
2.800 0.084 1.660 
9.639 0.367 8.213 
10.504 0.344 9.301 
165.241 4.056 153.674 
0.734 0.947xlO-' 1.426 
-4.434 -0.280xl 0-3 -3.692 
-3.041 -0.007 -2.165 
-2.427 -0.191 -2.156 
-2.844 -0.183 -1.488 
-2.929 -0.146 -2.570 
-0.576 -0.888xlo-3 -0.340 
3.090 0.067 2.066 
0.565 0.018 0.579 
-47136.882 -466764.468 
2052 2052 
Table 4.6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (7 Lags) - Females. 
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7 days to 0.802 if she was absent for the whole 7 days. 
Two explanations exist for this empirical regularity; true 'state' dependence and 'spu- 
rious' state dependence (Heckman (1981a)). 
True 'state' dependence depicts a situation where past experience of the event has 
a genuine behavioural effect on current choices, in the sense that an otherwise identical 
individual who has experienced the event in the past will behave differently from one 
who has not experienced the event. Since absence is to some extent determined by the 
worker's state of health, which is unlikely to be an independent realisation in each time 
period, 'state' dependence is likely to be a feature of this data. 
The existence of time persistent unobserved effects can also lead to 'spurious' state 
dependence. Under these circumstances, past experience may appear to be a determi- 
nant of future experience simply because it acts as a proxy for these temporally persistent 
unobserved effects. The results reported in Appendix A show that the size of the coef- 
ficients on the lag dummies are slightly smaller after controlling for unobserved effects. 
This implies that the effect past absence has on current choices is to some extent over- 
estimated in a model that neglects heterogeneity, since part of the relationship between 
past absence and current choices arises due to 'spurious' state dependence. 
Barmby, Orme and Treble (1995) and Barmby, Bojke and Treble (1997) using data 
from the daily absence records of a large U. K manufacturing firm in 1988 also examine the 
effect past absence has on current choices. Barmby, Orme and Treble (1995), for example, 
include a dummy variable for absence lagged 1 period in their empirical specification, 
and using a logistic analysis find that the lag of absence has a positive and significant 
effect on the probability of absence. In addition, they also find that the existence of 
unobserved effects appears to accentuate the structural influence lagged absence has on 
current choices, with the coefficient on the lag of absence falling in value once unobserved 
effects have been controlled for. Barmby, Bojke and Treble (1997) include 5 lag dummies 
in their logistic specification and find a similar result. 
Despite these findings, overall very few other economic studies appear to have exam- 
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ined the effect past absence has on current absence decisions. This is surprising given 
that in this and other studies that account for the lag of absence the largest and most sig- 
nificant coefficient is usually absence lagged I period. Also, as can be seen in Appendix 
A the significance and relative importance of some of the other explanatory variables 
appears to decline once some account is made for the lag of absence. For example, for 
men bonus pay, age and the dummy variable for marital status are significant when no 
account is made of lag structure, but become insignificant once absence lagged I period 
is included in the specification. Similarly, for women basic pay, having a degree and the 
presence of children are significant when no account is made of lag structure, but again 
become insignificant once absence lagged 1 period is included in the specification. 
Other explanatory variables also have an important role to play on the probability of 
absence. In line with the findings of other studies (see, for example, Drago and Wooden 
(1992), Chaudhury and Ng (1992), and Kenyon and Dawkins (1989)) basic pay has a 
negative and significant effect on the probability of absence for males. However, its effect 
on female absence behaviour is largely insignificant. In contrast, bonus pay has a negative 
and significant effect on the probability of absence for women in all specifications, but is 
insignificant for men. This raises an important endogeneity problem for women since, as 
mentioned earlier, the negative relationship between absence and bonus pay could arise 
if females were rewarded for lower absence rates by receiving a higher bonus. 
The coefficient on the management dummy is also negative and significant, indicating 
that managers are less likely to be absent from work than staff. For example, for males 
the predicted probability of absence decreases by 22.22% (from 0.009 to 0.007) if the 
&representative' male worker goes from being a member of staff to management. Similarly, 
for females the predicted probability of absence decreases by 15.38% (from 0.013 to 0.011) 
when a woman enters the management grades. Such a finding is in line with expectations 
reflecting the fact that managers are likely to have more flexible employment contracts 
than staff. 
For females tenure with the firm also has a negative and significant effect on the 
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probability of absence in all specifications. However, the effect is only slight. The results 
show that a 20% increase in tenure would cause the female absence rate to fall by 1.54% 
(from 0.0130 to 0.0128). In contrast, tenure has a slight positive and significant effect on 
male absence behaviour, and the results show that a 20% increase in tenure would cause 
the probability of absence for a 'representative' male worker to increase by 2.20% (from 
0.0091 to 0.0093). 
Important differences between men and women also emerge when looking at the effect 
personal characteristics have on absence behaviour. For females having a degree has a 
negative and significant effect on the probability of absence, but is insignificant for males. 
In contrast, for both men and women having a professional qualification has a negative 
and significant effect on the probability of absence. 
Finally, the dummy variable for marital status is positive and significant for females, 
but insignificant for males. For women the results show that the predicted probability of 
absence increases by 6.15% (from 0.0130 to 0.0138) when a female gets married. Such a 
finding indicates that married women are more likely to be absent from work than single 
women and could reflect the dual role females usually experience in both the home and 
work. Married women may, for example, be more likely to be absent from work than 
single women in order to engage in non-market activities (e. g., child care). 
4.7 Pay Spread. and Absence Behaviour 
In comparison to Section 4.6 this section pays particular attention to the incentive effects 
remuneration has on absence behaviour. Audas, Barmby and Treble (2000) use data 
from the administrative personnel records of the large U. K financial sector firm outlined 
in Chapter 2 to investigate how workers respond to remuneration differences and luck in 
the promotion system. They use absence as a proxy for effort and find that individuals 
respond to larger pay spreads (which in their analysis is made up of the employee's 
basic salary spread and bonus spread) by working harder. This section extends one 
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aspect of Audas, Barmby and Treble's (2000) analysis and decomposes pay spread into 
its component parts in order to investigate the effect basic salary spread and bonus spread 
individually has on absence behaviour. The effect lag structure has on these results is 
also examined. 
4.7.1 Model 
Audas, Barmby and Treble (2000) base their results on Lazear and Rosen's (1981) tour- 
nament model. As mentioned in Chapter 3 the essence of a tournament is that workers 
compete against one another for a fixed prize, which in the case of a firm is usually in the 
form of a promotion to a relatively better paid position. Consider again a tournament 
comprising of two-players (denoted by j and k) where the winner receives the fixed prize, 
Wl+,, and the loser receives the fixed prize, WI, W1+1 > W1. As before the optimal supply 
of effort for individual i is given by: 
WI) 
6p 
=cij, k (4.22) 5/ti 
and the probability that worker j wins in a contest against an identical opponent k is 
given by: 
P= prob(qj > qk) = prob(lLj - ILk > Ek - 6j) = G(ttj - 1-tk) (4.23) 
where G(. ) is the cumulative distribution function for Ek - Ej- It follows from this that: 
6P 
= 
6G(pj - Ilk) Uli 
- Ilk) T1 -Li -61-Li ,=, (4.24) 
where g(. ) is the probability density function for Ck - Ej- In equilibrium the effort levels 
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of the two individuals are assumed to be the same i. e., I-t, * = p* and at this point equation k 
(4.22) becomes: 
(Wl+l - WOO) = Opi) i =j, k (4.25) 
As mentioned before since C'(pi) is monotonically increasing in P the effort with which 
workers pursue their promotion increases with the size of the pay spread, W1+1 - W1. 
Another implication of equation (4.25) is that the smaller is the importance of luck, the 
greater is the amount of effort used by employees to win their promotion contest. 
4.7.2 Data and Variables 
In this analysis, as in Audas, Barmby and neble (2000), the impact of the promotion 
system on the supply of effort is measured using the absence rate as a proxy for effort. 
As before a logistic mixture model is used to estimate the probability of absence, such 
that: 
71., = . J" I - 1 
1 if indivdual i is absent 
0 otherwise 
(4.26) 
i N, t=1...... Ti, where i is the individual, and t are the time subscripts. 
The explanatory variables in this analysis are the same as those included in the model 
outlined in the previous section, with one exception. In this analysis the difference in 
mean basic pay between workers in grade 1 and grade 1+1 (i. e., the basic pay spread), 
and the difference in mean bonus pay between employees in grade 1 and grade 1+I (i. e., 
the bonus spread) are used as the compensation variables. As mentioned in Section 4.7.1 
tournament theory suggests that the relationship between absence and remuneration 
spread should be negative; higher pay spreads should be associated with higher effort 
levels through the convexity of the cost function. 
u otnerwise 
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As outlined in Chapter 2 the firm has an explicit hierarchical structure in which 
workers can be assigned to one of 12 levels or grades; grades 2 to 6 represent the clerical 
grades, while grades 7 to 13 represent the management grades. However, since promotion 
in grades 2 to 4 is geared more to attainment of a standard than to demonstrating 
superiority over rivals when constructing remuneration spreads the individuals in these 
grades are dropped from the analysis. Workers can also be assigned to three other grades 
(grades 1,98 and 99) which do not appear to be part of the conventional hierarchy. 
Individuals in these grades are thus not included in the resulting logistic model. Finally, 
since grades 11 to 13 are so sparsely populated workers in these grades are also ignored in 
the following analysis. Consequently, the data set outlined in Section 4.4 is restricted to 
individuals in grades 5 to 10 as in Audas, Barmby and Treble (2000), with the information 
on employees in grade 11 being included to define the prize for individuals in grade 10. 
4.7.3 Empirical Results 
The logistic model outlined in Section 4.5.1 is again estimated separately for both males 
and females. Maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic for absence lagged 7 days are 
presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 for men and women, respectively. Again for completeness 
maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic for absence lagged 6 days to absence lagged 
0 days are presented in Appendix B. Columns I and 11 of these tables report the results 
for the standard logistic, while columns III and IV report the results for the logistic after 
controlling for heterogeneity. 
These results again highlight the importance of controlling for lag structure. As can 
be seen in Appendix B, in the absence of lag structure bonus spread has a negative 
and significant effect on the probability of absence. However, once absence lagged I day 
is included in the analysis, bonus spread no longer has a significant effect on absence 
behaviour. In contrast, for both males and females basic pay spread has an insignificant 
effect on the probability of absence in all specifications. 
As mentioned earlier, Audas, Barmby and Treble (2000) find that even after con- 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 7 
Ablag 6 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-5.165 -40.520 -5.079 -28.342 
0.538 4.830 0.262 2.412 
0.735 5.804 0.580 4.799 
0.120 1.017 0.065 0.571 
0.446 4.180 0.358 3.438 
0.230 2.555 0.165 1.844 
0.371 5.203 0.322 4.474 
5.038 104.635 4.694 92.602 
0.342xlo-4 1.057 0.262xlo-4 0.586 
-0.146xlo-3 -2.027 -0.133xlo-3 -1.347 
0.007 1.674 0.008 1.305 
-0.336 -3.889 -0.302 -2.516 
0.023 0.332 0.061 0.625 
-0.203 -4.857 -0.212 -3.485 
0.005 1.246 0.007 1.324 
-0.024 -0.511 -0.025 -0.383 
-0.005 -0.236 -0.005 -0.182 
-15959.436 -15757.309 
1409 1409 
Table 4.7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Anaysis (7 Lags) - Males. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 7 
Ablag 6 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.578 
0.657 
0.361 
0.237 
0.197 
0.422 
0.447 
4.294 
0.719X10-4 
-0.198X1 0-3 
-0.004 
-0.354 
-0.162 
-0.095 
-0.832x10-3 
0.102 
0.002 
-23-199 -4.375 -13.971 
10.928 0.444 7.413 
5.179 0.253 3.699 
3.477 0.174 2.606 
3.094 0.137 2.178 
7.575 0.358 6.484 
9.830 0.409 8.970 
135.951 4.091 125.943 
1.072 0.123xlo-4 0.116 
-1.482 _0.747Xlo-4 -0.356 
-1.789 -0.003 -0.912 
-2.042 -0.238 -0.870 
-1.977 -0.080 -0.636 
-2.369 -0.120 -1.968 
-0.409 -0.814xlo-3 -0.256 
3.993 0.094 2.456 
0.088 0.003 0.091 
-31610.412 
1471 
-31294.499 
1471 
Table 4.8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (7 Lags) - Females. 
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trolling for the lag of absence pay spread (a combination of basic pay spread and bonus 
spread) has the proposed negative and significant effect on effort levels. Thus, although 
the results outlined above show that the remuneration variables are not individually sig- 
nificant they do have a negative and significant effect when combined. It should, however, 
be noted that an important difference between the two analyses is that Audas, Barmby 
and Treble (2000) take explicit account of 'luck', while in the results outlined in Appendix 
B aside from controlling for unobserved effects no direct account is taken of the 'luck' 
component. 
The effect the remaining explanatory variables have on the probability of absence are 
largely the same as those outlined in Section 4.6.2. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter seeks to add to the growing empirical literature on absenteeism by inves- 
tigating some of the determinants of absence within our large financial sector firm. In 
doing so it highlights the importance past absence has on current absence decisions and 
shows that in all specifications the largest and most significant coefficient is the lag of 
absence. The positive sign on this coefficient indicates that individuals who were away 
from work the previous day have a higher probability of absence than those who have not 
experienced the event. Such a result is in line with expectations since absence is to some 
extent determined by the worker's state of health. Despite these findings, only a handful 
of other studies (for example, Barmby, Orme and 'D-eble (1995) and Barmby, Bojke and 
Treble (1997)) have so far addressed the effect lag structure has on absence behaviour. 
These results also highlight the importance of controlling for unobserved effects. In 
particular, as a result of 'spurious' state dependence the effect past absence has on current 
choices is, to some extent, over-estimated in a model that neglects heterogeneity. 
Finally, in line with the findings of many other studies on absence, comparing the 
results by gender and family situation important differences emerge between individuals 
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in the variables which affect their absence behaviour. In particular, marital status is 
positive and significant for females, but insignificant for males. As mentioned earlier, 
such a finding indicates that married women are more likely to be absent from work than 
single women and could reflect the dual role females usually experience in both the home 
and work. 
4.9 Appendix A 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic analysis for both men and women for ab- 
sence lagged 7 days to absence lagged 1 day are presented below. In this section financial 
characteristics are represented by the worker's annual salary (comprising of the individ- 
ual's basic pay and a regional allowance), and bonus pay. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 6 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag I 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observation 
Logistic Specification, 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.823 
1.047 
0.186 
0.441 
0.157 
0.408 
4.930 
-0.105xl 0-4 
-0.150xlo-4 
0.009 
-0.253 
-0.007 
-0.223 
0.002 
-0.062 
0.003 
-68.890 -4.731 -45.861 
12.589 0.702 8.441 
1.852 0.102 1.049 
4.862 0.344 3.867 
2.031 0.087 1.125 
6.639 0.355 5.717 
118.604 4.615 105.752 
-4.136 -0-130XIO-4 -3-556 
-2.071 -0.832xlO-5 -1.257 
2.818 0.010 1.980 
-5.906 -0.246 -3.957 
-0.099 0.040 0.415 
-5.857 -0.229 -3.957 
0.889 0.004 0.966 
-1.452 -0.052 -0.860 
0.167 0.003 0.095 
-20966.498 
1685 
-20701.614 
1685 
Table 4.9: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (6 Lags) - Males. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard 
Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 6 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.316 
0.715 
0.370 
0.170 
0.445 
0.395 
4.245 
0.275xlo-5 
-0.229xlo-3 
-0.006 
-0.145 
-0.222 
-0.112 
-0.730xl 
0-3 
0.068 
0.010 
Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio 
-84.475 -4.362 -53.358 
15.614 0.462 9.999 
6.869 0.278 5.243 
3.331 0.097 1.927 
9.935 0.370 8.304 
10.784 0.348 9.425 
165.680 4.053 153.713 
0.659 0.962xlO-'5 1.421 
-4.408 -0.282xl 0-3 -3.722 
-2.912 -0.007 -2.176 
-2.480 -0.195 -2.177 
-2.761 -0.181 -1.456 
-3.046 -0.152 -2.599 
-0.446 -0.773xl 0-3 -0.290 
3.199 0.069 2.067 
0.513 0.018 0.564 
-47221.867 
2052 
-46715.200 
2052 
Table 4.10: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (6 Lags) - Females. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard 
Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.822 
0.930 
0.495 
0.176 
0.418 
4.934 
-0.104xlo-4 
-0.155xlo-4 
0.010 
-0.250 
-0.021 
-0.229 
0.003 
-0.071 
0.002 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio 
-68.922 -4.737 -44.376 
11.727 0.557 6.978 
5.483 0.371 4.178 
2.283 0.091 1.180 
6.818 0.357 5.732 
118.923 4.612 105.637 
-4.135 -0.136xlo-4 -3.619 
-2.113 -0.804xlO-' -1.211 
3.005 0.010 1.992 
-5.858 -0.251 -3.916 
-0.301 0.040 0.400 
-6.022 -0.242 -4.000 
0.955 0.004 0.974 
-1.649 -0.053 -0.853 
0.096 0.001 0.046 
-21039.608 -20735.327 
1685 1685 
Table 4.11: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (5 Lags) - Males. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard 
Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.317 
0.843 
0.223 
0.469 
0.400 
4.254 
0.278xlo-5 
-0.227xlo-3 
-0.006 
-0.153 
-0.216 
-0.110 
-0.557xlo-3 
0.071 
0.008 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio 
-84.623 -4.368 -52.454 
19.440 0.562 12.762 
4.417 0.125 2.497 
10.520 0.380 8.552 
10.958 0.348 9.434 
166.338 4.054 153-817 
0.668 0.987xlo-5 1.450 
-4.396 -0.285xl 0-3 -3.793 
-2.850 -0.008 -2.230 
-2.610 -0.203 -2.217 
-2.696 -0.179 -1.414 
-3-005 -0.155 -2.592 
-0.341 -0.684xlo-3 -0.248 
3.348 0.071 2.084 
0.423 0.017 0.535 
-47337.916 -46763-576 
2052 2052 
Table 4.12: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (5 Lags) - Females. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Age 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.828 
1.163 
0.220 
0.423 
4.944 
-0.106x10-4 
-0.159x1 0-4 
0.010 
-0.244 
0.003 
-0.038 
-0.234 
0.078 
-0.182x1 0-4 
-69.093 -4.748 
16.914 0.731 
2.878 0.109 
6.920 0.355 
119.478 4.615 
-4.206 -0-143xlo-4 
-2.139 -0-776xlo-5 
3.203 0.011 
-5.717 -0.253 
1.088 0.004 
-0.557 0.037 
-6.188 -0.254 
-1.812 -0.053 
-0-001 -0.799xlo-4 
-43.315 
10.270 
1.421 
5.705 
105.618 
-3.718 
-1.165 
2.003 
-3.840 
1.018 
0.366 
-4.023 
-0.830 
0.272xlO -2 
-21103-807 -20758.682 
1685 1685 
Table 4.13: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (4 Lags) - Males. 
150 
Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.320 
0.767 
0.520 
0.423 
4.257 
0.253xlo-5 
-0.228xlo-3 
-0.006 
-0.157 
-0.206 
-0.112 
-0.806xlo-4 
0.075 
0.006 
-84.920 -4.378 -51.201 
19.845 0.477 11.565 
11.752 0.407 9.195 
11.624 0.358 9.698 
166.999 4.051 153.830 
0.610 0.995xlo-5 1.443 
-4.422 -0.29 IX10-3 -3-905 
-2.743 -0.008 -2.291 
-2.685 -0.208 -2.223 
-2.596 -0.176 -1.361 
-3.078 -0.164 -2.655 
-0.050 -0.313xlo-3 -0.109 
3.510 0.073 2.086 
0.283 0.016 0.475 
-47514.523 -46841.424 
2052 2052 
Table 4.14: Maximum Likelihood Esitmates of Logistic Analysis (4 Lags) - Females. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualfication 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.848 -69.468 -4.774 -41.888 
1.043 17.674 0.566 9.026 
0.458 7.501 0.368 5.895 
4.947 119.925 4.613 105.387 
-0.107xlo-4 -4.270 -0.152xlo-4 -3.849 
-0.173xlo-4 -2.223 -0.756xlo-5 -1.124 
0.011 3.549 0.011 2.000 
-0.233 -5.493 -0.257 -3.710 
-0-066 -0.951 0.034 0.318 
-0.241 -6.387 -0.272 -3.963 
0.004 1.386 0.005 1.108 
-0.091 -2.136 -0.053 -0.799 
-0.002 -0-108 -0.002 -0.072 
-21234-777 -20808.657 
1685 1685 
Table 4.15: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (3 Lags) - Males. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag I 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.328 
1.064 
0.460 
4.271 
0.204xlO -5 
-0.228xlo-3 
-0.005 
-0.162 
-0.191 
-0.117 
0.517XIO-3 
0.080 
0.003 
-85.288 -4.394 -49.922 
31.167 0.702 19.573 
12.725 0.375 10.170 
168.338 4.055 154.103 
0.493 0.971XIO-5 1.388 
-4.452 -0.295xlo-3 -4.009 
-2.551 -0.842xlo-2 -2.321 
-2.777 -0.212 -2.210 
-2.419 -0.170 -1.285 
-3.217 -0.176 -2.772 
0.319 0.22 jX10-3 0.073 
3.758 0.076 2.099 
0.177 0.015 0.429 
-47700.038 -46905-986 
2052 2052 
Table 4.16: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (3 Lags) - Females. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.875 
1.165 
4.965 
_O. logXlo-4 
-0.187xlo-4 
0.013 
-0.218 
-0.102 
-0.255 
0.005 
-0.109 
-0.005 
-70-011 -4.793 -40.667 
25.049 0.698 13.780 
120.915 4.624 105.413 
-4.389 -0.165xlo-4 -4.069 
-2.341 -0.743xlo-5 -1.097 
4.136 0.012 2.157 
-5.192 -0.254 -3.518 
-1.464 0.029 0.265 
-6.800 -0.307 -4.111 
1.721 0.005 1.058 
-2.580 -0.049 -0.711 
-0.265 -0.004 -0.112 
-21382.348 -20848.092 
1685 1685 
Table 4.17: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (2 Lags) - Males. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard 
Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Basic Pay 
Bonus Pay 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.343 
1.167 
4.296 
0.650xlo-6 
-0.224xlo-3 
-0.004 
-0.173 
-0.158 
-0.128 
0.002 
0.088 
-0.880xlo-3 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio 
-86.006 -4.436 -47.851 
41.670 0.787 26.191 
170.766 4.066 154.747 
0.157 0.845xlo-5 1.172 
-4.407 -0.299X10-3 -4.156 
-2.117 -0.009 -2.301 
-2.981 -0.214 -2.131 
-2.030 -0.154 -1.117 
-3.538 -0.201 -3.028 
1.190 0.002 0.571 
4.175 0.078 2.038 
-0.045 0.013 0.371 
-48152.193 -47088-730 
2052 2052 
Table 4.18: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (2 Lags) - Females. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -4.936 -71.532 -4.818 -40.655 
Ablag 1 5.689 187.994 5.009 146.170 
Basic Pay -0.116xlo-4 -4.729 _0.191X10-4 -4.776 
Bonus Pay -0.203x10-4 -2.413 -0.672x10-5 -0.977 
Tenure 0.015 4.967 0.016 2.904 
Management -0.200 -4.826 -0.240 -3.353 
Degree -0.158 -2.251 0.022 0.185 
Professional Qualification -0.277 -7.482 -0.385 -5.684 
Age 0.007 2.484 0.004 0.896 
Married -0.127 -3.053 -0.029 -0.429 
Children -0.006 -0.332 -0.002 -0.061 
Log-likelihood -21688.843 -20940.175 
Number of Observations 1685 1685 
Table 4.19: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (1 Lag) - Males. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -4.360 -87.201 -4.507 -46.614 
Ablag 1 5.010 261.206 4.499 216.074 
Basic Pay -0.366xjO-5 -0.892 0.363xIO-5 0.488 
Bonus Pay -0.205xIO-3 -4.118 -0.297xjO-3 -4.253 
Tenure -0.002 -1.127 -0.009 -2.173 
Management -0.175 -3.056 -0.184 -1.779 
Degree -0.096 -1.271 -0.122 -0-907 
Professional Qualification -0.160 -4.443 -0.245 -3.621 
Age 0.004 2.735 0.005 1.428 
Married 0.104 5.028 0.079 1.917 
Children -0.007 -0.388 0.014 0.391 
Log-likelihood -48982.188 -47418.304 
Number of Observations 2052 2052 
Table 4.20: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (1 Lag) - Females. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -3.857 -79.395 -4.067 -44.778 
Basic Pay -0.152xlO -4 -7.694 -0.247x1O-4 -6.159 
Bonus Pay -0.818xIO -4 -5.484 -0.116xlo-4 -1.510 
Tenure 0.019 9.030 0.029 7.328 
Management -0.301 -9.299 -0.109 -1.956 
Degree -0.317 -5.618 -0.028 -0.171 
Professional Qualification -0.417 -15.446 -0.243 -4.879 
Age 0.013 7.171 0.006 1.953 
Married -0.219 -7.164 -0.137 -2.465 
Children -0.017 -1.217 0.033 1.016 
Log-likelihood -40882.782 -33492.322 
Number of Observations 1685 1685 
Table 4.21: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (0 Lags) - Males. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -3.268 -87.979 -4-086 -52.269 
Basic Pay -0.719xlO-5 -2.280 0.177x1O-4 2.660 
Bonus Pay -0.366xjO-3 -7.627 -0.263x10-3 -4.491 
Tenure -0.003 -2.152 -0.017 -5.442 
Management -0.263 -5.868 -1.029 -12.833 
Degree -0.114 -1.928 0.816 9.257 
Professional Qualification -0.253 -9.105 -0.508 -10.107 
Age 0.006 5.459 0.021 9.376 
Married 0.177 11.419 0.204 5.552 
Children -0.010 -0.711 -0-080 -3-531 
Log-likelihood -87561.028 -74023.710 
Number of Observations 2052 2052 
Table 4.22: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (0 Lags) - Females. 
4.10 Appendix B 
Again maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic analysis for males and females for 
absence lagged 7 days to. absence lagged 1 day are presented below. However, in this 
section financial characteristics are represented by pay spread and bonus spread. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 6 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag I 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-5-170 -40.596 -5.083 -28.099 
1.109 11.367 0.750 7.717 
0.153 1.297 0.078 0.683 
0.464 4.356 0.363 3.494 
0.241 2.675 0.168 1.869 
0.374 5.245 0.322 4.466 
5.045 104.862 4.696 92.601 
0.343xlo-4 1.065 0.256xlo-4 0.567 
-0.146xio-3 -2.033 -0.132xlo-3 -1-330 
0.007 1.744 0.008 1.317 
-0.334 -3.870 -0.302 -2.491 
0.018 0.253 0.060 0.609 
-0.206 -4.927 -0.217 -3.515 
0.005 1.274 0.007 1.306 
-0.028 -0.588 -0.025 -0.380 
-0.006 -0.273 -0-005 -0.186 
-15970-852 15760-178 
1409 1409 
Table 4.23: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (6 Lags) - Males. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 6 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag I 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.597 
0.778 
0.300 
0.223 
0.435 
0.455 
4.297 
0.776xlo-4 
-0.212xlo-3 
-0.004 
-0.369 
-0.155 
-0.098 
-0.672xlo-3 
0.104 
0.001 
-23.348 -4.388 -13.818 
13.681 0.521 9.095 
4.443 0.210 3.175 
3.518 0.150 2.389 
7.828 0.363 6.568 
10.041 0.413 9.060 
136.337 4.089 125.989 
1.160 0.157xl 0-4 0.146 
-1.588 -0.839xlo-4 -0.394 
-1.689 -0.003 -0.898 
-2.137 -0.250 -0.900 
-1.892 -0.077 -0.607 
-2.447 -0.122 -1.947 
-0.331 -0.734xlO-' -0.227 
4.108 0.095 2.447 
0.041 0.003 0.074 
-31667.745 
1471 
-31321.135 
1471 
Table 4.24: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (6 Lags) - Females. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-5.170 
0.949 
0.516 
0.266 
0.385 
5.048 
0.348xlo-4 
-0.147xlo-3 
0.007 
-0.334 
0.005 
-0.211 
0.005 
-0.037 
-0.007 
-40.663 -5.086 -27.196 
10.187 0.569 6.098 
4.869 0.389 3.747 
2.962 0.175 1.946 
5.412 0.323 4.472 
105.121 4.693 92.454 
1.082 0.230xlo-4 0.496 
-1.605 -0.129X10-3 -1.267 
1.875 0.008 1.327 
-3.882 -0.304 -2.426 
0.073 0.058 0.572 
-5.053 -0.230 -3.594 
1.343 0.007 1.263 
-0.770 -0.025 -0.365 
-0.357 -0.006 -0.215 
-16030.088 
1409 
-15788.254 
1409 
Table 4.25: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (5 Lags) - Males. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 5 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.601 
0.818 
0.285 
0.462 
0.461 
4.304 
0.793xlo-4 
-0.213xlo-3 
-0.004 
-0.382 
-0.149 
-0.096 
-0.557xl 
0-3 
0.110 
-0.528xlo-3 
-23.505 -4.399 -13.612 
15.034 0.532 9.644 
4.520 0.183 2.945 
8.346 0.375 6.795 
10.197 0.414 9.081 
136.840 4.089 126.032 
1.192 0.182xlo-4 0.166 
-1.192 -0.918xlo-4 -0.424 
-1.638 -0.004 -0.921 
-2.221 -0.262 -0.930 
-1.835 -0.073 -0.564 
-2.413 -0.121 -1.856 
-0.274 -0.669xlo-3 -0.200 
4.321 0.098 2.466 
-0.022 0.002 0.044 
-31756.213 
1471 
-31360.921 
1471 
Table 4.26: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (5 Lags) - Females. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
-5.177 
1.202 
0.313 
0.391 
5.059 
0.35 1X10-4 
-0.148x1 
0-3 
0.008 
-0.330 
-0.012 
-0.217 
0.005 
-0.044 
-0.009 
-40.774 -5.090 -26.467 
14.895 0.760 9.135 
3.507 0.194 2.167 
5.519 0.321 4.443 
105.620 4.697 92.424 
1.097 0.191X10-4 0.399 
-2.083 -0.123xlo-3 -1.181 
2.042 0.008 1.348 
-3.849 -0.299 -2.318 
-0.167 0.054 0.516 
-5.203 -0.244 -3.678 
1.419 0.007 1.242 
-0.929 -0.024 -0.339 
-0.448 -0.007 -0.240 
-16078.556 -15806.105 
1409 1409 
Table 4.27: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (4 Lags) - Males. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 4 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coeffiicient t-ratio 
-4.620 
0.843 
0.516 
0.482 
4.309 
0.835xlo-4 
-0.22 jX10-3 
-0.004 
-0.398 
-0.142 
-0.098 
-0.145xlo-3 
0.114 
-0.002 
-23.754 -4.418 -13.423 
16.980 0.517 10.121 
9.398 0.403 7.344 
10.699 0.423 9.272 
137.406 4.087 126.043 
1.264 0.216xlo-4 0.194 
-1.673 -0.102xlo-3 -0.466 
-1.590 -0.004 -0.968 
-2.330 -0.276 -0.961 
-1.753 -0.071 -0.541 
-2.465 -0.123 -1.801 
-0.072 -0.386xl 0-3 -0.111 
4.498 0.101 2.462 
-0.096 -0.641X10-3 -0.016 
-31862.159 -31405.511 
1471 1471 
Table 4.28: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (4 Lags) - Females. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag I 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-5.207 
1.172 
0.427 
5.065 
0.364xlo-4 
-0.152xlo-3 
0.009 
-0.325 
-0.039 
-0.222 
0.006 
-0.059 
-0.011 
-41.185 -5.207 -41.185 
17.162 1.172 17.162 
6.044 0.427 6.044 
106.101 5.065 106.101 
1.145 0.364x10-4 1.145 
-2.147 -0.152x10-3 -2.147 
2.296 0.009 2.296 
-3.812 -0.325 -3.812 
-0.542 -0.039 -0.524 
-5.346 -0.222 -5.346 
1.692 0.006 1.692 
-1.254 -0.059 -1.254 
-0.556 -0.011 -0.556 
-16179.916 -16179.916 
1409 1409 
Table 4.29: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (3 Lags) - Males. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 3 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observation 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4.643 
1.095 
0.526 
4.323 
0.866xlo-4 
-0.229xlo-3 
-0.003 
-0.413 
-0.127 
-0.101 
0.434xl 0-3 
0.122 
-0.004 
-23.936 -4.435 
25.855 0.722 
11.742 0.444 
138.533 4.091 
1.314 0.218xlo-4 
-1.737 -0.108xlo-3 
-1.496 -0.004 
-2.426 -0.283 
-1.583 -0.067 
-2.549 -0.129 
0.216 0.337xlo-4 
4.806 0.104 
-0.169 -0.004 
-31997.480 
1471 
-13.201 
16.233 
9.754 
126.258 
0.193 
-0.485 
-1.022 
-0.965 
-0.504 
-1.758 
0.922xlO -2 
2.467 
-0.089 
-31454.826 
1471 
Table 4.30: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (3 Lags) - Females. 
167 
Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-5.256 
1.228 
5.084 
0.407X10-4 
-0.163x10 -3 
0.011 
-0.322 
-0.079 
-0.237 
0.007 
-0.081 
-0.015 
-41.787 -5.090 -24.431 
22.807 0.726 12.306 
-2.326 4.709 92.179 
1.294 -0.521xlO-5 -0.103 
-2.326 -0.820xlo-4 -0.737 
2.861 0.011 1.550 
-3.813 -0.258 -1.874 
-1.080 0.045 0.390 
-5.748 -0.306 -4.197 
1.992 0.007 1.087 
-1.717 -0.006 -0.077 
-0.741 -0.012 -0.364 
-16318-310 
1409 
-15886.861 
1409 
Table 4.31: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (2 Lags) - Males. 
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Variable 
Constant 
Ablag 2 
Ablag 1 
Pay Spread 
Bonus Spread 
Tenure 
Management 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Children 
Log-likelihood 
. 
Number of Observations 
Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-4-709 -24.473 -4.500 -12-808 
1.261 36.659 0.869 23.541 
4.353 140.815 4.105 126.918 
0.986xlo-4 1.508 0.276xlo-4 0.237 
-0.258xlo-3 -1.972 -0.130xlo-3 -0-560 
-0.003 -1.309 -0.462xlo-2 -1.060 
-0.457 -2.701 -0.310 -1.014 
-0.097 -1.222 -0.060 -0.436 
-0.109 -2.770 -0.140 -1.617 
0.002 0.908 0.130xl 0-2 0.321 
0.134 5.339 0.108 2.409 
-0.009 . -0.385 -0.933xlo-2 -0.219 
-32307.992 -31580.414 
1471 1471 
Table 4.32: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (2 Lags) - Females. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -5.354 -43.080 -5.073 -23-675 
Ablag 1 5.855 168.357 5.113 128.412 
Pay Spread 0.500xl 0-4 1.620 -0.214xIO-4 0.405 
Bonus Spread -0.187xlO -3 -2.711 -0.562xIO-4 -0.475 
Tenure 0.014 3.618 0.014 2.057 
Management -0.329 -3.973 -0.230 -1.631 
Degree -0.138 -1.893 0.049 0.401 
Professional Qualification -0.259 -6.376 -0.373 -4.953 
Age 0.009 2.583 0.005 0.709 
Married -0.106 -2.292 0.026 0.336 
Children -0.016 -0.780 -0.017 -0.491 
Log-likelihood -16572.566 -15960.426 
Number of Observations 1409 1409 
Table 4.33: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (1 Lag) - Males. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -4.869 -25-654 -4.755 -12.971 
Ablag 1 5.131 218.451 4.585 178.729 
Pay Spread 0.133xIO-3 2.056 0.725x10-4 0.599 
Bonus Spread -0.343xl 0-3 -2.656. -0.245x10-3 -1-015 
Tenure -0.001 -0.650 -0.005 -1.026 
Management -0.546 -3.277 -0.444 -1.356 
Degree -0.037 -0.484 -0.046 -0.344 
Professional Qualification -0.137 -3.510 -0.115 -1.010 
Age 0.004 2.109 0.005 1.027 
Married 0.157 6.318 0.109 2.201 
Children -0.018 -0.761 -0.019 -0.434 
Log-likelihood -32949.200 -31845.720 
Number of Observations 1471 1471 
Table 4.34: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (I Lag) - Females. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -4.435 -48.769 -4.682 -26.872 
Pay Spread 0.916xjO-4 3.670 0.507XIO-4 1.464 
Bonus Spread -0.327X10-3 -5.856 -0.279xIO-3 -3.548 
Tenure 0.017 6.536 0.042 9.191 
Management -0.558 -8.493 -0.469 -4.898 
Degree -0.261 -4.511 0.361 2.646 
Professional Qualification -0.385 -13.349 -0.307 -5.789 
Age 0.018 7.620 0.010 2.073 
Married -0.168 -5.085 -0.332 -5.336 
Children -0.044 -2.959 0.049 1.703 
Log-likelihood -32268.669 -25892.929 
Number of Observations 1409 1409 
Table 4.35: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (0 Lags) - Males. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -4.184 -30.408 -4.184 -30.408 
Pay Spread 0.270x10-3 0.770 0.270xjO-3 0.770 
Bonus Spread -0.70 jX10-3 -7.244 -0.70 jX10-3 -7.244 
Tenure -0.002 -0.947 -0.002 -0.947 
Management -1.006 -8.351 -1.006 -8.351 
Degree -0.005 -0.083 -0.005 -0.083 
Professional Qualification -0.210 -7.035 -0.210 -7.035 
Age 0.006 4.265 0.006 4.265 
Married 0.266 14.438 0.266 14.438 
Children -0.027 -1.580 -0.027 -1.580 
Log-likelihood -60309.542 -60309.542 
Number of Observations 1471 1471 
Table 4.36: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Analysis (0 Lags) - Females. 
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Chapter 5 
Turnover 
5.1 Introduction 
The pattern of labour turnover in the U. K has been investigated extensively in a number 
of studies. Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999), for example, investigate job 
mobility and job tenure using work history data from the British Household Panel Survey 
over the period 1915 to 1990. They find that, on average, individuals in Britain hold 5 
jobs during their working life. They show this job changing to be greatest among young 
workers who are still in the process of finding a good lifetime job match and find that 
half of all job changes take place during the first 10 years of the individual's working life. 
Similarly, Gregg and Wadsworth (1995) using data from the Labour Force Survey for the 
years 1975,1984,1989, and 1993 finds that over half of all job changes take place before 
the age of 30. 
In contrast, evidence for the U. S suggests that the number of jobs held by workers in 
the U. S is approximately double the number held by those in the U. K. Hall (1982), for 
example, using data from the Current Population Survey finds that the average individual 
in the U. S holds approximately 10 jobs during their lifetime. However, in line with the 
results outlined above he shows that this job changing is most intense among young 
workers, and finds that by the age of 24 individuals have on average experienced 4 out 
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of the 10 jobs they will hold during their entire career. Hall (1982) shows that between 
the ages of 25 and 39 an average of 4 job changes take place, while from 39 onwards, 
when near lifetime work is characteristic, on average less than 3 more job changes occur. 
Similarly, Topel and Ward (1992) using data from the Longitudinal Employee-Employer 
data file between 1957 and 1972 finds that by the tenth year of entry into the labour 
market over half of young men in the U. S have held 6 or more jobs, while over a third 
have held 8 jobs or more. 
This chapter uses data from the personnel and payroll records of the large U. K finan- 
cial sector organisation outlined in Chapter 2 to investigate the separation behaviour of 
new entrants i. e., those workers who entered the firm between January 1989 and March 
1997. The aim of this chapter is to again look at gender differences in order to exam- 
ine whether males and females differ in the factors that affect their turnover behaviour. 
Two modes of analysis are used to examine this behaviour; the incidence of separation 
is estimated using a random effects logistic model and duration models with competing 
risks of exit due to quits, layoffs or 'other reasons' are used to estimate the hazard of 
separation. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides a summary of some of 
the economic theory behind labour turnover. Section 5.3 reviews some of the empirical 
evidence on labour turnover. A description of the data and model being used is given 
in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Key empirical results are reported in Section 5.6, 
while implications for future work and the conclusions are presented in Section 5.7. 
5.2 Theory 
5.2.1 Matching Models 
In these models turnover occurs as a result of the arrival of new information about 
the worker's current job match, or because of the arrival of new information about an 
alternative job. The most widely cited job matching model is Jovanovic (1979), the main 
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points of which are outlined below. 
Jovanovic (1979) makes three assumptions in his job matching theory of labour 
turnover. First, workers are assumed to have different levels of productivity in different 
jobs, and have differing levels of productivity when performing the same task. Second, 
contracts are assumed to be made with workers on an individual basis enabling employers 
to award a higher relative wage to those workers who match their jobs well. Third, both 
employers and employees are assumed to have imperfect information about the allocation 
of workers to their optimal task. The quality of the job match is thus unknown to both 
employers and employees at the time of hiring. 
The essence of Jovanovic's (1979) model is that over time both employers and em- 
ployees learn about the quality of the job match. It follows from this that individuals 
will only remain on jobs in which their Productivity is revealed to be relatively high, and 
leave jobs in which their productivity is revealed to be relatively low. 
Jovanovic (1979) also predicts that the relationship between the hazard of separation 
and tenure is non-monotonic. In other words, as both employees and employers learn 
more about the quality of the job match the hazard of separation should rise as poorly 
matched workers leave the organisation. However, as tenure increases only the well- 
matched individuals remain with the firm causing the hazard of hazard of separation to 
fall. 
5.2.2 Human Capital Theory 
Human capital theory also provides important insights into labour turnover. Investment 
in human capital can take two forms; general or specific. General training tends to 
increase the productivity of workers not only in the organisation providing the training, 
but also in all other firms. Specific training, on the other hand, tends to raise the 
individual's productivity more in the firm providing the training than elsewhere. It 
should be noted that whether training is general or specific affects who bears the cost of 
this investment, which in turn has implications for labour turnover behaviour. 
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The issue of who bears the costs in the case of general training is relatively straight- 
forward. Since general training increases the marginal product of workers not only in the 
organisation providing the training but also in all other firms, employers are unwilling to 
bear the costs of this investment and pay the worker a competitive wage during and after 
training in case the worker leaves before the firm can reap the benefits of its investment. 
The costs of general training are thus borne by the worker. 
The case of who bears the costs of specific training is less straightforward. Employers 
are again unwilling to bear the total costs of this training in case the workers leave 
before the firm can reap the benefits of its investment. Similarly, since the skills the 
employees acquire during specific training are difficult to re-employ elsewhere workers 
are also unwilling to bear the total costs of this training. Under these circumstances, 
the costs and returns are usually shared (although not necessarily equally) between the 
employees and the firm. Workers may, for example, be paid more than their marginal 
product while training but paid less than their marginal product after training. 
Rom this both Becker (1962) and Parsons (1972) argue that labour turnover is likely 
to be lower in firms with large investments in firm-specific human capital than in or- 
ganisations with no training or just general training. They assert that since the costs of 
any investment in firm-specific capital are usually borne by both workers and the firm, 
employees should have less of an incentive to quit and firms ought to have less of an 
incentive to lay them off if both parties are to reap the returns from their investments. 
Consider, for example, a firm which experiences an unexpected fall in demand for its 
product, the rest of the economy being unaffected. Becker (1962) argues that since the 
marginal product of workers without specific training i. e., the untrained or those with just 
general training is initially equal to wages, a fall in demand should cause these workers 
to be laid off in order to prevent their marginal product from falling below wages. In 
contrast, since the marginal product of workers with specific training is initially greater 
than wages (as it must be if the firm is to reap any returns from its investment) Becker 
(1962) and Parsons (1972) assert that providing the decline in demand does not cause 
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the individual's marginal product to fall below wages the firm has no incentive to layoff 
these workers. The organisation would, in fact, suffer a capital loss if such workers 
were permanently lost to the firm. Similarly, Becker (1962) argues that if the decline 
in demand were to push the marginal product of workers with specific training below 
wages, these individuals would only be laid off if the decline in demand were thought to 
be permanent. Any worker laid off by the firm would seek employment elsewhere causing 
the firm's investment in the individual to be lost forever. It follows from this that the 
larger the organisations's investment in a worker the lower is the firm's incentive to lay 
him/her off. 
Becker (1962) also extends his analysis to cover general declines in demand where 
wages are sticky and remain at their initial level. He argues that under these circum- 
stances the above conditions would still hold, but with one notable exception. During a 
general decline in demand the firm would have a greater incentive to layoff workers with 
specific training than when it alone experiences a fall in demand, since during a general 
downturn workers with specific training are less likely to find employment elsewhere. 
The analysis so far has concentrated on layoffs. Becker (1962) nevertheless asserts 
that similar reasons can be used to show that compared with other workers the quit rate of 
specifically trained workers is also relatively low and fluctuates less during the business 
cycle. In other words, since the marginal product of workers with specific training is 
initially greater than wages, the earnings that could be received elsewhere would have to 
be greater than this initial difference in order to induce individuals to quit. 
Scoones and Bernhardt (1998) explore the accumulation of human capital further and 
examine the employee's decision to invest in firm-specific capital or general capital. As 
mentioned above, since tile skills the employees acquire during specific training are diffi- 
cult to re-employ else where standard theory suggests that workers should be unwilling to 
invest in firm-specific capital unless higher wages are guaranteed by long-term contracts. 
However, Scoones and Bernhardt (1998) show that with asymmetric information workers 
may choose to invest in firm-specific capital rather than general capital even without 
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long-term contracts. 
They argue that before a worker is promoted only the individual's present employer 
knows the worker's ability, and so the employer does not have to compensate the indi- 
vidual fully for his/her ability. However, in order to exploit this ability, the employee 
must be promoted. As mentioned in Chapter 3, when a worker is promoted it signals 
information to competing firms that s/he is of a higher ability, leading to a wage in- 
crease. Scoones and Bernhardt (1998) assert that since by investing in firm-specific skills 
a worker increases his/her likelihood of promotion, which in turn ensures higher wages, 
workers maybe willing to forgo general capital investment for specific investment. 
5.3 Literature Review 
This section gives a brief review of some of the empirical literature on the causes and 
consequences of labour turnover. It should be noted that although, as shown in the intro- 
duction to this chapter, the pattern of labour turnover in the U. K has been investigated 
in a number of studies very little attention has been paid by U. K economists into the 
determinants of labour turnover. This is in contrast to the US where researchers appear 
to have a long history of looking at worker separation behaviour. 
5.3.1 Kaplan-Meier Estimates 
Most studies on labour turnover tend to begin their empirical analysis by conducting a 
preliminary graphical analysis of the raNv data by plotting the Kaplan-Meier estimates of 
the hazard of separation'. A common finding of many of these studies is that the Kaplan- 
Meier estimates are low during the initial stages of the contract, before rising and then 
beginning to fall slightly as tenure increases. Such a finding lends some support to the 
'Suppose the sample contains n observations and the exit times are ordered so that T, < T2 < ... < Tk. As a result of censoring and ties in the durations the number of completed durations k is usually less 
than n. The Kaplan-Meier estimator A(Tj) is derived by taking the number of spells completed at time 
Tj, hj and dividing by the number of spells neither completed or censored before duration Tj denoted 
by the risk set, nj. Thus: 
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job matching models of labour turnover (see, for example, Jovanovic (1979)) outlined 
in Section 5.2. In other words, as both employees and employers learn more about the 
quality of the job match the hazard of separation should rise as poorly matched workers 
leave the organisation. However, as tenure increases, only the well-matched individuals 
remain with the firm and so the hazard of separation ought to fall slightly. 
Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) plot the Kaplan-Meier estimates by 
gender for workers in their first and fifth job, respectively. They find that the hazard 
of separation rises during the first 12 to 24 months of a job, before declining thereafter 
across all reasons for leaving, which in their data set is split into quits, layoffs and 'other 
reasons 12 . 
Sicherman (1996) using data from the personnel records of a large US insurance 
company over the period 1971 to 1980 finds that the empirical hazard of quitting increases 
during tile first 2 months of tenure with the firm, before declining at a decreasing rate 
thereafter. In addition, lie finds the decline in the hazard to be greater for females than 
males, although the hazard rate remains higher for women than men at every level of 
firm tenure. Farber (1994) using data from the NLSY finds a similar result. 
In contrast, Lane and Parkin (1998) using data from the personnel records of 2123 
partners from the accountancy firm Ernst and Young over the period October 1989 to 
March 1991 finds that the empirical hazard of quitting does not peak until tile individual 
has been a partner for approximately 6 years, while the hazard of termination does not 
reach a peak until the worker has been a partner for at least 10 years. Similarly, Spurr 
and Sueyoshi (1993) using data from two cohorts of US lawyers between 1969 and 1983 
finds evidence of a peak exit rate of between 6 and 7 years. 
A h- 
A (Tj) =- 
nj 
(5.1) 
2 In their analysis 'other reasons' includes termination of contract, bad health, retirement, pregnancy, 
family care, national service, and full-time education. 
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5.3.2 Job Characteristics and Mirnover 
The effect financial compensation has on labour turnover has also been examined in 
a number of studies. In most of these studies evidence of a negative and significant 
relationship between financial compensation and labour turnover is common. 
Blau and Kahn (1981) use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Labour 
Market Experience (NLS) over the period 1969 to 1972 to examine the effect financial 
compensation has on labour turnover. They include two variables measuring financial 
compensation in their analysis; the worker's current wages and the median earnings in the 
individual's occupational category. Using a probit analysis they show that both current 
wages and median earnings have a negative and significant effect on the probability of 
quitting. 
As mentioned earlier, the larger the amount of specific human capital the less likely 
the worker is to quit or be laid off. Blau and Kahn (1981) argue that the financial com- 
pensation variables maybe acting as a proxy for the total amount of accumulated specific 
capital, giving rise to this negative relationship between earnings and lab our turnover. 
In addition, they assert that aside from this human capital interpretation a number of 
other reasons can be used to explain this finding. For example, they argue that a higher 
current wage, ceteris paribus, may signify a higher transitory wage relative to the median 
earnings in the individual's occupational category. Rom this they assert that the higher 
the worker's current wage, all else equal, the lower the individual's incentive to search 
and hence the probability s/he will find a better job elsewhere is reduced. In addition, 
they argue that, controlling for other factors, the higher is the median earnings in the 
worker's occupational category the higher will be the individual's permanent earnings on 
a particular job, so reducing the probability of quitting. 
Similarly, Viscusi (1980) using data from the University of Michigan Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics over the period 1975 to 1976 finds that wages have a negative and 
significant effect on the probability of quitting. Viscusi (1980) also estimates his quit 
equation using the difference between the worker's actual and predicted wages (i. e., the 
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(wage gap') as the measure of compensation and finds similar evidence of a negative and 
significant relationship between the 'wage gap' and the probability of quitting. Such a 
finding is in line with expectations, indicating that individuals with a large wage gap 
should be less likely to quit since they are being paid more than their predicted wage. 
In addition, Dolton and von der Klaauw (1995) examine the turnover behaviour of 
teachers in the U. K using data from a survey of individuals who graduated in 1980. They 
estimate a proportional hazard and find that the higher are the teacher's relative earnings 
the less likely they are to leave the profession. According to their results, a 10% increase 
in relative monthly earnings should cause the probability of exit at 5 years of tenure to 
fall by 9%. Dolton and von der Klaauw (1999) also uses the same data set to estimate a 
competing risk model of exit and finds that the higher the teacher's wage the less likely 
they are to leave teaching for career or family reasons. 
Lazear (1999) using data from the personnel records of a large US financial sector 
firm over the period 1986 to 1994 also investigates the effect financial compensation has 
on labour turnover behaviour. He estimates both a logit and a proportional hazard 
model and again finds evidence of a negative and significant relationship between total 
compensation and labour turnover. In contrast, Lazear (1999) finds that comparable 
salary, which measures the salary from jobs that are comparable to the one held, has a 
positive and significant effect on both the probability and hazard of separation. From 
this he concludes that individuals higher up the hierarchy are more likely to exit the 
firm than all other workers. However, within a given grade the more highly paid, and 
presumably better-suited employees, are the ones more likely to remain on the job. 
In contrast, Wilson and Peel (1991) using data from 52 engineering and metal working 
firms over the period 1983 to 1984 estimate several alternative specifications of a quit 
equation regression, and find that in all specifications real wages have an insignificant 
effect on quit behaviour. Similarly, Lindeboorn and Theeuwes (1991) using data from 
two waves of a Dutch panel survey of individuals in 1985 and 1986 find that wages tend 
to have an insignificant effect on labour separation behaviour. 
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As seen in Section 5.3.1 another variable that has an important impact on labour 
turnover is the worker's tenure with the firm. In line with the findings outlined in the 
previous section Viscusi (1980), for example, shows that a dummy variable measuring 
tenure with the firm of a year or less has a positive and significant effect on the probability 
of quitting, which is greater for females than males. He argues that in addition to 
Jovanovic's (1979) job matching model of labour turnover a number of other reasons can 
be used to explain this finding. Viscusi (1980) asserts that employees with low tenure 
may not have had time to accumulate much firm-specific human capital, making it easier 
for them to change jobs than those who have substantial experience and seniority with 
the organisation. In addition he argues that since workers with a high propensity to 
quit are more likely to quit the firm early, the tenure dummy may also be reflecting this 
self-selection phenomenon. He asserts that it could, for example, be capturing women 
who work for short periods of time out of economic necessity. 
Sicherman (1996) also investigates the effect tenure has on labour turnover and finds 
evidence of a negative relationship between tenure and the hazard of quitting for all 
market-related reasons 3, which is stronger for women than men. He finds that at low 
levels of tenure the hazard of quitting is initially greater for females than males, while for 
women with more than 5 years of experience females are less likely to quit than males. 
Similarly, Light and Ureta (1990) using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys 
of Labor Market Experience (NLS) find evidence of a negative relationship between tenure 
and the probability of separation, regardless of gender, cohort, and race. They assert 
that: 
... If this means that workers are finding and locking into good jobs, then it 
is good news for men and women alike. 
Similarly, Meitzen (1986) using data from the Employment Opportunities Pilot Pro- 
grams (EOPP) Employers' Survey in the U. S and a continuous time hazard finds that 
3These include higher earnings, better working conditions, greater opportunities, nearer home or 
better transportation, and more interesting or suitable job. 
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for males the hazard of quitting declines with tenure. For females he finds that the 
hazard of quitting increases with tenure. From this Meitzen (1986) concludes that the 
job-matching process operates in a different way for women. He argues that since women 
do not usually have continuous labour force attachment due to family and other committ- 
ments, they may not have very well devleoped labour market preferences or expectations. 
Meitzen (1986) argues that, under these circumstances, women may require more on-the- 
job learning in order to establish their labour market preferences, and until this process 
is complete a decision on the quality of the job match and quitting cannot be made. In 
addition, Meitzen (1986) argues that women may only become aware of various types of 
sex discrimination after being on the job for a while. 
Other job characteristics also affect labour turnover behaviour. Spurr and Sueyoshi 
(1993), for example, estimate various duration models for two cohorts of US lawyers, 
and find that in both cohorts employment in a small town and firm size has a negative 
and significant effect on the hazard of separation. These results no doubt reflect the 
relative availability of alternative employment for lawyers in large towns, and the greater 
opportunities for career progression that present themselves in larger organisations. In 
contrast, Wilson and Peel (1991) find that firm size has an insignificant effect on quit 
behaviour. 
The effect unions have on quit rates has also been examined in a number of studies. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984), for example, find evidence of a strong negative correla- 
tion between unionisation and quits, supporting their exit-voice trade off. According to 
this argument unions increase the productivity of their members by providing a direct 
path through which workers can voice their discontent to management thereby reducing 
voluntary turnover (or quit rates). Similarly, Wilson and Peel (1991) find that in all 
specifications the presence of a union has a negative and significant effect on average quit 
rates. 
In addition, Wilson and Peel (1991) find that profit-sharing and share ownership 
schemes also have a consistent negative and significant impact on quits in all specifica- 
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tions. It has been argued that profit-related pay and share ownership schemes reduce 
quits through their impact on employee commitment (Florkowski (1987)), employee in- 
volvement and satisfaction (Long (1980)), and employees' psychological and financial 
motivation (Hammer, Landau, and Stern (198 8)). Interestingly, they find that of the two 
schemes, share options have the strongest impact on quit behaviour. For example, they 
find that share ownership schemes lead to a reduction in quits of between 2% and 2.5%, 
compared to a reduction of between 1% and 2% for profit-sharing schemes. 
Finally, Lindeboorn and Theeuwes (1991) find significantly higher escape rates for 
workers who are in a job that requires managerial skills. 
5.3.3 Gender Differences and Turnover 
Another important explanatory variable in most studies on labour turnover is the indi- 
vidual's gender. A common finding of many of these studies is that females tend to have 
relatively weak job attachments and are thus more likely to leave the firm than their 
male counterparts. 
Viscusi (1980), for example, finds that women have higher predicted quit rates than 
men. However, he finds that if females are assumed to have the same type of jobs, 
firm tenure and live in the same region as males (but have their own personal and quit 
equation coefficients) then most of these differences are eliminated. Similarly, Sicherman 
(1996) finds that although women have a higher hazard of departure 4 than men once 
grade level and time spent in different grade levels have been controlled for this gender 
gap is cut by more than half In addition, as outlined above Sicherman (1996) finds that 
although at low levels of tenure the hazard of quitting for all market related reasons is 
higher for females than males, among workers with more than 5 years seniority women 
are less likely to quit than men. 
Similarly, Blau and Kahn (1981) using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys 
of Labor Market Experience (NLS) over the period 1970 to 1971 finds that females have 
4 Departures includes all reasons excluding death. 
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higher predicted quit rates than males. They also examine the importance differences in 
characteristics between men and women have on quit rates, and find that when the male 
values of the explanatory variables are substituted into the female probit functions the 
predicted quit rates of women fall below that of men. Similar results are found when the 
female values of the explanatory variables are substituted into the male probit functions. 
Blau and Kahn (1981) also consider the extent to which the differences in quit rates 
between men and women arise due to differences in labour market opportunities as op- 
posed to personal characteristics. They find that if females are assumed to have the job 
characteristics of the average male worker, but have their own personal characteristics 
(that includes tenure with the firm) predicted quit rates for women will be less than those 
for men. Blau and Kahn (1981) argue that this finding may in part be a reflection of sex 
discrimination in the labour market. 
Light and Ureta (1990) also use data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of 
Labor Market Experience (NLS) in their study on labour turnover. However, in contrast 
to Blau and Kahn (1981) their sample is observed over a longer period of time. The 
women in their sample are followed from 1968 to 1985, and the men from 1966 to 1981. 
In order to control for different birth cohorts, Light and Ureta (1990) define an 'early' 
cohort consisting of those individuals who were born between 1944 and 1947, and a 
'late' cohort comprising of those workers who were born between 1951 and 1954. They 
estimate proportional hazard models for all job separations among continuously employed 
individuals5 
, and use these estimates to calculate the implied probabilities that their 
'modal" worker will leave his/her job in the next 6 months, conditional on different 
levels of current tenure 7. Light and Ureta (1990) evaluate these probabilities in 1970 to 
1971 for the 'early' cohort and in 1976 to 1977 for the 'late' cohort. They show that 
for employees in the earlier cohort the probability of separation is lower for females than 
5Their sample thus excludes workers who are quitting their jobs in order to leave the labour force. 
GLight and Ureta (1992) define their 'modal' worker as being married, living in an SMSA, a high 
school graduate, and deemed to be a stayer for unobserved reasons. 
7The probabilities are evaluated at the cohort mean values of the hourly wage, the unemployment 
rate, and prior experience. 
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males (regardless of race and current tenure). Light and Ureta (1990), for example, 
find that white women have a 10.3% chance of leaving their jobs in the first 6 months, 
compared with 16.7% for that of men. In contrast, for individuals in the later cohort the 
probability of separation is higher for females than males (regardless of race and current 
tenure). 
Spurr and Sueyoshi (1993) estimate several alternative specifications of the hazard 
function in their study on labour turnover and find that in all specifications being a 
woman has a positive and significant effect on the hazard of separation, which changes 
little over time. They argue that in addition to economic discrimination a number of other 
possible explanations can be used to explain these findings. Spurr and Sueyoshi (1993), 
for example, argue that since females tend to have better non-market opportunities (for 
example, in household production) relative to their market opportunities than males, 
women maybe more likely to leave than males to leave the firm in orde r to purse these 
non-market activities. In addition, they assert that the higher separation among females 
may also arise due to a change in their partner's job. Spurr and Sueyoshi (1993) argue 
that since women often tend to earn less than men, females maybe forced to leave the 
firm for the sake of their partner's career if he is transferred or takes a job in a different 
location. Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991) also find that females are more mobile than 
males. 
Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) use a Cox proportional hazard with 
competing risks of exit due to quits, layoffs, and 'other reasons' to estimate some of the 
determinants of job separation in their study on labour turnover. They find that women 
are significantly less likely than men to be laid off, but are significantly more likely than 
males to leave their jobs for 'other reasons'. However, while women in their first job are 
statistically less likely than men to quit, Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) 
find no statistically significant gender difference in quit behaviour for workers in their 
fifth job. 
Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) also combine separations due to quits 
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and 'other reasons' into one category in order to examine the effect gender has on worker- 
initiated separations. They find that gender has no significant effect on the hazard of 
worker-initiated separations from the first job, but they show that for individuals in their 
fifth job females are significantly more likely than males to initiate a separation. Booth, 
Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) also interact gender with labour market entry 
dates and find that for workers in their first job, women entering the labour market 
before 1951 are significantly less likely than men to initiate a separation, while females 
in later cohorts are significantly more likely to initiate a separation. However, they find 
that for individuals in their fifth job women entering the labour market prior to 1951 are 
significantly less likely to initiate a separation, while gender has no significant effect on 
the hazard of worker-initiated separations for workers entering the labour market after 
1951. Wilson and Peel (1991) also find that gender has no significant effect on quit 
behaviour. 
5.3.4 Other Personal Characteristics and Tarnover 
Another variable that is often thought to be associated with labour turnover is the 
employee's age. A common finding of many of these studies is that age has a negative 
effect on labour turnover. Viscusi (1980), for example, finds evidence of a negative and 
significant relationship between age and the probability of quitting. He argues that since 
the returns to worker mobility fall with age this may cause older individuals to be less 
likely to leave the firm than younger workers. 
Similarly, Lindeboom and Thceuwes (1991) find that the young experience relatively 
high job-to-job mobility, whereas job-to-job transitions are relatively rare for the elderly. 
They argue. that such a finding could reflect the 'job shopping' phase individuals go 
through at the beginning of their careers. Lazear (1999) also finds evidence of a negative 
and significant relationship between age and the probability of separation, and Meitzen 
(1986) finds that age has a negative effect on the hazard of quitting which is stronger for 
females than males. 
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In contrast, Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) finds that age has a posi- 
tive and significant effect on the hazard of separation for 'other reasons' (which includes 
retirement and bad health). In addition, they show that age at the start of the fifth job 
has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of being laid off. 
The effect race has on labour turnover has also been examined in a number of studies. 
It should, however, be noted that the relationship between race and separation behaviour 
is often regarded as being a priori ambiguous. Viscusi (1980), for example, argues that 
while discrimination in the firm may increase the worker's incentive to leave, discrimina- 
tion in the market may make it more difficult for the individual to find a new job thereby 
increasing his/her incentive to stay. 
Viscusi (1980) examines the effect race has on the probability of quitting, and finds 
that non-whites are statistically less likely to leave the firm than whites. Booth, Francesconi 
and Garcia-Serrano (1999) also include a dummy variable for race in their study on labour 
turnover and find that non-white males are significantly less likely than white males to 
quit their first job, while non-white females are significantly more likely than white women 
to leave for 'other reasons'. In contrast, they show that for workers in their fifth job race 
has no statistically significant effect on the hazard of separation. 
Another variable that is included in most studies on labour turnover is the individual's 
educational attainment. Again the relationship between education and labour turnover 
is often viewed as being a priori indeterminate. Sicherman (1999), for example, asserts 
that on the one hand education may increase labour turnover if it causes more highly 
educated workers to attract better jobs elsewhere. Alternatively, he argues that education 
may also reduce worker separation behaviour if it enables better educated employees to 
receive more firm-specific training. 
Viscusi (1980) finds that the effect years of schooling has on the probability of quitting 
is mixed. He finds that for females schooling has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of quitting across both specifications (i. e., in both the wage-gap quit equation 
and the wage-quit equation), while for males schooling is only significant in the wage-gap 
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quit equation where it has a negative effect on the probability of quitting. 
Sicherman (1996) also examines the effect years of schooling has on the likelihood of 
separation, and finds evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between schooling and 
the hazard of quitting for all market-related reasons, which is stronger for women than 
men. He finds that at low levels, schooling has a negative effect on the hazard of quitting, 
while for females with more than 5 years of schooling and for males with schooling of 11 
years or more, it has a positive effect on the hazard of quitting. 
In addition, Sicherman (1996) investigates the effect an additional year of schooling 
has on the likelihood of separation for each of the different reasons for departure (these 
derivatives are calculated at both 12 and 16 years of schooling) and finds that schooling 
has a strong positive effect on quitting to take a job that offers better opportunities, and 
a negative effect on quitting for health and personal reasons. He also shows that for men 
schooling has a negative effect on the likelihood of dismissal, while for women schooling 
has a negative effect on the likelihood of leaving for non-market reasons, including illness 
in the family and household duties. 
Booth, Rancesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) also include variables measuring high- 
est educational attainment in their study on labour turnover. They find that workers 
with higher educational levels are significantly less likely to be laid off from their first job, 
but are significantly more likely to leave their first job for 'other reasons'. However, they 
find that while men with a degree are significantly more likely to quit, educational qual- 
ifications have no significant effect on the quit behaviour of women workers. In addition, 
Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) finds that for individuals in their fifth job 
the only educational variable to have a statistically significant impact are A-levels, which 
for males have a positive and significant effect on the hazard of being laid off. 
Spurr and Sueyoshi (1993) find that in all specifications the quality of the lawyer's 
school, and HONORS (an indicator of academic distinction) have a negative effect upon 
job exit. Similarly, Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991) find that workers with an extended 
primary education have a significantly lower hazard of separation. 
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5.3.5 Career Mobility and the Labour Market 
On a related issue, Sicherman and Calor (1990) examines the effect variables such as 
schooling and tenure have on occupational mobility (both within and across firms). Using 
data on male heads of households they estimate a multinomial logit that distinguishes 
between three career decisions; the individual moves to a higher level occupation across 
organisations, the worker gets promoted to a higher level occupation within the same 
firm, or the individual stays where s/he is. They find that when no control is made for 
occupation of origin, schooling has a negative effect on career mobility (both within and 
across firms). Such a finding is in line with their predictions indicating that since better 
educated workers are often able to start their working life further up the organisational 
hierarchy their careers are likely to involve fewer occupation changes (both within and 
across firms) than those of less educated workers. In addition, they find that after 
controlling for occupation of origin schooling has a positive effect on career mobility 
(both within and across firms). Such a finding is again in line with their expectations 
indicating that given an occupation of origin, educated individuals are more likely to 
move to a higher-level occupation than all other workers. 
Sicherman and Galor (1990) also examine the effect time in the labour market (expe- 
rience) and tenure with the firm has on career mobility. They find that time in the labour 
market has a negative effect on career mobility, and that with higher levels of experience 
mobility is more likely to occur within firms than across them. In addition, they show 
that tenure with the firm has a positive effect on the probability of promotion. Such a 
finding is in line with their expectations indicating that skills and experience gained in 
previous occupations increase the probability that a worker will move to a higher level 
occupation. 
Dolton and Kidd (1988) using data from the 1980 cohort of male U. K grades drawn 
from the 1987 Department of Employment Survey examines the interrelationship be- 
tween a worker's investment in training and his/her career decisions. They estimate a 
multinominal logit in which four occupational/career decisions can be made; the individ- 
191 
ual can stay in the same job without being promoted, be promoted in the first job and 
stay in that job, move to a different job in the same occupation, or move to a different 
occupation. According to their results workers who stay in the same firm are more likely 
to invest in firm-specific human capital than all other workers. In contrast, they find that 
individuals who change jobs or occupations are more likely to invest in general human 
capital than all other workers. 
5.4 D at a 
This chapter uses data from the personnel and payroll records of the large U. K financial 
sector firm outlined in Chapter 2 to investigate some of the causes and consequences of 
labour turnover. In this organisation all individuals who exit the organisation. are asked 
to cite their main reason for leaving. Eleven distinct exit codes are used to record the 
worker's reason for departure, and in this study these codes are split into three categories; 
quits (q), layoffs (1) and 'other reasons' (o). Following McLaughlin (1991) and Booth, 
Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) quits are defined as worker-initiated separations, 
and layoffs as firm-initiated separations. As in Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano 
(1999) 'other reasons' includes end of temporary contract, ill health, retirement and 
pregnancy. It should be noted that in this analysis exit code data is only available for 
those individuals who left the firm between January 1989 and February 1994, but as will 
be seen it nevertheless provides an important insight into the differences between males 
and females in their reason for departure. 
This study uses the data outlined above to analyse the turnover behaviour of new 
entrants i. e., those individuals who entered the firm between January 1989 and March 
1997. Approximately 20,256 workers entered the firm over this period; 8,667 men and 
11,589 women. A full-definition of the variables and summary statistics of the sample are 
given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Summary statistics of the workers who joined 
the firm between January 1989 and February 1994 (the period over which exit code data 
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is available) are presented in Table 5.3. It should be noted that individuals with missing 
values in any of the variables are dropped from the sample. 
Table 5.4 reports the distribution of each reason for departure by men and women over 
the period January 1989 to February 1994. As can be seen, females account for 59.664% 
of total separations, while males account for only 40.336%. For both men and women the 
main reason for leaving the firm is quits. Voluntary departures account for 75.781% of 
separations for males and 67.852% of separations for females. Involuntary separations, on 
the other hand, account for 23.021% of separations for men and 23.662% of separations 
for women, while not surprisingly, 'other reasons' (which includes pregnancy) accounts 
for 8.486% of departures among females and only 1.198% for males. 
5.5 Empirical Specification 
Two modes of analysis are used in this chapter to analyse the turnover behaviour of 
new entrants. Firstly, as in Lazear (1999) the incidence of separation is estimated using 
a logistic model. - Secondly, following Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999), a 
proportional hazard with competing risks of exit due to quits (q), layoffs (1) and 'other 
reasons' (o) is used to estimate the hazard of separation. 
5.5.1 Logistic Model 
Following Lazear (1999) each person-month is treated as a distinct observation and the 
probability that individual i leaves the firm in a given month (dit = 1) is written as a 
latent variable model of the form: 
di*t = 6Xit + vit (5.2) 
where: 
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Variable 
Tenure 
Salary 
Grade I 
Grade 2 
Grade 3 
Grade 4 
Grade 5 
Grade 6 
Grade 7 
Grade 8 
Grade 9 
Grade 10 
Grade 11 
Grade >12 
Other 
Rate 1 
Rate 2 
Rate 3 
Rate 4 
Rate 5 
Rate 6 
Date Hired 
Married 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Description 
worker's tenure with the firm 
worker's salary 
=1 if worker is 
=1 if worker is 
=I if worker is 
=1 if worker is 
1 if worker is 
=1 if worker is 
=1 if worker is 
=I if worker is 
=1 if worker is 
=1 if worker is 
1 if worker is 
1 if worker is 
1 if worker is 
in grade 1,0 otherwise 
in grade 2,0 otherwise 
in grade 3,0 otherwise 
in grade 4,0 otherwise 
in grade 5,0 otherwise 
in grade 6,0 otherwise 
in grade 7,0 otherwise 
in grade 8,0 otherwise 
in grade 9,0 otherwise 
in grade 10,0 otherwise 
in grade 11,0 otherwise 
in grade 12, or 13,0 otherwise 
in grade 1,98, or 99,0 otherwise 
I if performance rating is 1,0 otherwise 
1 if performance rating is 2,0 otherwise 
1 if performance rating is 3,0 otherwise 
I if performance rating is 4,0 otherwise 
1 if performance rating is 5,0 otherwise 
1 if unrated, 0 otherwise 
date individual joined the firm 
=1 if worker is married, 0 otherwise 
=1 if worker has a degree, 0 otherwise 
=1 if worker has a professional qualification, 0 otherwise 
age when worker entered the firm 
Table 5.1: Variable Names and Definitions - Turnover. 
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Males Females 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Tenure 29.261 
Salary 17181.200 
Management 0.405 
Rate 1 0.003 
Rate 2 0.020 
Rate 3 0.300 
Rate 4 0.151 
Rate 5 0.022 
Rate 6 0.492 
Married 0.307 
Degree 0.160 
Professional Qualification 0.060 
Age 28.205 
Number of Observations 
23.439 31.722 24-300 
14196.42 11528.100 5977.502 
8667 
0.491 0.105 0.307 
0.055 0.001 0.037 
0.139 0.007 0.085 
0.458 0.279 0.449 
0.358 0.205 0.403 
0.147 0.028 0.166 
0.500 0.473 0.499 
0.461 0.289 0.453 
0.367 0.067 0.251 
0.238 0.042 0.200 
8.175 26.095 7.596 
11589 
Note: Means are computed on all available person-months 
(276,717 for males and 396,770 for females). 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics - Turnover (Full Sample). 
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Males Females 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Tenure 21.228 15.207 22.300 15.337 
Salary 15395.890 12376.810 10078.370 5152.020 
Management 0.380 0.486 0.088 0.284 
Rate 1 0.003 0.053 0.002 0.040 
Rate 2 0.006 0.076 0.001 0.033 
Rate 3 0.272 0.445 0.226 0.418 
Rate 4 0.146 0.353 0.197 0.398 
Rate 5 0.019 0.137 0.025 0.158 
Rate 6 0.554 0.497 0.549 0.498 
Married 0.277 0.448 0.243 0.429 
Degree 0.139 0.346 0.057 0.231 
Professional Qualification 0.046 0.209 0.029 0.169 
Age 25.062 8.056 22.910 7.382 
Number of Observations 5037 7125 
Note: Means are computed on all available person-months 
(135,555 for males and 212,195 for females). 
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics - TVrnover (Restricted Sample). 
196 
Exit Reason Male(%) Female(%) Total(%) 
1. Voluntary Departure 
Voluntary 75.781 67.852 71-050 
Total 75.781 67.852 71.050 
2. Involuntary Departure 
Involuntary 16-823 12.500 14.244 
Business Sold 1.927 1.549 1.702 
Change of Contract 2.396 8.099 5.798 
End of Temporary Contract 1.875 1.514 1.660 
Total 23.021 23.662 23.403 
3. Other 
Involuntary - Health 0.052 0.141 0.105 
Pregnancy 0 6.338 3.782 
Voluntary - Health 0.625 1.690 1.261 
Retirement 0.365 0.282 0.315 
Death 0.156 0.035 0.084 
Total 1.198 8.486 5.546 
All 40.336 59.664 100 
Number of Observations 1920 2840 4760 
Table 5.4: Distribution of Reasons for Exit by Gender. 
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dit =-= 
I if di*t >0 ýO 
otherwise 
(5.3) 
i=1, ... ) N, t=1, ... ' Tj where i is the individual and t are the time subscripts. The 
set of parameters, 8, capture the effect the vector of explanatory variables, Xit, have on 
the worker's separation decision. A full description of the variables used in this model 
are given in Table 5.1. The error term, vit, is an independent realisation of a random 
variable with cumulative distribution function (CDF) F(. ). The probability of separation 
can thus be written as: 
P(dit = 1) = P(di, > 0) = F(, 8'Xit) (5.4) it 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the above specification are ob- 
tained by maximising the following likelihood function. In its general form this likelihood 
function can be written as: 
N Tj 
L(6) = rl rl F(, 8'Xit)yil [I - F(O'Xit)] 1-Y't 
i=1 t=1 
Using a logistic specification for F(. ) this becomes: 
N Ti 
exp(ßlxit) ) Y't (1 exp(ß'Xit) ) 1-Y't L(ß)=11 11 
exp(ß'7it) 1+ exp(ß'ý 
N Ti 
-,, - t Of Ir Nvif 
(5.5) 
(5.6) 
um, w ý'it) -. - 
1+ exp(, 8'Xit)- i=l t=l 
198 
Since data is not available on all the variables that may affect turnover behaviour, 
some account for unobserved heterogeneity in the model specified above needs to be 
made. As outlined in Chapter 4 this can be achieved by decomposing the error term, vit, 
in the following way: 
Vit = Cei + Uit (5.7) 
where uit is independently distribution over i and ai captures time invariant individual 
specific effects. Now, the probability of separation can be written as: 
P(yit = 1) = P(yi*, t > 0) = F(, 8'Xit + ai) (5.8) 
The inclusion of ai allows workers who are identical in terms of their observed charac- 
teristics to differ systematically in their response probabilities. As before the individual 
specific effects, aj, are treated as random, representing the extent to which the intercept 
of the ith worker differs from the overall intercept. One way of estimating such a model is 
to assume that the unobserved components, ozi, are independent of the observed regres- 
sors, and are a random sampling from a distribution with a probability density function 
h(a). in the population. The unobserved components can then be integrated out of the 
likelihood to form the marginal likelihood in the following way: 
co T 
HF(, 8'Xit + a)yit[i - F(, 6'Xit +a)]'-Yilh(a)da (5.9) 
01) t=i 
Under weak regularity conditions maximisation of this likelihood function gives con- 
sistent (as N tends to oo) estimates of 3. Using a logistic distribution for the cumulative 
distribution function equation 5.20 becomes: 
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N Ti I Yit 
rl f 00 r, (exp (o Xit + a')) h (a) da 
1+ exp(O'Xit + ai) 
2=1 t=l 
(5.10) 
In this model the incidental parameters, aj, are assumed to be normally distributed 
N(O, 1) in the population, and equation 5.21 is estimated using SABRE software devel- 
oped by Barry, Francis and Davies (1990). 
5.5.2 Hazard Model 
A cox proportional hazard model is also used to estimate the hazard of separation. Thus: 
A (x, t) = Ao (t) exp (x (t)'ß) (5.11) 
where Ao(t) is the baseline hazard, and x(t)' is a vector of explanatory variables with 
unknown coefficients, fl. It is called a proportional hazard because the explanatory vari- 
ables have the effect of multiplying the hazard function by a scale factor exp(x(t)', 6) that 
does not depend on duration, t. 
Cox's (1972) partial likelihood approach provides a convenient way of estimating '0 
without having to specify a functional form for the baseline hazard, Ao(t). Suppose that 
the sample contains n distinct exit times that are ordered so that T, < T2 < ... < T, 
and for any time, Ti, the risk set, Iý., represents all individuals whose exit time is at least 
Tj (in other words, for every individual j in the risk set Iý., tj > Tj). Assuming that 
there are no censoring or ties in the durations the conditional probability that individual 
i completes a spell at duration Tj can be written as: 
Prob[tj = Tilrisk setil 
Ao(t) exp(x'iO) (5.12) 
E Ao (t) exp (xý, 6) 
jcRý 
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This expression reduces to: 
exp(x, ý, O) 
E exp (xj, 8) 
jcRý 
and the resulting partial log-likelihood function becomes: 
ln L= >_. '[xiO ->ýx,, 6)1 
i=l jqER, 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
where the unknown parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
It should be noted that both censoring and ties can be easily dealt with in this partial 
likelihood framework. For example, an individual whose spell is censored between tj and 
tj+l is included in the risk set, R,, for ordered, completed exit times T, through to Tj 
but not in any others. Ties in the durations are handled by including a contribution to 
the likelihood for each of the tied observations, using the same observations in the risk 
set, R, for each. 
Competing Risks 
The model discussed so far specifies the determinants of a single risk, that of leaving the 
firm. However, as mentioned earlier for some of the workers who left the firm between 
January 1989 and February 1994 their reason for departure is also recorded. In this 
analysis a Cox proportional hazard with competing risks of exit due to quits (q), layoffs 
(1) and 'other reasons' (o) is used to estimate whether workers who cite different reasons 
for departure also exhibit different behavioural characteristics. 
Suppose again that T is the individual's tenure with the firm at the time of departure 
and there are K possible reasons for leaving that are labelled with the subscript k, where 
k=1,2, ..., K. As before the hazard function is denoted by \(t) and the probability 
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density and survival functions are denoted by f(t) and S(t), respectively. Lancaster 
(1990) argues that one way of estimating a model with competing risks is to assume that 
for each individual their observed duration is determined by whichever of the jTkj is the 
least. Then the hazard function with observed duration Tk can be written as: 
Pr(t <T Ak = liM k :ýt+ dtIT >- t) 
dt-0 dt 
where: 
(5.15) 
Sk(t) = Pr(Tk > t) (5.16) 
and: 
c 
Ak (t) exp -I Ak(u)du - Aj (u) du dt 
j=l, ji4k 0 
ý Ak exp - Äj (u) du dt 
j=l 01 
by independence of the ITk}: 
Kt 
Ak exp _E Ai (u) du dt (5.17) 
j=l 
10 
From this it can be seen that observations which exit due to a destination other than 
k are treated as censored at the point of completion. 
202 
Now the proportional hazard model can be written as: 
Ak (X 
i 
t) -' /\Ok 
(t) exp (Xißk) 
and the resulting partial log-likelihood is: 
n 
InL TN% - 
i=1 
5.6 Empirical Results 
5.6.1 Independent Variables 
icRi 
ß1 
(5.18) 
(5.19) 
The explanatory variables in the models outlined above include a variable measuring 
the worker's monthly salary, which is made up of the individual's basic pay, a regional 
allowance and a performance related bonus. As shown in Section 5.3.2 evidence of a 
negative and significant relationship between financial components and labour turnover 
is common (see, for example, Blau and Kahn (1981) and Viscusi (1980)). 
A dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a member of staff or man- 
agement is included to account for the effect position in the hierarchy has on labour 
separation behaviour, and a set of dummy variables are included to capture performance 
effects (base case is rate 1 to 3). Lazear (1999) finds that both workers further up the 
hierarchy and better performers are less likely to separate than all other employees. 
In line with Lazear (1999) date of hire is also included as a regressor in the empirical 
analysis. Lazear (1999) finds that surprisingly date of hire has a negative and significant 
effect on the probability of separation, indicating that those who have been hired most 
recently are less likely to leave the firm than all other workers. 
The effect educational attainment such as whether the individual has a degree (base 
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case is no degree) or a professional qualification (base case is no professional qualification) 
is also investigated. The relationship between education and labour turnover is, however, 
a priorZ indeterminate. As mentioned earlier, Sicherman (1996) asserts that on the one 
hand education may increase labour turnover if it causes more highly educated workers 
to attract better jobs elsewhere. Alternatively, he argues that education may also reduce 
labour separation behaviour if it enables better educated workers to receive more firm- 
specific training. 
Finally, controls are made for personal characteristics such as martial status (base 
case is single) and age. 
5.6.2 Logistic Results 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic regression for males and females are given in 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. Columns I and 11 of Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report the results 
for the standard logistic, while columns III and IV report the results for the logistic after 
controlling for heterogeneity. 
Comparing the results by gender both striking similarities and important differences 
emerge between men and women in the variables which affect their probability of depar- 
ture. 
As can be seen, for both males and females the coefficient on the management dummy 
is positive and significant, indicating that individuals higher up the hierarchy are more 
likely to leave the firm than all other workers. In contrast, for both men and women 
the coefficients on the performance ratings are negative and significant with a downward 
trend, indicating that better performers are less likely to leave the firm than other work- 
ers8. Lazear (1999) reports a similar result and argues that it may reflect the fact that at 
least part of what is measured by the firm's performance ratings is firm-specific. For both 
males and females having a professional qualification also has a negative and significant 
effect on the probability of separation. Such a finding is in line with expectations indi- 
8This downward trend is only slight for females. 
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cating that the quality of the job match is likely to improve if the worker has a relevant 
professional qualification. 
Important differences between men and women, however, emerge when looking at the 
effect salary has on the probability of separation. According to these results salary is 
only significant for men where in line with the findings outlined in Section 5.3.2 it has 
a negative effect on the probability of separation. As mentioned earlier, Blau and Kahn 
(1981), for example, argue that the financial compensation variables maybe acting as a 
proxy for the total amount of accumulated specific capital, giving rise to this negative 
relationship between wages and labour turnover. In other words, as noted in the theory 
section on human capital and turnover the larger the amount of specific human capital 
the less likely the worker is to quit or be laid off (see, for example, Becker (1962) and 
Parsons (1972)). 
Other differences between males and females emerge when looking at the effect per- 
sonal characteristics have on the probability of separation. In particular, for women 
being married has a positive and significant effect on the probability of separation, but 
has a negative and significant effect on separation behaviour for men. This could reflect 
the differing roles males and females tend to play in the home. Married women may, 
for example, be more likely to leave the firm than single women in order to engage in 
non-market opportunities (e. g., child care). In contrast, married men have traditionally 
been regarded as the main wage earners within a household, which may make them less 
willing than single men to leave a relatively stable working environment. 
Finally, age is positive and significant for females but surprisingly insignificant for 
males. Such a finding indicates that older women are more likely to leave the firm than 
younger women. This result may arise because older workers tend to be more likely to 
be laid off or to leave the labour market entirely (due to ill health, retirement etc) than 
younger employees. This issue is returned to in the competing risks model estimated in 
the next section. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -5.227 -22.277 -3-990 -12.768 
Salary -0.282x10-5 -1.807 -0.33 1XIO-5 -1.718 
Management 0.291 6.517 0.296 5.294 
Rate 4 -0.441 -7.339 -0.433 -6.683 
Rate 5 -0.774 -4.677 -0.712 -4.056 
Rate 6 0.011 0.288 -0.294 -6.112 
Date Hired 0.753x10-4 3.567 -0.217xIO-4 -0.792 
Degree -0.018 -0.381 -0.413x10-1 -0.683 
Professional Qualification -0.534 -5.784 -0.475 -4.405 
Age 0.005 1.818 0.003 0.755 
Married -0.155 -3.400 -0.125 -2.144 
Log-likelihood -19774.074 -19698.839 
Number of Observations 8667 8667 
Table 5.5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Turnover Model - Males. 
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Logistic Specification 
Standard Random Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant -5.913 -30.035 -4.513 -16.703 
Salary -0.126xjO-4 -3.618 -0.160x10-5 -0.388 
Managment 0.277 4.730 0.169 2.205 
Rate 4 -0.478 -10.252 -0.506 -9.853 
Rate 5 -0.498 -4.648 -0-518 -4.411 
Rate 6 0.108 3.352 -0.270 -6.451 
Date Hired 0.13 1XIO-3 7.270 0.16 1XIO-5 -0.065 
Degree 0.075 1.265 0.031 0.384 
Professional Qualification -0.547 -5.922 -0.476 -4.235 
Age 0.009 4.411 0.009 3.128 
Married 0.216 6.408 0.382 8.568 
Log-likelihood -28044.105 -27886.532 
Number of Observations 11589 11589 
Table 5.6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Turnover Model - Females. 
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Variable 
Cox Proportional Hazard 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Salary -0.144xlO -7 -0.968 
Management 0.298 6.737 
Rate 4 -0.397 -6.617 
Rate 5 -0.696 -4.208 
Rate 6 -0.324 -7.308 
Degree -0.010 -0.206 
Professional Qualification -0.339 -3.630 
Age -0.001 -0.326 
Married -0.110 -2.432 
Log-likelihood -31459-103 
Number of Observations 8667 
Table 5-7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard of Departure - Males. 
5.6.3 Hazard Results 
The explanatory variables included in the Cox proportional hazard are the same as 
those in the logistic regression. Maximum likelihood estimates of the Cox proportional 
hazard for males and females are presented in Tables 5.7. and 5.8, respectively. The 
results reported in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 largely mimic (in both sign and significance) the 
results of the logistic models. For example, workers who are in a staff grade, have a 
professional qualification, and a high performance rating have a significantly lower hazard 
of separation than all other employees. Similarly, for women being married has a positive 
and significant effect on the hazard of separation, but has a negative and significant effect 
on the likelihood of separation for men. However, in contrast to the results outlined in the 
previous section salary has an insignificant effect on the hazard of separation. Similarly, 
the coefficient on age is also insignificant for both males and females. 
208 
Variable 
Cox Proportional Hazard 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Salary -0.114x10-7 -0.374 
Management 0.211 3.688 
Rate 4 -0.432 -9.245 
Rate 5 -0.415 -3.868 
Rate 6 -0.365 -8.980 
Professional Qualification -0.353 -3.800 
Age 0.002 1.106 
Married 0.271 7.971 
Log-likelihood -46240.016 
Number of Observations 11589 
Table 5.8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard of Departure - Females. 
Competing Risks Model As mentioned earlier for some of the individuals who left the 
firm between January 1989 and February 1994 their reason for departure is also recorded. 
For comparison purposes maximum likelihood estimates of the Cox proportional hazard 
for men and women over this restricted period are presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.10, 
respectively. 
The results presented in these tables are, not surprisingly, similar (in both sign and 
significance) to the hazard results reported for the entire sample, but with one notable 
exception. In contrast to the previous results for both males and females, wages have 
a positive and significant effect on the hazard of separation, indicating that the higher 
the worker's salary the more likely s/he is to leave the firm. Since these employees have 
only been at the organisation for a short period of time (at most 4 years) they will not 
have accumulated much firm-specific human capital, which may make them less tied to 
the company than the individuals analysed in the full sample. Thus, instead of being 
a measure of firm-specific human capital the wage variable could, in this instance, be 
acting as a proxy for general human capital accumulation. 
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Variable 
Salary 
Management 
Rate 4 
Rate 5 
Rate 6 
Degree 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Log-likelihood 
Number of Observations 
-15291.020 
5037 
Table 5.9: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard of Departure (Restricted Sam- 
ple) - Males. 
Variable 
Cox Proportional Hazard 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Salary 
Management 
Rate 4 
Rate 5 
Rate 6 
Professional Qualification 
Age 
Married 
Log-Likelihood 
Number of Observations 
-23905.434 
7125 
Table 5.10: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard of Departure (Restricted 
Sample) - Females. 
Cox Proportional Hazard 
Coefficient t-ratio 
0.649xlO-5 3.128 
0.087 1.323 
-0.419 -4.743 
-0.965 -3.416 
-0.198 -3.055 
-0.006 -0.092 
-0.641 -3.862 
0.003 0.813 
-0.124 -1.872 
0.13 jX10-4 2.966 
-0.002 -0.026 
-0.346 -5.042 
-0.171 -1.178 
-0.343 -5.691 
-0.490 -2.947 
0.004 1.361 
0.299 6.027 
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The estimation results for the competing risks model for males and females are re- 
ported in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, respectively. Again most coefficients have the expected 
sign. However, since the coefficients are no longer restricted to be equal between the 
three risks, the findings differ slightly when compared with the single risk model. 
In line with the previous results salary has a positive and significant effect on the 
hazard of quitting. Similarly, for men salary has a positive and significant effect on the 
layoff hazard. However, for both males and females, salary has an insignificant effect on 
the hazard of leaving for 'other reasons. 
Other significant results include the management dummy which has a positive and 
significant effect on the hazard of quitting for men, but a negative effect on the hazard 
of quitting for women. In addition, for females being a manager has a positive and 
significant effect on the hazard of being laid off. 
Similarly, in line with the previous results for males the coefficients on the performance 
ratings have a negative and significant effect on the hazard of separation for quits and 
layoffs. For both men and women having a professional qualification also has a negative 
and significant effect on the hazard of separation for quits and layoffs. As mentioned 
earlier, these results may reflect the fact that better matched workers are less likely to 
leave tile firm. 
For females, marital status has a positive and significant effect on the hazard of 
separation for 'other reasons' (including pregnancy), but is insignificant for males. In 
contrast, being married has a negative and significant effect on tile hazard of quitting 
for men but is insignificant for women. Such a finding again highlights the differing 
roles males and females tend to play in the home. As mentioned earlier, married women 
maybe more likely to leave the firm than single women in order to pursue non-market 
activities, and given these household commitments may also be more likely to be laid off 
than single women. In contrast, married men have traditionally been regarded as the 
main wage earners within a household, which may make them less willing than single 
men to leave a relatively stable working environment. 
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Cox Proportional Hazard 
Quit Layoff Other 
Variable Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
Salary 0.679xl 0-7 2.741 0.793xIO-7 2.103 -0.399xlo-4 -1.086 
Management 0.143 1.868 0.065 0.490 -0.627 -0.997 
Rate 4 -0.323 -3.127 -0.677 -3.810 -0.544 -0.786 
Rate 5 -0.761 -2.359 -1.789 -2.503 -0.515 -0.468 
Rate 6 -0.154 -2.043 -0.304 -2.337 -0.540 -0.862 
Degree -0.032 -0.401 0.067 0.496 0.092 0.118 
Prof. Qual. -0.530 -2.874 -0.947 -2.463 
Age -0.009 -1.845 0.023 3.021 0.140 6.858 
Married -0.145 -1.850 0.004 0.032 -0.803 -1.511 
Log-likelihood -11643.962 -3447.889 -157.741 
No. of Obs. 1455 442 23 
Table 5.11: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard of Departure: A Competing 
Risks Model - Males. 
Finally, for females age has a positive and significant effect on the hazard of leaving 
for 'other reasons' (including pregnancy). However, for both males and females older 
workers are more likely than younger workers to be laid off, while for men they are also 
more likely to quit. 
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Cox Proportional Hazard 
Quit Layoff Other 
Variable Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
Salary 0.161XIO-4 2.917 0.78 IX10-7 0.962 0.141xl 0-4 0.776 
Management -0.175 -1.560 0.523 3.500 -0.660 -1.881 
Rate 4 -0.382 -4.204 -0.259 -2.117 -0.418 -2.029 
Rate 5 -0.274 -1.308 0.046 0.208 -0.688 -1.321 
Rate 6 -0.286 -3.794 -0.369 -3.096 -0.680 -3.449 
Degree 0.062 0.590 -0.314 -1.705 -0.535 -1.316 
ProL Qual. -0.468 -2.363 -0.536 -1.565 -0.661 -0.918 
Age -0.68 jX10-3 -0.174 0.022 4.202 -0.017 1.800 
Married -0.030 -0.453 0.559 5.986 1.728 10.891 
Log-likelihood -16355.391 -5492.163 -1938.829 
No. of Obs 1927 672 241 
Table 5.12: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hazard of Departure: A Competing 
Risks Models - Females. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter seeks to add to the limited empirical evidence on labour separation be- 
haviour in the U. K by investigating some of the causes and consequences of labour 
turnover within our large U. K financial sector firm. 
Exit code data which is available for those individuals who left the firm between Jan- 
uary 1989 and February 1994 provides an important insight into some of the similarities 
and differences between males and females in their reason for departure. Women, for 
example, account for 59.664% of total separations over this period, compared with only 
40.336% for that of men. From this voluntary departures account for 75.781% of separa- 
tions for males and 67.852% of separations for females. Involuntary separations, on the 
other hand, account for 23.021% of separations for men and 23.662% of separations for 
women, while not surprisingly 'other reasons' (which includes pregnancy) accounts for 
8.486% of departures among females and only 1.198% of departures among males. 
To identify some of the determinant of labour turnover the incidence of separation is 
estimated using a random effects logistic and the hazard of separation is estimated using 
a Cox proportional hazard. The results show that in most specifications workers who 
are in a staff grade, have a professional qualification, and a higher performance rating 
have a significantly lower likelihood of separation than all other employees. These findings 
also highlight some important differences between men and women in the variables which 
affect their likelihood of separation. In particular, for females being married has a positive 
, 
and significant effect on the likelihood of separation, but has a negative and significant 
effect on male separation behaviour. As mentioned earlier, this could reflect the differing 
roles men and women tend to play in the home. Married women may, for example, 
be more likely to leave the firm than single women in order to engage in non-market 
opportunities (e. g., child care). In contrast, married men have traditionally been regarded 
as the main wage earners within a household, which may make them less willing than 
single men to leave a relatively stable working environment. 
For the workers who left the firm between January 1989 and February 1994 a Cox 
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proportional hazard with competing risks of exit due to quits (q), layoffs (1), and 'other 
reasons' (o) is also used to estimate whether workers who cite different reasons for de- 
parture also exhibit different behavioural characteristics. These results provide further 
support for the findings outlined above. In particular, they show that for females marital 
status has a positive and significant effect on the hazard of leaving for 'other reasons' 
(including pregnancy), but is insignificant for males. In contrast, being married has a 
negative and significant effect on the hazard of quitting for men, but is insignificant for 
women. 
In line with Dolton and van der Klauuw (1999), who use a model suggested by Heck- 
man and Singer (1984), an obvious extension to the work produced in this paper would 
be to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the competing risks model estimated in the 
previous section. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis uses data from the monthly personnel and payroll records of a large U. K 
banking sector firm to add to the limited body of empirical evidence in the area of 
personnel economics. In doing so it examines three broad fields of personnel economics: 
promotion, absenteeism and labour turnover. Although personnel data of this type has 
been available for other countries, especially the US (see, for example, Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom (1994) and Lazear (1999)) this is one of the first data sets of its kind to be 
used to analyse the internal workings of a U. K firm. 
A detailed review of this large U. K financial sector organisation is presented in Chap- 
ter 2. The personnel and payroll records used in this thesis are available over the period 
January 1989 to March 1997 (giving 99 monthly observations). Although the firm varies 
in size over this period overall it employs approximately 40,000 full-time workers and 
20,000 part-time workers. Each observation in this data set is identified via a unique 
staff identification number and for each individual the personnel and payroll records 
contain details of the worker's job code, work unit code, salary, bonus, position in the hi- 
erarchy, date of entry into their current spell of employment, performance rating, partial 
post code of home and work, sex, age, marital status, number of children, ethnic origin, 
and some indicators of educational attainment. 
Chapter 2 also examines the internal structure of the firm and finds that the organ- 
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isation has an explicit hierarchy in which workers can be assigned to one of 12 levels or 
grades; grades 2 to 6 represent the clerical grades, while grades 7 to 13 represent the 
management grades. Although the number of individuals employed in the clerical grades 
fell slightly between January 1989 and March 1997, the relative structure of the rest of 
the hierarchy has, nevertheless, remained remarkably stable over the period studied. 
This chapter also investigates the extent to which the arrangements in our firm mimic 
those found in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's (1994) influential paper in this area. Again 
it should be noted that the analysis outlined in this chapter draws heavily on work 
produced by Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001). 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) use data from the personnel records of a large 
US service sector firm over the period 1969 to 1988 to analyse the extent to which the 
arrangements in their organisation characterise Doeringer and Piore's (1971) definition 
of an internal labour market. Despite the fact that the two firms operate in different 
countries, and the two sets of personnel records are available over different time periods 
the structure of the two organisations, nevertheless, appear to be remarkably similar. 
As mentioned above our firm, like Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's (1994), has an ex- 
plicit hierarchy which is relatively stable over time. In line with Doeringer and Piore's 
(1971) description of an internal labour market there is also evidence from both organ- 
isations that the internal labour market is allocating workers to jobs. Careers in both 
firms, for example, tend to be relatively long and demotions are rare. There is, however, 
no evidence in either organisation to support the idea of defined ports of entry and exit; 
entry and exit can occur at all grades/levels. 
Employers in both firms also tend to use lower level job performance to learn about the 
innate abilities of their workers, and use this information in their subsequent promotion 
decisions. Such an inference is supported by the existence of promotion fast-tracking in 
both organisations, in which those promoted quickly at one grade/level are promoted 
more often and more quickly from the next grade/level. 
Finally, in line with Doeringer and Piore's (1971) description of an internal labour 
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market there is evidence from both firms that wages are not determined solely on an 
individual basis but are strongly related to the grade the worker is in. The structure 
of pay is also convex within both organisations, as many incentive-based theories e. g., 
tournament theory (see Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986)) would suggest. 
Although many similarities exist between the two firms important differences do, 
nevertheless, arise. Exit rates, for example, tend to be more variable in our large financial 
sector organisation than in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's (1994). The hierarchy also 
changes its structure more markedly in this firm than in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom's 
(1994), with the management grades becoming proportionately more important over the 
period studied. Finally, in contrast to Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994), in this firm 
evidence of pay compressions within grades is only true for the staff grades. In the 
management grades workers in the higher quartiles tend to receive bigger pay increases 
than those in the lower quartiles. 
Chapter 3 investigates some of the causes and consequences of promotion within our 
large U. K financial sector firm. In particular, it examines whether the promotion fast- 
track effects outlined above survive after controlling for other factors, such as human 
capital effects. Due to a lack of suitable data empirical research in this area is still 
relatively scarce. In particular, only a handful of studies have addressed the determinants 
of promotion for the U. K. Despite this, a number of stylised facts emerge when looking 
at comparisons in human resource practices between countries, especially between Japan 
and the U. S. For example, a common view when looking at the internal workings of a 
firm is that U. S and Japanese organisations differ in their policies towards promotion. 
U. S organisations tend to engage in promotion fast-tracking in which those promoted 
quickly at one grade/level tend to get promoted more often and more quickly from the 
next grade/level. Japanese companies, on the other hand, tend to adopt a late selection 
approach to promotion. 
The analysis reported in this chapter uses a discrete-time proportional hazard based 
on the model proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) to study the time to promotion. 
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Among other things, these results show that time in the previous grade has a negative 
and significant effect on the hazard of promotion. In other words, the shorter the time 
spent by workers in their previous grade the more likely they are to be promoted from 
their current grade. Such a finding persists even after controlling for unobserved effects 
and provides further support for the existence of promotion fast-tracking within the firm. 
This chapter makes a number of important contributions to the debate on the eco- 
nomics of promotion. First, it provides preliminary evidence that U. K organisations 
adopt similar fast-track promotion patterns to their US counterparts. Second, a number 
of theoretical models can be used to explain promotion fast-tracking e. g., human capital 
models, biased contests (Meyer(1991)), and the optimal setting of promotion criteria in 
the face of differing outside opportunities (Lazear (1995)). However, the results reported 
in this paper, using duration models of time to promotion, produce similar findings to 
Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello (1997) and show that promotion fast-tracking survives even 
after controlling for human capital effects. 
Chapter 3 also investigates some of the causes and consequences of promotion within 
our large U. K financial sector firm. The results show that individuals who have a long 
tenure with the firm, are older, have a low performance rating and are in an upper 
management grade have a lower hazard of promotion than all other workers. These 
findings also add to the limited empirical evidence on gender differences and promotion, 
and show that in line with the conventional view on promotion females are less likely to 
be promoted than their male counterparts. 
The issue of absenteeism within this large financial sector firm is addressed in Chapter 
4. Despite the large costs that are associated with absenteeism until recently very little 
attention has been paid by economists into the causes and consequences of absence. 
This chapter thus seeks to add to the growing empirical literature on absenteeism by 
investigating some of the determinants of absence within our large financial sector firm. 
The analysis reported here uses a random effects logistic to estimate the incidence of 
absence for a random sample of 3,737 workers who were continuously employed by the firm 
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in 1992. In particular, these results highlight the importance past absence has on current 
absence behaviour. They show that in all specifications the largest and most significant 
coefficient is absence lagged 1 period. The positive sign on this coefficient indicates that, 
not surprisingly, individuals who were away from work the previous day have a higher 
probability of absence than all other workers. Despite these findings very few other studies 
appear to have addressed the effect past absence has on current choices. The results 
reported in this chapter also highlight the importance of controlling for heterogeneity 
and show-that as aresult of 'spurious' state dependence the effect past absence has on 
current choices is largely over-estimated in a model which neglects unobserved effects. 
In addition, in line with the findings of many other studies on absence (see, for 
example, Bridges and Mumford (2001)) comparing the results by both gender and family 
situation some important differences emerge between individuals in the variables that 
affect their absence behaviour. In particular, the findings show that marital status is 
positive and significant for females, but insignificant for males. Such a finding indicates 
that married women are more likely to be absent from work than single women and could 
reflect the dual role females usually experience in both the home and work. Married 
women may, for example, be more likely to be absent from work than single women in 
order to engage in non-market activities (e. g., child care). 
Finally, Chapter 5 uses data from the personnel and payroll records of our large 
U. K financial sector firm to investigate some of the causes and consequences of labour 
turnover. For those workers who left the firm between January 1989 and February 1994 
the personnel files record the individual's main reason for leaving. In this study these 
codes are split into three distinct categories: quits (q), layoffs (1) and 'other reasons' 
(o). As in Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) 'other reasons' includes end of 
temporary contract, ill health, retirement and pregnancy. 
Again, due to a lack of suitable data empirical research that looks at the determinants 
of worker separation behaviour for the U. K is still relatively scarce. This is in contrast to 
the U. S that appears to have a long history of looking at worker separation behaviour. 
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The pattern of labour turnover in the U. K has, however, been investigated extensively 
in a number of studies. Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999), for example, find 
that on average individuals in Britain hold 5 jobs during their working life. In contrast, 
evidence for the U. S suggest that the number of jobs held is approximately double the 
number held by workers in the U. K. Hall (1982), for example, using data from the Current 
Population Survey finds that the average individual in the U. S holds approximately 10 
jobs during their lifetime. 
This chapter analyses the turnover behaviour of new entrants i. e., those individuals 
who entered the firm between January 1989 and March 1997. Two modes of analysis are 
used to examine the separation behaviour of new entrants. In line with Lazear (1999) 
the incidence of separation is estimated using a logistic model, and a proportional hazard 
model is used to estimate the hazard of separation. Then, following Booth, Francesconi 
and Garcia-Serrano (1999) a proportional hazard with competing risks of exit due to 
quits (q), layoffs (1) and 'other reasons' (o) is used to estimate the hazard of separation 
for those individuals who left the firm between January 1989 and February 1994 (the 
period over which exit code data is available). 
The results show that in most specifications workers who are in a staff grade, have 
a professional qualification, and a higher performance rating have a significantly lower 
likelihood of separation than all other individuals. The findings also highlight impor- 
tant differences between men and women in the variables that affect their likelihood of 
separation. In particular, they show that for females being married has a positive and 
significant effect on the likelihood of separation, but has a negative and significant effect 
on male separation behaviour. This finding could again highlight the differing roles men 
and women tend to play in the home. Married women may, for example, be more likely 
to leave the firm than single women in order to engage in non-market opportunities (e. g., 
child care). In contrast, married men have traditionally been regarded as the main wage 
earners within a household, which may make them less willing than single men to leave 
a relatively stable working environment. 
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The competing risks Cox proportional hazard model provides further support for 
the findings outlined above. In particular, it shows that for females marital status has 
a positive and significant effect on the hazard of leaving for 'other reasons' (including 
pregnancy), but is insignificant for males. In contrast, the results show that being married 
has a negative and significant effect on the hazard of quitting for men, but is insignificant 
for women. 
An obvious limitation of the work produced in this thesis is that it assumes that 
promotion and turnover are independent. This is obviously not always going to be 
the case. One way to extend the work produced in the thesis would be to estimate a 
competing risk model of duration in the grade, where individuals can leave the grade 
either due to promotion or because they exit the firm. 
In summary, this thesis provides an indepth analysis of the internal workings of a 
large U. K financial sector firm. In doing so it makes a significant contribution to a field 
of research where the empirical evidence is still relatively scarce. In addition, by adding 
to the studies that use firm-level data of this kind it helps to address the extent to which 
previous findings can be thought of as representative of organisations generally, and in 
doing so helps to increase our understanding of how firms are organised. 
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